In this report the Defence Committee argues that the capabilities of HM Forces should be determined not by budgetary constraints but by a fully-developed strategy which defines the position in the world that the UK wants to adopt. The report urges the government to produce a comprehensive national security strategy in the first place and let that document, along with the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), direct the next Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). The allocation of resources will be based on national spending priorities set to meet the nation's security needs. There is a danger of defence becoming a matter of discretionary spending. Decisions about the expeditionary capability that the UK retains must be based on proper strategic decision making about the UK's place in the world and not simply flow from the "horse-trading" that surrounds the CSR process. The report points to a lack of understanding amongst the public of why we have Armed Forces. General sympathy and support for the Armed Forces must not obscure a hard-headed understanding of what they are for. The process of producing the next Defence and Security Review is the opportunity to engage the public in understanding the future of the Armed Forces. The Committee has very real concerns about the focus that will be given to the number of asymmetric security threats to the UK, such as from terrorism or cyber attack. The Government must think more strategically about the resilience of the country's critical infrastructure and recovery following an attack.

UK military personnel as individuals are properly subject to UK and international law wherever they serve and there are processes to ensure scrutiny of their individual behaviour and legal compliance but, in the last ten years, legal judgments in the UK and elsewhere against the MoD have raised a number of legal, ethical and practical questions for the Armed Forces and their conduct of operations. The growing number of such challenges is leading to a feeling of disquiet amongst military personnel and informed commentators about the extent and scale of judicial involvement in military matters.There are two aspects of the use of human rights law in military operations that most concern the Committee: The extraterritorial application of the European Convention on Human Rights has allowed claims in the UK courts from foreign nationals. However, the requirement for full and detailed investigations of every death resulting from an armed conflict is putting a significant burden on the MoD and the Armed Forces. Secondly, there has been a failure of the accepted principle of combat immunity, most recently evidenced in the Supreme Court majority judgment in June 2013 allowing families and military personnel to bring negligence cases against the MoD for injury or death. This seems to us to risk the judicialisation of war and to be incompatible with the accepted contract entered into by Service personnel and the nature of soldiering.

The Defence Committee says the Government must describe the circumstances in which the UK would intervene militarily in the future. A strategic and well-articulated vision of the UK's position in the world and the level of influence it is able to exert would lead to more rational decisions on whether or not to intervene as well as a better public understanding of the rationale for any such future decision. It would also assist in identifying the strategic objective of such operations, contributing to a more coherent UK foreign, defence and security policy. The Committee supports the Government's adoption of an "adaptable posture" in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review. The threats to UK national security remain uncertain and unpredictable and it is important flexibility to deal with them is retained. The current main national security threat was from international terrorism, but the Committee calls on the Government to ensure that the next National Security Strategy gives due weight to the likelihood of a return to an increased threat of state versus state conflict. The Government needs to resolve the balance between Parliament's essential role as a strategic inquisitor on military deployments and the use of the Royal Prerogative in conflict decisions. The Government should commit to ensuring that a summary of the legal justification on military action is available to Parliament in advance of any debate. The Government should also set out how it intends to define and assess successful exit strategies and end states.

The MoD's financial settlement in the next Comprehensive Spending Review must be made in the light of the need to retain a credible deterrent capacity in the country's Armed Forces. The Committee welcomes the emphasis that the Government places on the importance of cyber defence and the commitment of resources to a new cyber strike capability. But the difficulty in identifying actors in a cyber attack makes the ability to deter that much harder. Similar questions arise in deterrence against the asymmetrical threat of terrorism as it is difficult to identify interests and groups against which a response can be legitimately targeted. The Committee is calling on the MoD to set out how it can make clear that both cyber and terrorist attack will elicit an appropriate and determined response. Looking at the nuclear deterrent, the Committee points out that the UK's ability to effect a nuclear response is not credible in dealing with all threats, and so strong conventional deterrence is also required. And given the importance of communication to the concept of deterrence, investment in diplomatic and intelligence assets must be integral to the UK's security apparatus. The Committee concludes that it would be naive to assume that a decision not to invest in the nuclear deterrent would release substantial funds for investment in other forms of security. The Committee believes that the decision on the retention of the nuclear deterrent, should be made on its own merits.

Employing several historical case studies between 1940-2003 and marshalling a host of primary sources, William D. James argues that British politicians and officials have thought in grand strategic terms under American hegemony - even if they do not realise or admit to this.

The Work Of The Joint Committee On The National Security Strategy In 2013-14 (HC 169, HL 1257) covers the work of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, which was established with a broad role; to consider the National Security Strategy. In practice, the Committee has considered not only the National Security Strategy (NSS) document 'A Strong Britain In An Age Of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy' published by the Government in 2010 (see below), but also the wider strategy that underlies government decision making on matters affecting national security. The report gives an account of activities over the past year, highlighting in particular the evidence session with the Prime Minister in January 2014; draws attention to areas of continuing concern; and outlines objectives for the remainder of the Parliament.

