Christian Thomasius's natural jurisprudence is essential to understanding the origins of the Enlightenment in Germany, where his importance was comparable to that of John Locke's in England. First published in 1688, Thomasius's Institutionum jurisprudentiae divinae (Institutes of Divine Jurisprudence) attempted to draw a clear distinction between natural and revealed law and to emphasize that human reason was able to know the precepts of natural law without the aid of Scripture. Thomasius also argued that his orthodox Lutheran opponents had failed to understand this distinction and thereby had confused reason and Scripture. In addition to the Institutes of Divine Jurisprudence, this volume contains significant selections from his Fundamenta juris naturae et gentium (Foundations of the Law of Nature and Nations), published in 1705. In Foundations Thomasius significantly revised the theory he had put forward in the Institutes, and much of the Foundations therefore is a paragraph-by-paragraph commentary on his earlier ideas. These works are a companion to Thomasius's Essays on Church, State, and Politics, and together they provide the first-ever English presentation of this preeminent German thinker.

To attempt to study Scripture without studying its law is to deny it. To attempt to understand Western civilization apart from the impact of Biblical law within it and upon it is to seek a fictitious history and to reject twenty centuries and their progress. The Institutes of Biblical Law has as its purpose a reversal of the present trend. it is called "Institutes" in the older meaning of the that word, i.e., fundamental principles, here of law, because it is intended as a beginning, as an instituting consideration of that law which must govern society, and which shall govern society under God. To understand Biblical law, it is necessary to understand also certain basic characteristics of that law. In it, certain broad premises or principles are declared. These are declarations of basic law. The Ten Commandments give us such declarations. A second characteristics of Biblical law, is that the major portion of the law is case law, i.e., the illustration of the basic principle in terms of specific cases. These specific cases are often illustrations of the extent of the application of the law; that is, by citing a minimal type of case, the necessary jurisdictions of the law are revealed. The law, then, asserts principles and cites cases to develop the implications of those principles, with is purpose and direction the restitution of God's order.

Scholars praised the 1992 edition of this book as a groundbreaking intellectual treatment of Islamic jurisprudence. Bernard Weiss's revised edition brings to life Sayf al-Din al-Amidi's classic exposition of the methodologies through which Muslim scholars have constructed their understandings of the divine law. Weiss's new introduction provides an overview of Amidi's jurisprudence that facilitates deeper comprehension of the challenging dialect of the text. This edition includes an in-depth analysis of the nature of language and the ways in which it madeiates the law, while shaping it at the same time. An index has been added.

Over his long and illustrious career, Knud Haakonssen has explored the role of natural law in formulating doctrines of obligation and rights in accordance with the interests of early modern polities and churches. The essays collected in this volume range across this exciting and contested field. These 13 new essays acknowledge Haakonssen's immense academic achievement and give us new insights into the cultural and political role of law and rights in a variety of historical contexts and circumstances.

This book argues that classical natural law jurisprudence provides a superior answer to the questions “What is law?” and “How should law be made?” rather than those provided by legal positivism and “new” natural law theories. What is law? How should law be made? Using St. Thomas Aquinas’s analogy of God as an architect, Brian McCall argues that classical natural law jurisprudence provides an answer to these questions far superior to those provided by legal positivism or the “new” natural law theories. The Architecture of Law explores the metaphor of law as an architectural building project, with eternal law as the foundation, natural law as the frame, divine law as the guidance provided by the architect, and human law as the provider of the defining details and ornamentation. Classical jurisprudence is presented as a synthesis of the work of the greatest minds of antiquity and the medieval period, including Cicero, Aristotle, Gratian, Augustine, and Aquinas; the significant texts of each receive detailed exposition in these pages. Along with McCall’s development of the architectural image, he raises a question that becomes a running theme throughout the book: To what extent does one need to know God to accept and understand natural law jurisprudence, given its foundational premise that all authority comes from God? The separation of the study of law from knowledge of theology and morality, McCall argues, only results in the impoverishment of our understanding of law. He concludes that they must be reunited in order for jurisprudence to flourish. This book will appeal to academics, students in law, philosophy, and theology, and to all those interested in legal or political philosophy.

This book examines the relation between religion and jurisprudence, God, and peace respectively. It argues that in order to elucidate the possible role religion can play in the contemporary world, it is useful to analyse religion by associating it with other concepts. Why peace? Because peace is probably the greatest promise made by religions and the greatest concern in the contemporary world. Why jurisprudence? Because, quoting Kelsen’s famous book "Peace through Law", peace is usually understood as something achievable by international legal instruments. But what if we replace "Peace through Law" with "Peace through Religion"? Does law, as an instrument for achieving peace, incorporate a religious dimension? Is law, ultimately, a religious and normative construction oriented to peace, to the protection of humanity, in order to keep humans from the violence of nature? Is the hope for peace rational, or just a question of faith? Is religion itself a question of faith or a rational choice? Is the relatively recent legal concept of “responsibility to protect” a secular expression of the oldest duty of humankind? The book follows the structure of interdisciplinary research in which the international legal scholar, the moral philosopher, the philosopher of religion, the theologian, and the political scientist contribute to the construction of the necessary bridges. Moreover, it gives voice to different monotheistic traditions and, more importantly, it analyses religion in the various dimensions in which it determines the authors' cultures: as a set of rituals, as a source of moral norms, as a universal project for peace, and as a political discourse.

The Institutes are a complete exposition of the elements of Roman law and are divided into four books—the first treating of persons and the differences of the status they may occupy in the eye of the law; the second-of things, and the modes in which rights over them may be acquired, including the law relating to wills; the third of intestate succession and of obligations; the fourth of actions and their forms. For many centuries they had been the familiar textbook of all students of Roman law.