Anti-cartel measures seek to prevent violations of competition law such as agreements among competitors to fix prices, restrict product supply or submit collusive tenders. This report examines the harm caused by cartels and the progress made to strengthen methods of investigation and sanctions systems to tackle this problem. It also outlines and identifies the challenges that lie ahead.

This paper distills and organizes facts about cartels from about 20 European Commission decisions over 2000-2004. It describes the properties of a collusive outcome in terms of the setting of price and a market allocation, monitoring of agreements with respect to price but more importantly sales, punishment methods for enforcing an agreement and also the use of buy-backs to compensate cartel members, methods for responding to external disruptions from non-cartel suppliers and handling over-zealous sales representatives, and operational procedures in terms of the frequency of meetings and the cartel's organizational structure.

One of the most contentious and high-profile aspects of EU competition law and policy has been the regulation of those serious competition or antitrust violations now often referred to as 'hard core cartels'. Such cartel activity typically involves large and powerful corporate producers and traders operating across Europe and beyond, and comprise practices such as price fixing, bid rigging, market sharing, and limiting production in order to ensure 'market stability' and maintain and increase profits. There is little disagreement now, in terms of competition theory and policy at both international and national levels, regarding the damaging effect of such trading practices on public and consumer interests, and such cartels have been subject to increasing condemnation in the legal process of regulating and protecting competition. Regulating Cartels in Europe provides critical evaluation of the way in which European-level regulation has evolved to deal with the activities of such anti-competitive business cartels. They trace the historical development of cartel regulation in Europe, comparing the more pragmatic and empirical approached favored in Europe with the more dogmatic and uncompromising American policy on cartels. In particular, the work considers critically the move towards the use of fully fledged criminal proceedings in this area of legal control, examining evolving aspects of enforcement policy such as the use of leniency programs and the deployment of a range of criminal law and other sanctions. This new edition of the work covers emerging themes and arguments in the discipline, including the judicial review of decisions against cartels, the criminological and legal basis of the criminalization of cartel conduct, and the range and effectiveness of sanctions used in response to cartel activity.

This book reviews progress in the fight against hard core cartels. It quantifies the harm caused by cartels and identifies improved methods of investigation. It also examines progress in strengthening sanctions against businesses and individuals.

This book contributes to the existing knowledge about the extent of cartels' overcharges and other harm to businesses and consumers worldwide, and sheds light on new and effective "leniency programmes", as well as on optimal sanctions in cartel cases.

An effective prosecution of cartels is a top priority for European Competition Authorities and a very relevant outcome for the good functioning of our economy. Despite relevant advances in the last decades, there is still need to improve the effectiveness of cartel prosecution in Europe. This book assesses the current system, identifies recent trends, best practices and future challenges. Looking not only at enforcement by the European Commission and the European Court of Justice, but also at enforcement in some relevant Member State jurisdictions, this collective book reviews key issues for public and private enforcement in cartel cases, such as, among others, the importance of institutional design of the Competition authority for cartel prosecution, the design and implementation of leniency programs, the type, level and calculation of fines, or the use of evidence and settlements. It also deals with key aspects of judicial review of administrative decisions. Furthermore it examines the experiences of criminalization of cartels in Europe and new developments regarding claims for damages by cartels victims. With the participation of experts of the European Commission and National Competition Authorities, the European Court of Justice and national courts, scholars and lawyers, it follows an international conference coorganised by the Centre for Competition Policy of CEU San Pablo University and the Spanish Competition Authority in Madrid, co-funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness and the European Commission through the Jean Monnet action.

A study of the normative justification for criminalising cartel activity which goes beyond historical accounts of the topic.

State crackdowns on drug cartels often backfire, producing entrenched 'cartel-state conflict'; deterrence approaches have curbed violence but proven fragile. This book explains why.

One of the most surprising developments in Mexico's transition to democracy is the outbreak of criminal wars and large-scale criminal violence. Why did Mexican drug cartels go to war as the country transitioned away from one-party rule? And why have criminal wars proliferated as democracy has consolidated and elections have become more competitive subnationally? In Votes, Drugs, and Violence, Guillermo Trejo and Sandra Ley develop a political theory of criminal violence in weak democracies that elucidates how democratic politics and the fragmentation of power fundamentally shape cartels' incentives for war and peace. Drawing on in-depth case studies and statistical analysis spanning more than two decades and multiple levels of government, Trejo and Ley show that electoral competition and partisan conflict were key drivers of the outbreak of Mexico's crime wars, the intensification of violence, and the expansion of war and violence to the spheres of local politics and civil society.

This book is inspired by the international movement towards the criminalisation of cartel conduct over the last decade. Led by US enforcers, criminalisation has been supported by a growing number of regulators and governments. It derives its support from the simple yet forceful proposition that criminal sanctions, particularly jail time, are the most effective deterrent to such activity. However, criminalisation is much more complex than that basic proposition suggests. There is complexity both in terms of the various forces that are driving and shaping the movement (economic, political and social) and in the effects on the various actors involved in it (government, enforcement agencies, the business community, judiciary, legal profession and general public). Featuring contributions from authors who have been at the forefront of the debate around the world, this substantial 19-chapter volume captures the richness of the criminalisation phenomenon and considers its implications for building an effective criminal cartel regime, particularly outside of the US. It adopts a range of approaches, including general theoretical perspectives (from criminal theory, economics, political science, regulation and criminology) and case-studies of the experience with the design and enforcement of existing or contemplated criminal cartel regimes in various jurisdictions (including in Australia, Canada, EU, Germany, Ireland and the UK). The book also explores the international dimensions of criminalisation - its specific practical consequences (such as increased potential for extradition) as well as its more general implications for trends of harmonisation or convergence in competition law and enforcement.