GAO-06-847 Military Transformation: Additional Actions Needed by U.S. Strategic Command to Strengthen Implementation of Its Many Missions and New Organization

In Feb. 2007, the President directed the DoD to establish the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) to help strengthen U.S. security cooperation with African nations and bring peace and stability to the continent. This review assessed DoD's: (1) efforts to establish the command and communicate its mission; (2) progress in integrating personnel from other U.S. gov¿t. agencies into AFRICOM; and (3) plans and costs for establishing a permanent HQ and supporting offices in Africa. The auditor analyzed relevant documentation and obtained perspectives from the combatant commands, military services, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of State, USAID, and non-governmental organizations. Includes recommendations. Illus.

In 2004, the Dept. of State (State) Inspector General (IG) concluded that State's three-bureau structure for conducting arms control and nonproliferation policy did not adequately address post-9/11 challenges, including possible terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. The IG also noted that State had yet to formalize the responsibilities of the three bureaus in its Foreign Affairs Manual, which sets out agency organization and functions. Between late 2005 and early 2006, State created a new two-bureau structure to better address these issues and improve efficiency This report assesses the extent to which State addressed: (1) the objectives of its 2005-2006 reorganization; and (2) key transformation practices. Includes recommend. Illus.

The Army's modular force restructuring is a multiyear $52.5 billion initiative to redesign operational Army units. The Army also plans to spend $70 billion through fiscal year 2013 to expand the force by 74,200 military personnel. Congress mandated that GAO report annually through fiscal year 2012 on the Army's modular force. For this report, GAO assessed to what extent the Army has accomplished the following: (1) implemented and established management controls for its modular force and force expansion initiatives, and (2) assessed its modular unit designs. GAO assessed Army plans and funding requests; visited brigades that were reorganizing; and examined key Army planning documents, performance metrics, and testing plans. Both brigade combat teams and support brigades were visited, including units from the active component Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve. GAO recommends the following: (1) the Army develop a comprehensive strategy and funding plan to improve accountability for staffing and equipping the modular force; (2) the Army develop a plan for assessing the modular force designs; and (3) DoD should review the Army's strategy, funding plan, and assessment plan. DoD concurred with GAO's recommendations; however, DoD's actions for assessing unit designs did not fully meet the intent of GAO's recommendations. GAO added a matter for congressional consideration to require the Army to more fully assess modular force designs in full spectrum warfare.

The DoD has spent over $115 billion since the mid-1980s to develop a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) comprised of land, air, and sea-based elements -- such as missiles and radars -- working together as an integrated system. Since the cost to operate and support a weapon system accounts for most of a system¿s lifetime costs, the resources needed to fund BMDS could be significant as DoD fields an increasing number of BMDS elements. In 2005, DoD began planning to transition responsibility for supporting BMDS elements from the Missile Defense Agency to the services. This report assesses the extent to which DoD has: planned to support BMDS elements over the long-term; and identified long-term operation and support costs.

In 2002, the DoD established the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to develop and deploy globally integrated ballistic missile defenses to protect the U.S. homeland, deployed forces, friends, and allies. To deliver an operational capability as quickly as possible, the agency was not subject to traditional DoD requirements and oversight processes. While directed to work closely with the combatant commands, the agency was not required to build missile defenses to meet specific operational requirements. This report assesses the extent to which DoD has developed a process that identifies, prioritizes, and addresses overall combatant command priorities as the MDA develops ballistic missile defense capabilities. Includes recommend. Illus.

Pentagon spending has been the target of decades of criticism and reform efforts. Billions of dollars are spent on weapons programs that are later abandoned. State-of-the-art data centers are underutilized and overstaffed. New business systems are built at great expense but fail to meet the needs of their users. Every Secretary of Defense for the last five Administrations has made it a priority to address perceived bloat and inefficiency by making management reform a major priority. The congressional defense committees have been just as active, enacting hundreds of legislative provisions. Yet few of these initiatives produce significant results, and the Pentagon appears to go on, as wasteful as ever. In this book, Peter Levine addresses why, despite a long history of attempted reform, the Pentagon continues to struggle to reduce waste and inefficiency. The heart of Defense Management Reform is three case studies covering civilian personnel, acquisitions, and financial management. Narrated with the insight of an insider, the result is a clear understanding of what went wrong in the past and a set of concrete guidelines to plot a better future.

The outsourcing of military and security services is the object of intense legal debate. States employ private military and security companies (PMSCs) to perform functions previously exercised by regular armed forces, and increasingly international organisations, NGOs and business corporations do the same to provide security, particularly in crisis situations. Much of the public attention on PMSCs has been in response to incidents in which PMSC employees have been accused of violating international humanitarian law. Therefore initiatives have been launched to introduce uniform international standards amidst what is currently very uneven national regulation. This book analyses and discusses the interplay between international, European, and domestic regulatory measures in the field of PMSCs. It presents a comprehensive assessment of the existing domestic legislation in EU Member States and relevant Third States, and identifies implications for future international regulation. The book also addresses the crucial questions whether and how the EU can potentially play a more active future role in the regulation of PMSCs to ensure compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law.