This “excellent biography” of one of the US Army’s unsung heroes “provides a much-needed re-examination of the early post-Vietnam Army" (Bowling Green Daily News). By the 1970s, the United States Army was demoralized by the outcome of the Vietnam War and shifting attitudes at home. The institution as a whole needed to be reorganized and reinvigorated—and General William E. DePuy was the man for the job. In 1973, DePuy was appointed commander of the newly established Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). By integrating training, doctrine, combat developments, and management in the US Army, he cultivated a military force prepared to fight and win in modern war. General William E. DuPuy is the first full-length biography of this key figure in American military history. With extensive interviews with those who knew DePuy, as well as access to his personal papers, Henry G. Gole chronicles and analyzes his unique contributions to the Army and nation. Gole guides the reader from DePuy's boyhood and college days in South Dakota through the major events and achievements of his life. During World War II, DePuy served in the 357th Infantry Regiment in Europe from the Normandy invasion until 1945, when he was stationed in Czechoslovakia. DePuy was asked by George Patton to serve as his aide; he supervised clandestine operations in China; he was instrumental in establishing Special Forces in Vietnam; and he briefed President Lyndon B. Johnson in the White House. But his finest contribution was fixing a broken Army.

William E. DePuy was likely the most important figure in the recovery of the United States Army from its collapse after the defeat in Vietnam. That is a rather large claim, and it suggests a precedence over a number of other distinguished officers, both his contemporaries and successors. But it is a claim that can be justified by the test of the “null hypothesis:” Could the Army that conducted the Gulf War be imagined without the actions of General DePuy and those he instructed and inspired? Clearly, it could not. There are a few officers of the period about whom one can make the same claim. To judge properly the accomplishments of General DePuy and his talented subordinates at the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), one must understand the sense of crises and defeat that pervaded the Army in the 1970s. By 1973, the United States had lost the war in Vietnam. Only the most optimistic or naïve observer held out hope that the Geneva Accords would provide security for the Republic of South Vietnam. The US Army was in a shambles, with discipline destroyed and the chain of command almost nonexistent. The “All Volunteer Army” was borne on a wave of permissiveness that compounded the problems of restoring discipline. Moreover, the army was ten years behind its most likely enemy in equipment development, and it had no warfighting doctrine worthy of the same. With the able assistance of the commander of the Armor Center, General Donn Starry, General DePuy wrenched the Army from self-pity and recrimination about its defeat in Vietnam into a bruising doctrinal debate that focused the Army's intellectual energies on mechanized warfare against a first-class opponent. Critics might argue correctly that that the result was incomplete, but they out not to underestimate how far the Army had to come just to begin the discussion. General DePuy also changed the way Army battalions prepared for war. He made the US Army a doctrinal force for the first time in history. Ably seconded by General Paul Gorman, DePuy led the Army into the age of the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP). The intellectual and training initiatives were joined then, with a third concern of General DePuy's TRADOC: the development of a set of equipment requirements, with a concentration of effort on a limited number, ultimately called the “Big Five.” The result was the suite of weapons that overmatched the Iraqis in Operation Desert Storm – Apache attack helicopters, M1 tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, Patriot air defense missiles, and Black Hawk assault helicopters. General DePuy championed the recruitment of a high-quality soldiery, an effort beyond his own significant responsibilities but, even so, one he never ceased to support and forward.

Beskriver udviklingen af den amerikanske hærs doktriner efter Vietnam-krigen.

General George Joulwan played a role in many pivotal world events during his long and exceptional career. Present at both the rise and fall of the Berlin Wall, he served multiple tours in Germany during the Cold War and two tours in Vietnam. By chance, he was recruited as Nixon's White House deputy chief of staff and witnessed the last acts of the Watergate drama first-hand. He went on to lead US Southern Command—fighting insurgencies and the drug war in Latin America—and was Supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces in Europe (SACEUR) during the Rwandan genocide and the Bosnian peacekeeping missions of the 1990s. Joulwan chronicles his career in the upper echelons of the armed forces. He shares his experiences working with major military and political figures, including generals William E. DePuy, Alexander Haig, John Vessey, and Colin Powell, US ambassador Richard Holbrooke, and presidents Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton. Beyond the battlefield, Joulwan became an advocate for military and civilian relations during the Vietnam War, deescalating several high-intensity situations while studying at Loyola University as part of the US Army's Option C program. Watchman at the Gates merges memory and lessons in leadership as Joulwan pays tribute to his teachers and colleagues and explains the significance of their influence on his personal approach to command. As a leader of combat troops in Vietnam, he appealed to his subordinates on an individual basis, taking time to build relationships that proved vital to the effectiveness of his commands. He also reveals how similar relationships of mutual understanding were crucial in his peaceful and productive dealings with both allies and enemies. At its heart, this inspiring memoir is a soldier's story—written by a warrior who saw defending his country and the democratic values it stands for as his highest calling. Featuring a foreword by Tom Brokaw, Watchman at the Gates offers incredible insights into world events as well as valuable lessons for a new generation of leaders.

