This book brings together papers of well-known specialists in game theory and adjacent problems. It presents the basic results in dynamic games, stochastic games, applications of game theoretical methods in ecology and economics and methodological aspects of game theory.

This volume brings together papers of well-known specialists in game theory and adjacent problems. It presents the basic results in dynamic games, stochastic games, applications of game theorectical methods in ecology and economics and the methodological aspects of game theory.

This is the second of three volumes surveying the state of the art in Game Theory and its applications to many and varied fields, in particular to economics. The chapters in the present volume are contributed by outstanding authorities, and provide comprehensive coverage and precise statements of the main results in each area. The applications include empirical evidence. The following topics are covered: communication and correlated equilibria, coalitional games and coalition structures, utility and subjective probability, common knowledge, bargaining, zero-sum games, differential games, and applications of game theory to signalling, moral hazard, search, evolutionary biology, international relations, voting procedures, social choice, public economics, politics, and cost allocation. This handbook will be of interest to scholars in economics, political science, psychology, mathematics and biology. For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes

Professor Zagare provides methods for analysing the structure of the game; considers zero and nonzero-sum games and the fundamental 'minimax theorem'; and investigates games with more than two players, including the possibility of coalitions between players.

This book brings together papers of well-known specialists in game theory and adjacent problems. It presents the basic results in dynamic games, stochastic games, applications of game theoretical methods in ecology and economics and methodological aspects of game theory.

This book brings together papers of well-known specialists in game theory and adjacent problems. It presents the basic results in dynamic games, stochastic games, applications of game theoretical methods in ecology and economics and methodological aspects of game theory.

An easily accessible introduction to over three centuries of innovations in geometry Praise for the First Edition “. . . a welcome alternative to compartmentalized treatments bound to the old thinking. This clearly written, well-illustrated book supplies sufficient background to be self-contained.” —CHOICE This fully revised new edition offers the most comprehensive coverage of modern geometry currently available at an introductory level. The book strikes a welcome balance between academic rigor and accessibility, providing a complete and cohesive picture of the science with an unparalleled range of topics. Illustrating modern mathematical topics, Introduction to Topology and Geometry, Second Edition discusses introductory topology, algebraic topology, knot theory, the geometry of surfaces, Riemann geometries, fundamental groups, and differential geometry, which opens the doors to a wealth of applications. With its logical, yet flexible, organization, the Second Edition: • Explores historical notes interspersed throughout the exposition to provide readers with a feel for how the mathematical disciplines and theorems came into being • Provides exercises ranging from routine to challenging, allowing readers at varying levels of study to master the concepts and methods • Bridges seemingly disparate topics by creating thoughtful and logical connections • Contains coverage on the elements of polytope theory, which acquaints readers with an exposition of modern theory Introduction to Topology and Geometry, Second Edition is an excellent introductory text for topology and geometry courses at the upper-undergraduate level. In addition, the book serves as an ideal reference for professionals interested in gaining a deeper understanding of the topic.

This book offers a gentle introduction to the mathematics of both sides of game theory: combinatorial and classical. The combination allows for a dynamic and rich tour of the subject united by a common theme of strategic reasoning. Designed as a textbook for an undergraduate mathematics class and with ample material and limited dependencies between the chapters, the book is adaptable to a variety of situations and a range of audiences. Instructors, students, and independent readers alike will appreciate the flexibility in content choices as well as the generous sets of exercises at various levels.

Chapters in Game Theory has been written on the occasion of the 65th birthday of Stef Tijs, who can be regarded as the godfather of game theory in the Netherlands. The contributors all are indebted to Stef Tijs, as former Ph.D. students or otherwise. The book contains fourteen chapters on a wide range of subjects. Some of these can be considered surveys while other chapters present new results: most contributions can be positioned somewhere in between these categories. The topics covered include: cooperative stochastic games; noncooperative stochastic games; sequencing games; games arising form linear (semi-) infinite programming problems; network formation, costs and potential games; potentials and consistency in transferable utility games; the nucleolus and equilibrium prices; population uncertainty and equilibrium selection; cost sharing; centrality in social networks; extreme points of the core; equilibrium sets of bimatrix games; game theory and the market; and transfer procedures for nontransferable utility games. Both editors did their Ph.D with Stef Tijs, while he was affiliated with the mathematics department of the University of Nijmegen.

Comprises lectures given at Tel Aviv University and Oxford University in 1990.