The Army's modular force restructuring is a multiyear $52.5 billion initiative to redesign operational Army units. The Army also plans to spend $70 billion through fiscal year 2013 to expand the force by 74,200 military personnel. Congress mandated that GAO report annually through fiscal year 2012 on the Army's modular force. For this report, GAO assessed to what extent the Army has accomplished the following: (1) implemented and established management controls for its modular force and force expansion initiatives, and (2) assessed its modular unit designs. GAO assessed Army plans and funding requests; visited brigades that were reorganizing; and examined key Army planning documents, performance metrics, and testing plans. Both brigade combat teams and support brigades were visited, including units from the active component Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve. GAO recommends the following: (1) the Army develop a comprehensive strategy and funding plan to improve accountability for staffing and equipping the modular force; (2) the Army develop a plan for assessing the modular force designs; and (3) DoD should review the Army's strategy, funding plan, and assessment plan. DoD concurred with GAO's recommendations; however, DoD's actions for assessing unit designs did not fully meet the intent of GAO's recommendations. GAO added a matter for congressional consideration to require the Army to more fully assess modular force designs in full spectrum warfare.

The Army's modular force restructuring is a multiyear $52.5 billion initiative to redesign operational Army units. The Army also plans to spend $70 billion through fiscal year 2013 to expand the force by 74,200 military personnel. Congress mandated that GAO report annually through fiscal year 2012 on the Army's modular force. For this report, GAO assessed to what extent the Army has accomplished the following: (1) implemented and established management controls for its modular force and force expansion initiatives, and (2) assessed its modular unit designs. GAO assessed Army plans and funding requests; visited brigades that were reorganizing; and examined key Army planning documents, performance metrics, and testing plans. Both brigade combat teams and support brigades were visited, including units from the active component Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve. GAO recommends the following: (1) the Army develop a comprehensive strategy and funding plan to improve accountability for staffing and equipping the modular force; (2) the Army develop a plan for assessing the modular force designs; and (3) DoD should review the Army's strategy, funding plan, and assessment plan. DoD concurred with GAO's recommendations; however, DoD's actions for assessing unit designs did not fully meet the intent of GAO's recommendations. GAO added a matter for congressional consideration to require the Army to more fully assess modular force designs in full spectrum warfare.

Force Structure: Better Management Controls Are Needed to Oversee the Army's Modular Force and Expansion Initiatives and Improve Accountability for Results

This report offers an alternative measure of the budget that incorporates adjustments for the effects of the business cycle. It is one of a series of periodic reports that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) submits to the Committees on the Budget reports about fiscal policy and provide baseline projections of the federal budget. This report is based on information presented in A Preliminary Analysis of the President¿s Budget and an Update of a Budget and Economic Outlook, released in March 2009. Tables and figures.

A CBO study. Assesses the competitiveness of nuclear power compared to other sources of new capacity to generate electricity.

The high pace of overseas operations is taking a heavy toll on Army equip. Harsh combat and environmental conditions over sustained periods of time have exacerbated equip. repair, replacement, and recapitalization problems. To support ongoing operations and prepare for the future, the Army has embarked on 4 initiatives: (1) restructuring from a div.-based force to a modular brigade-based force; (2) expanding the Army by adding 74,000 people; (3) repairing, replacing, and recapitalizing new equip.; and (4) replacing equip. borrowed from its pre-positioned equip. sets. This statement addresses: the equip. related cost of Army initiatives, and the mgmt. challenges facing the Army and the actions needed to improve its implementation of these initiatives.

Since September 11, 2001, Congress has provided about $808 billion to the DoD for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in addition to funding in DoD's base budget. Prior reports have found DoD's reported GWOT cost data unreliable and found problems with transparency over certain costs. In response, DoD has made several changes to its cost-reporting procedures. Congress has shown interest in increasing the transparency of DoD's cost reporting and funding requests for GWOT. This report assessed: (1) DoD's progress in improving the accuracy and reliability of its GWOT cost reporting; and (2) DoD's methodology for reporting GWOT costs by contingency operation. Includes recommendations. Charts and tables.