In this report the Defence Committee says the information published so far by the Scottish Government on the defence and security implications of Scottish independence falls far short of requirements. The Committee also cannot currently judge the likely running costs of the proposed Scottish defence force, given the limited information it has so far received. The Committee is, however, unconvinced that the proposed budget of £2.5bn can support both the proposed Scottish defence force and the purchase of new equipment including fast jets and submarines. The report seeks answers to the following questions: how would a sovereign Scottish Government ensure the defence and security of an independent Scotland? For what purposes would Scottish armed forces be used? How would Scottish armed forces be structured and trained, and where would they be based? How much would it cost to equip, support and train an independent Scotland's armed forces and how much of this could be procured and delivered domestically? And how many jobs in the defence sector would be placed at risk? The Committee also raises detailed questions about the proposed Scottish defence force: the numbers and types of aircraft and naval vessels which would be needed and how they would be procured and maintained; the numbers of combat troops the Scottish Government envisages (including its plan to re-instate historic Scottish regiments); and the availability of training facilities to maintain the appropriate professional standards. In the event of independence, the defence industry in Scotland would face a difficult future.

In this report the Defence Committee argues that the capabilities of HM Forces should be determined not by budgetary constraints but by a fully-developed strategy which defines the position in the world that the UK wants to adopt. The report urges the government to produce a comprehensive national security strategy in the first place and let that document, along with the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), direct the next Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). The allocation of resources will be based on national spending priorities set to meet the nation's security needs. There is a danger of defence becoming a matter of discretionary spending. Decisions about the expeditionary capability that the UK retains must be based on proper strategic decision making about the UK's place in the world and not simply flow from the "horse-trading" that surrounds the CSR process. The report points to a lack of understanding amongst the public of why we have Armed Forces. General sympathy and support for the Armed Forces must not obscure a hard-headed understanding of what they are for. The process of producing the next Defence and Security Review is the opportunity to engage the public in understanding the future of the Armed Forces. The Committee has very real concerns about the focus that will be given to the number of asymmetric security threats to the UK, such as from terrorism or cyber attack. The Government must think more strategically about the resilience of the country's critical infrastructure and recovery following an attack.

The MoD's financial settlement in the next Comprehensive Spending Review must be made in the light of the need to retain a credible deterrent capacity in the country's Armed Forces. The Committee welcomes the emphasis that the Government places on the importance of cyber defence and the commitment of resources to a new cyber strike capability. But the difficulty in identifying actors in a cyber attack makes the ability to deter that much harder. Similar questions arise in deterrence against the asymmetrical threat of terrorism as it is difficult to identify interests and groups against which a response can be legitimately targeted. The Committee is calling on the MoD to set out how it can make clear that both cyber and terrorist attack will elicit an appropriate and determined response. Looking at the nuclear deterrent, the Committee points out that the UK's ability to effect a nuclear response is not credible in dealing with all threats, and so strong conventional deterrence is also required. And given the importance of communication to the concept of deterrence, investment in diplomatic and intelligence assets must be integral to the UK's security apparatus. The Committee concludes that it would be naive to assume that a decision not to invest in the nuclear deterrent would release substantial funds for investment in other forms of security. The Committee believes that the decision on the retention of the nuclear deterrent, should be made on its own merits.

UK military personnel as individuals are properly subject to UK and international law wherever they serve and there are processes to ensure scrutiny of their individual behaviour and legal compliance but, in the last ten years, legal judgments in the UK and elsewhere against the MoD have raised a number of legal, ethical and practical questions for the Armed Forces and their conduct of operations. The growing number of such challenges is leading to a feeling of disquiet amongst military personnel and informed commentators about the extent and scale of judicial involvement in military matters.There are two aspects of the use of human rights law in military operations that most concern the Committee: The extraterritorial application of the European Convention on Human Rights has allowed claims in the UK courts from foreign nationals. However, the requirement for full and detailed investigations of every death resulting from an armed conflict is putting a significant burden on the MoD and the Armed Forces. Secondly, there has been a failure of the accepted principle of combat immunity, most recently evidenced in the Supreme Court majority judgment in June 2013 allowing families and military personnel to bring negligence cases against the MoD for injury or death. This seems to us to risk the judicialisation of war and to be incompatible with the accepted contract entered into by Service personnel and the nature of soldiering.

