One of the most contentious and high-profile aspects of EU competition law and policy has been the regulation of those serious competition or antitrust violations now often referred to as 'hard core cartels'. Such cartel activity typically involves large and powerful corporate producers and traders operating across Europe and beyond, and comprise practices such as price fixing, bid rigging, market sharing, and limiting production in order to ensure 'market stability' and maintain and increase profits. There is little disagreement now, in terms of competition theory and policy at both international and national levels, regarding the damaging effect of such trading practices on public and consumer interests, and such cartels have been subject to increasing condemnation in the legal process of regulating and protecting competition. Regulating Cartels in Europe provides critical evaluation of the way in which European-level regulation has evolved to deal with the activities of such anti-competitive business cartels. They trace the historical development of cartel regulation in Europe, comparing the more pragmatic and empirical approached favored in Europe with the more dogmatic and uncompromising American policy on cartels. In particular, the work considers critically the move towards the use of fully fledged criminal proceedings in this area of legal control, examining evolving aspects of enforcement policy such as the use of leniency programs and the deployment of a range of criminal law and other sanctions. This new edition of the work covers emerging themes and arguments in the discipline, including the judicial review of decisions against cartels, the criminological and legal basis of the criminalization of cartel conduct, and the range and effectiveness of sanctions used in response to cartel activity.

One of the most contentious and high-profile aspects of European Community competition law and policy has been the regulation of what may be described as serious antitrust violations, typically involving large and powerful corporate producers and traders operating across Europe, if not also in awider international context. Such 'hard core' cartels characteristically engage in practices such as price fixing, bid rigging, market sharing and limiting production in order to ensure 'market stability' and maintain and increase profits. There is little doubt now in terms of competition theory andpolicy at both international and national levels about the damaging effect of such trading practices on public and consumer interests, and such cartels have been increasingly strongly condemned in the legal process of regulating and protecting competition. Indeed, a number of legal systems are nowfollowing the American lead in criminalizing such activity. This may therefore be seen as the 'hard end' of the enforcement of competition policy, requiring more confrontational and aggressive methods of regulation, yet also presenting considerable challenges to effective enforcement on account ofthe economic power, sophistication and determination of the typical participants in such cartels.The focus of this study is a critical evaluation of the way in which European-level regulation has evolved to deal with the problem of anti-competitive cartels. It traces the historical development of cartel regulation in Europe, comparing the pragmatic and empirical approach traditional in Europewith the more dogmatic and uncompromising American policy on cartels and asks whether a fully-fledged criminal proceeding (with its attendant level of legal safeguards) is the most appropriate approach to legal regulation .

Essay from the year 2019 in the subject Law - Civil / Private / Trade / Anti Trust Law / Business Law, grade: 82.00, University College Cork, course: LLB, language: English, abstract: This paper is concerned with optimising the enforcement of European Union Competition Law against cartels participants. A critique of Directive 2014/104 and its main shortcomings will begin this paper. Investigation then launched into role of national competition authorities in the Union, arguing that enhanced member state cooperation and full transposition of draft Directive 2019/1 (ECN+) will deter cartel activity. Final point concerns individual liability against the company agents behind cartels, how corporate fines imposed by European Commission fail to deter individuals against continued cartel participation.

Explains how and why economic and social regulation at national/EU levels is rapidly replacing older forms of state intervention and also, to some extent, the redistributive policies of the welfare state. Includes case-studies.

Lee McGowans authoritative book is a very welcome addition to the literature ondevelopments in European antitrust. It focuses primarily on EU supernational cartel policy, providing a fascinating, critical account of why policy developed as it has and of its effectiveness in detecting, punishing and deterring cartelists to the present. With its emphasis on institutional structures and decision makingprocesses and its use of examples, the book will be an invaluable reference for political scientists and should also attract a wide readership among economists and lawyers. - Eleanor J. Morgan, University of Bath, UK.

Drawing on fresh archival evidence, this book tells the story of how experts, cartels and international organizations have written the rules for Europe since around 1850. It shows that the present-day European Union was a latecomer in European integration, which is embedded in a long-term technocratic internationalist tradition.