Did Nazi war criminals deceive the United States military during the Cold War? A new book by a Canberra-based historian tells the story of how America’s most famous and influential military theorist was seduced by the lies of Hitler’s defeated generals. From the author of Panzer Commander Hermann Balck and False Flags comes The Blind Strategist: John Boyd and the American Art of War. Colonel John Boyd, a maverick fighter pilot, revolutionized the American art of war through his ideas on conflict and the human mind. Boyd claimed that victory is won by the side which transitions through 'decision cycles' faster than the enemy and his ideas gained influential converts in the Pentagon who were seeking a new way of waging war after defeat in Vietnam. Although Boyd’s theories became the basis of American military doctrine, he relied upon the fraudulent testimony of former Nazi generals who fabricated historical evidence to disassociate their reputations from their defeat and cover up their willing participation in war crimes. Boyd certainly changed the American art of war, but did he corrupt it in the process? The Blind Strategist separates fact from fantasy and exposes the myths of maneuver warfare through a detailed evidence-based investigation. Discover how maneuver warfare has resulted in catastrophic decisions in this must-read for anybody interested in American military history.

“A terrific book, lively and brisk . . . a must read for anyone who tries to understand the Vietnam War.” —Thomas E. Ricks Is it possible that the riddle of America’s military failure in Vietnam has a one-word, one-man answer? Until we understand Gen. William Westmoreland, we will never know what went wrong in the Vietnam War. An Eagle Scout at fifteen, First Captain of his West Point class, Westmoreland fought in two wars and became Superintendent at West Point. Then he was chosen to lead the war effort in Vietnam for four crucial years. He proved a disaster. Unable to think creatively about unconventional warfare, Westmoreland chose an unavailing strategy, stuck to it in the face of all opposition, and stood accused of fudging the results when it mattered most. In this definitive portrait, prize-winning military historian Lewis Sorley makes a plausible case that the war could have been won were it not for General Westmoreland. An authoritative study offering tragic lessons crucial for the future of American leadership, Westmoreland is essential reading. “Eye-opening and sometimes maddening, Sorley’s Westmoreland is not to be missed.” —John Prados, author of Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945–1975

From the American Revolution to the global war on terror, U.S. Army doctrine has evolved to regulate the chaos of armed conflict by providing an intellectual basis for organizing, training, equipping, and operating the military. Walter E. Kretchik analyzes the service's keystone doctrine over three centuries to reveal that the army's leadership is more forward thinking and adaptive than has been generally believed. The first comprehensive history of Army doctrine, Kretchik's book fully explores the principles that have shaped the Army's approach to warfare. From Regulations For the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States in 1779 to modern-day field manuals, it reflects the fashioning of doctrine to incorporate the lessons of past wars and minimize the uncertainty and dangers of battle. Kretchik traces Army doctrine through four distinct eras: 1779-1904, when guidelines were compiled by single authors or a board of officers in tactical drill manuals; 1905-1944, when the Root Reforms fixed doctrinal responsibility with the General Staff; 1944-1962, the era of multiservice doctrine; and, beginning in 1962, coalition warfare with its emphasis on interagency cooperation. He reveals that doctrine has played a significant role in the Army's performance throughout its history-although not always to its advantage, as it has often failed to anticipate accurately the nature of the "next war" and still continues to be locked in a debate between advocates of conventional warfare and those who emphasize counterinsurgency approaches. Each chapter presents individuals who helped define and articulate Army doctrine during each period of its history-including George Washington and Baron von Steuben in the eighteenth century, Emory Upton and Arthur Wagner in the nineteenth, and Elihu Root and William DePuy in the twentieth. Each identifies the "first principles" set down in manuals covering such topics as tactics, operations, and strategy; size, organization, and distribution of forces; and the promise and challenges of technological innovation. Each also presents specific cases that analyze how effectively the Army actually applied a particular era's doctrine. Doctrine remains the basis of instruction in the Army school system, ensuring that all officers and enlisted soldiers share a common intellectual framework. This book elucidates that framework for the first time.

This is the second volume in a series of chronological histories prepared by the Marine Corps History and Museums Division to cover the entire span of Marine Corps involvement in the Vietnam War. This volume details the Marine activities during 1965, the year the war escalated and major American combat units were committed to the conflict. The narrative traces the landing of the nearly 5,000-man 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and its transformation into the ΙII Marine Amphibious Force, which by the end of the year contained over 38,000 Marines. During this period, the Marines established three enclaves in South Vietnam’s northernmost corps area, I Corps, and their mission expanded from defense of the Da Nang Airbase to a balanced strategy involving base defense, offensive operations, and pacification. This volume continues to treat the activities of Marine advisors to the South Vietnamese armed forces but in less detail than its predecessor volume, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1964; The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era.

In Danger 79er, historian James H. Willbanks tells the remarkable story of Lt. Gen. James F. Hollingsworth, a three-time recipient of the Distinguished Service Cross along with four Silver Stars, six Purple Hearts, and a host of additional medals and commendations. His career spanned wars both cold and hot, and throughout, "Holly" was a hard-charging, hands-on soldier who could be irreverent and brash but always "led from the front." Hollingsworth entered the US Army as a second lieutenant upon graduation from the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas (now Texas A&M University). In World War II, while leading tanks in Gen. George S. Patton's Third Army, Hollingsworth encountered dug-in German defenders. He lined up his thirty-four tanks and issued a command rarely heard in modern warfare: Charge! Patton later recognized Hollingsworth as one of the two best armored battalion commanders in the war. Twenty years later, Hollingsworth served in Vietnam, where he became identified by the radio call-sign of "Danger 79er," a designation that remained for the duration of his career. He later served in South Korea commanding I Corps (ROK/US) Group, the largest combined field army in the world. Even after retirement from active duty, Hollingsworth continued to serve as a military adviser during the Cold War. Danger 79er provides a compelling and inspiring read as it recounts the exciting story of one of the most decorated soldiers in the history of the US Army.