While strong Armed Forces remain the bedrock in safeguarding national interests new kinds of power projection are now required, both to make the use of force ('hard power') more effective and in some instances to replace it with the deployment of what has been labelled 'soft power'. Soft power involves getting what a country wants by influencing other countries to want the same thing, through attraction, persuasion and co-option. The information and digital revolution has transformed international relations and foreign policy, meaning that the UK must win over new and wider audiences to its point of view. The UK must change the way it interacts with other nations and communities, and is well-equipped to do so. Soft power methods of exercising international influence must now be combined with older approaches in order to secure and promote the UK's interests and purposes. To ensure that the exercise of soft power takes its place at the core of government policy-making, the Committee calls for the creation of a new strategic unit at the heart of Government. Its purpose would be to assist the Prime Minister in ensuring all Departments understand the importance of soft power and of upholding the UK's reputation, and in swiftly counteracting any potentially damaging policies or messages. While investing in soft power takes time to produce results, the Committee makes a number of recommendations including that BBC World Service's budget is not reduced any further in real terms and that the British Council is properly resourced to encourage the UK's creative industries

This report expresses the hope that the new President of Afghanistan will move swiftly to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement and Status of Forces Agreement in order to confirm the legal basis on which international forces will operate in Afghanistan post-2014. If a new ISAF Status of Forces Agreement is signed, in addition to the UK military training mission, other UK Government Departments will also be conducting activities in Afghanistan. The ability of these agencies to operate will be determined by what is likely to be an uneven security situation and there needs to be assurance that a cross government response to ensure a Comprehensive Approach to the work of all UK Government Departments and agencies in Afghanistan will be maintained. The potential for post election conflict in Afghanistan will be heavily influenced by the extent to which the unsuccessful candidates accept the results and the extent to which those who are successful are able to develop consent for Afghan security forces to secure the country to allow it to develop. Lasting peace in Afghanistan can only be achieved through a process of reconciliation with the Taliban. This particular Inquiry has examined the progress of withdrawal of UK forces and equipment, the expected assistance to the Afghan National Security Forces after 2014, the impact on Afghanistan of the new Government in Pakistan, and UK relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan after 2014

This reports finds that the Coalition Government has developed in public a more mature and measured relationship with the US, although there has been no fundamental change in the nature of the tie. The Committee declares the relationship to be in good health. In particular, the Committee said that it was not aware of any evidence that the House of Commons vote in August 2013 against potential military action in Syria had damaged the UK's relationship with the US. Rather, the Committee concluded that the episode illustrated general features of the UK-US relationship, namely that developments in the UK could influence US policy; and that the underlying tie was resilient. Today's publication follows up a report produced by the previous Foreign Affairs Committee at the end of the last Parliament, which recommended that the UK Government should adopt a more hard-headed and less deferential approach to the US. The Coalition Government seemed to have taken up this recommendation. The Committee criticises the UK Government's poor provision of information about the UK-US Joint Strategy Board, which was created during President Obama's State Visit to the UK in May 2011. Among strategic issues that it considered, the Committee agreed with the Government that the proposed EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) could have significant positive strategic impact for the UK and the transatlantic relationship.

This report notes mounting concern that UK Armed Forces may be falling below the minimum utility required to deliver the commitments that they are currently being tasked to carry out let alone the tasks they are likely to face between 2015 to 2020 when it is acknowledged that there will be capability gaps. The Committee is concerned that UK Armed Forces will be continually operating at the maximum level envisaged by the Defence Planning Assumptions. The Committee is not convinced that this aspiration can be achieved by co-operation with our allies given the challenges of aligning political with operational needs. The SDSR identified seven military tasks and the Defence Planning Assumptions that underpin them. However the Review fails to show how decisions such as those on the Aircraft Carriers and Nimrod MRA4 will lead to the Armed Forces being able to undertake those military tasks. The Committee has serious concerns over the realisation of what is called "Future Force 2020", the Government's intended shape of the Armed Forces from 2020, particularly as the provision of the necessary resources is only a Government aspiration, not Government policy. The MoD must reform, and ensure substantially improved transparency and control over, its finance and budgetary practices. When committing to undertake new operations the Government should state from the outset where that operation fits in the Defence Planning Assumptions and which of the military tasks it is meeting. The Committee is concerned that the Government seems to have postponed the sensible aspiration of bringing commitments and resources into line, in that it has taken on the new commitment of Libya while reducing the resources available to MoD.