In this monograph, Aistė Mickonytė examines the compliance of the European anti-cartel enforcement procedure with the presumption of innocence under Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The author maintains that the pursuit of manifestly severe punishment with insistence of the European Commission on administrative-level procedural safeguards is inconsistent with the robust standards of protection under the Convention. Arguing that EU anti-cartel procedure is criminal within the meaning of the Convention, this work considers this procedure in light of the core elements of the presumption of innocence such as the burden of proof and the principle of fault. The author zeroes in on the de facto automatic liability of parental companies for offences committed by their subsidiaries.

Cartels, trusts and agreements to reduce competition between firms have existed for centuries, but became particularly prevalent toward the end of the 19th century. In the mid-20th century governments began to use so called ‘cartel registers’ to monitor and regulate their behaviour. This book provides cases studies from more than a dozen countries to examine the emergence, application and eventual decline of this form of regulation. Beginning with a comparison of the attitudes to regulation that led to monitoring, rather than prohibiting cartels, this book examines the international studies on cartels undertaken by the League of Nations before World War II. This is followed by a series of studies on the context of the registers, including the international context of the European Union, and the importance of lobby groups in shaping regulatory outcomes, using Finland as an example. Section two provides a broad international comparison of several countries’ registers, with individual studies on Norway, Australia, Japan, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands. After examining the impact of registration on business behaviour in the insurance industry, this book concludes with an overview of the lessons to be learnt from 20th century efforts to regulate competition. With a foreword by Harm Schroter, this book outlines the rise and fall of a system that allowed nations to tailor their approach to regulating competition to their individual circumstances whilst also responding to the pressures of globalisation that emerged after the Second World War. This book is suitable for those who are interested in and study economic history, international economics and business history.

Competition is an immanent element of the market and in most market economies there exist competition regulation schemes, with their refined set of means and objectives. European competition policy is often referred to as the 'éminence grise' of common policies. This book aims at discovering the German roots of this policy, focusing on cartel regulation. The book first analyses the concept and types of restrictive agreements and examines how cartels are formed (or dissolved). Then Post-World War One Germany is viewed from the perspective of how this period influenced economic thoughts of that time. Afterwards, the competition regulation ideas of Robert Liefmann, the most active Freiburg professor of the 1920s are introduced. A detailed insight into the Freiburg School's thoughts on the market, state, competition and its regulation is also provided and the respective American theoretical knowledge is evoked in parallel. The relevant article of the 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community is discussed in comparison to the development of German cartel regulation from the end of World War Two to the birth and application of the 1957 competition law of Germany.

The European Union (EU) leniency programme is a key weapon in the Commission’s fight against hard-core cartels. Much of the success of EU cartel enforcement depends on the continued effectiveness of the leniency policy and is especially critical in response to the growth of private enforcement. This book offers a comprehensive description of the development of the policy, along with a normative framework that promises to ensure the full legitimacy of the leniency programme: the Commission’s policy should pursue not only effectiveness but also fairness. It is the first work to extensively analyse the effectiveness and fairness in the EU leniency policy. Proceeding systematically from clarifying the concepts of ‘effectiveness’ and ‘fairness’ to addressing the tension between leniency and private actions for damages, the author discusses the nature of, and interrelations among, such aspects as the following: – the theoretical model of the EU fining policy; – the compatibility of the EU enforcement system with fundamental rights protection; – the gathering and evaluation of evidence at the preliminary investigation stage; – the severity and foreseeability of the EU cartel fines; – judicial review by the EU Courts in competition matters; – to what extent the current policy is effective and fair; and – reforms brought about by the 2002 and 2006 Leniency Notices and the leniency-related amendments by the 2014 Antitrust Damages Directive. A key feature is the author’s presentation of a normative framework to test the effectiveness (deterrence) and substantive fairness (retribution) of the EU leniency policy. As a clear demonstration of how to forestall the danger of focusing on effectiveness of leniency at the expense of fairness, both in a substantive and in a procedural sense, this book is a major contribution to the literature of competition law. It will prove to be of great value to competition authorities, antitrust practitioners and interested academics not only in Europe but also throughout the world.