On 18 September 2014, Scotland held a referendum on the question: Should Scotland be an independent country? This is a most unusual event in modern democracies and engaged the political class, civil society, and the general public to an unprecedented degree, leading to an 85 per cent turnout in the final vote. This was an occasion to debate not just the narrow constitutional issue but the future of the nation, including the economy, social welfare, defence and security, and Scotland's place in Europe and the world. Debating Scotland comes from a team of researchers who observed the debates from close-up and engaged with both sides, with the media and with the public in analyzing the issues, while remaining neutral on the independence question. The book examines the main issues at stake, how they were presented, and how they evolved over the course of the campaign. The editors and contributing authors explore the ways both independence and union were framed, the economic issues, the currency, welfare, defence and security, the European Union, and how the example of small independent states was used. The volume concludes with an analysis of voter responses, based upon original survey research, which demonstrates how perceptions of risk and uncertainty on the main issues played a key role in the outcome.

The Scottish Government's White Paper must make absolutely clear the details of both its foreign and defence policies. Much of what has been suggested up to now suffers from a conspiracy of optimism. The most explicit pledges made to date include: that the whole cost of security and defence will be no more than £2.5 billion, that personnel in the armed services will total 15,000 full time and 5,000 reserve personnel, and that the defence force will include "current Scottish raised and restored UK regiments". Will we then have a defence force which is army heavy? An army which is infantry heavy? Or will historic regiments be redesignated as platoons, reserves or non-infantry units? If Faslane is to be kept at its existing workforce, how will people be retrained? What costs will be inccurred in the transition to the new Scottish Defence Force? What are the implications for procurement whether or not Scotland gets the assets it wants? Hanging over all of this is the future of Trident. Will a separate Scotland impose unilateral nuclear disarmament on the UK? Furthermore, membership for Scotland of NATO will require not only the unanimous agreement of all the existing NATO members, but also the resolution of any disputes with the UK. The Scottish Government must spell out what wages and conditions it would propose to offer to compensate those who would leave behind participation in world class armed services. The people of Scotland are entitled to expect that those who propose drastic change can explain what the consequences would be.

The Defence Committee says the Government must describe the circumstances in which the UK would intervene militarily in the future. A strategic and well-articulated vision of the UK's position in the world and the level of influence it is able to exert would lead to more rational decisions on whether or not to intervene as well as a better public understanding of the rationale for any such future decision. It would also assist in identifying the strategic objective of such operations, contributing to a more coherent UK foreign, defence and security policy. The Committee supports the Government's adoption of an "adaptable posture" in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review. The threats to UK national security remain uncertain and unpredictable and it is important flexibility to deal with them is retained. The current main national security threat was from international terrorism, but the Committee calls on the Government to ensure that the next National Security Strategy gives due weight to the likelihood of a return to an increased threat of state versus state conflict. The Government needs to resolve the balance between Parliament's essential role as a strategic inquisitor on military deployments and the use of the Royal Prerogative in conflict decisions. The Government should commit to ensuring that a summary of the legal justification on military action is available to Parliament in advance of any debate. The Government should also set out how it intends to define and assess successful exit strategies and end states.

This report expresses the hope that the new President of Afghanistan will move swiftly to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement and Status of Forces Agreement in order to confirm the legal basis on which international forces will operate in Afghanistan post-2014. If a new ISAF Status of Forces Agreement is signed, in addition to the UK military training mission, other UK Government Departments will also be conducting activities in Afghanistan. The ability of these agencies to operate will be determined by what is likely to be an uneven security situation and there needs to be assurance that a cross government response to ensure a Comprehensive Approach to the work of all UK Government Departments and agencies in Afghanistan will be maintained. The potential for post election conflict in Afghanistan will be heavily influenced by the extent to which the unsuccessful candidates accept the results and the extent to which those who are successful are able to develop consent for Afghan security forces to secure the country to allow it to develop. Lasting peace in Afghanistan can only be achieved through a process of reconciliation with the Taliban. This particular Inquiry has examined the progress of withdrawal of UK forces and equipment, the expected assistance to the Afghan National Security Forces after 2014, the impact on Afghanistan of the new Government in Pakistan, and UK relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan after 2014

There is no doubt that international law was of major importance during the Gulf conflict of 1990-91. Military and other actions were repeatedly justified through reference to international law, and disputes about interpretation were frequent. This book provides a definitive legal analysis of the conflict, with reference both to international and to English law. Some have been tempted to argue that international law is an ineffective means of controlling the activities of a state and its armed forces from the fact that there were no war crimes trials of the leaders of Iraq, or of any other state. International law does, however, provide a set of norms either (a) agreed to by individual states through the ratification of, or accession to, a treaty, or (b) which apply to all states by the operation of customary international law and other secondary sources. This book determines these norms in order to judge the manner in which individual states recognized the binding nature of them in the conduct of their operations. The contributors include lawyers from each of the three British armed services.