Comprises lectures given at Tel Aviv University and Oxford University in 1990.

It is impossible to understand modern economics without knowledge of the basic tools of gametheory and mechanism design. This book provides a graduate-level introduction to the economic modeling of strategic behavior. The goal is to teach Economics doctoral students the tools of game theory and mechanism design that all economists should know.

The advent of noncooperative game theory over the past two decades has brought about a mild revolution in economics. This book presents an accessible, non-technical discussion of the basic concepts from noncooperative theory, and explores the strengths, weaknesses, and future of the theory as a tool for economists.

Introduces the game-theoretic approach of modelling economic behaviour and interaction, focusing on concepts and ideas from the field of game-theoretic models which find commonly used applications in economics. This book provides the reader with skills necessary to formalize economic games and to make them accessible for game theoretic analysis.

"This book explores the evolution, through the first half of the 20th century, of the key neoclassical concept of rationality. The analysis begins with the development of modern decision theory, covers the interwar debates over the role of perfect foresight and analyzes the first game-theoretic solution concepts of von Neumann and Nash. The author's proposition is that the notion of rationality suffered a profound transformation that reduced it to a formal property of consistency. Such a transformation paralleled that of neoclassical economics as a whole from a discipline dealing with real economic processes to one investigating issues of logical consistency between mathematical relationships."

Cooperative game theory is a booming research area with many new developments in the last few years. So, our main purpose when prep- ing the second edition was to incorporate as much of these new dev- opments as possible without changing the structure of the book. First, this o?ered us the opportunity to enhance and expand the treatment of traditional cooperative games, called here crisp games, and, especially, that of multi-choice games, in the idea to make the three parts of the monograph more balanced. Second, we have used the opportunity of a secondeditiontoupdateandenlargethelistofreferencesregardingthe threemodels of cooperative games. Finally, we have bene?ted fromthis opportunity by removing typos and a few less important results from the ?rst edition of the book, and by slightly polishing the English style and the punctuation, for the sake of consistency along the monograph. The main changes are: (1) Chapter 3 contains an additional section, Section 3. 3, on the - erage lexicographic value, which is a recent one-point solution concept de?ned on the class of balanced crisp games. (2) Chapter 4 is new. It o?ers a brief overview on solution c- cepts for crisp games from the point of view of egalitarian criteria, and presents in Section 4. 2 a recent set-valued solution concept based on egalitarian considerations, namely the equal split-o? set. (3)Chapter5isbasicallyanenlargedversionofChapter4ofthe?rst edition because Section 5. 4 dealing with the relation between convex games and clan games with crisp coalitions is new.

Andreu Mas-Colell revolutionized our understanding of competitive markets, price formation, and the behavior of market participants. This volume presents the papers that solidified his standing as one of the preeminent economic theorists of our time. It also is invaluable for anyone wishing to study the craft of a master of economic modeling.

Classics in Game Theory assembles in one sourcebook the basic contributions to the field that followed on the publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (Princeton, 1944). The theory of games, first given a rigorous formulation by von Neumann in a in 1928, is a subfield of mathematics and economics that models situations in which individuals compete and cooperate with each other. In the "heroic era" of research that began in the late 1940s, the foundations of the current theory were laid; it is these fundamental contributions that are collected in this volume. In the last fifteen years, game theory has become the dominant model in economic theory and has made significant contributions to political science, biology, and international security studies. The central role of game theory in economic theory was recognized by the award of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science in 1994 to the pioneering game theorists John C. Harsanyi, John Nash, and Reinhard Selten. The fundamental works for which they were honored are all included in this volume. Harold Kuhn, himself a major contributor to game theory for his reformulation of extensive games, has chosen eighteen essays that constitute the core of game theory as it exists today. Drawn from a variety of sources, they will be an invaluable tool for researchers in game theory and for a broad group of students of economics, political science, and biology.

An introduction to game theory that offers not only theoretical tools but also the intuition and behavioral insights to apply these tools to real-world situations. This introductory text on game theory provides students with both the theoretical tools to analyze situations through the logic of game theory and the intuition and behavioral insights to apply these tools to real-world situations. It is unique among game theory texts in offering a clear, formal introduction to standard game theory while incorporating evidence from experimental data and introducing recent behavioral models. Students will not only learn about incentives, how to represent situations as games, and what agents “should” do in these situations, but they will also be presented with evidence that either confirms the theoretical assumptions or suggests a way in which the theory might be updated. Features: Each chapter begins with a motivating example that can be run as an experiment and ends with a discussion of the behavior in the example. Parts I–IV cover the fundamental “nuts and bolts” of any introductory game theory course, including the theory of games, simple games with simultaneous decision making by players, sequential move games, and incomplete information in simultaneous and sequential move games. Parts V–VII apply the tools developed in previous sections to bargaining, cooperative game theory, market design, social dilemmas, and social choice and voting. Part VIII offers a more in-depth discussion of behavioral game theory models including evolutionary and psychological game theory. Supplemental material on the book’s website include solutions to end-of-chapter exercises, a manual for running each chapter’s experimental games using pencil and paper, and the oTree codes for running the games online.

Architects and engineers can build models to test their ideas - why not managers? In Game Theory in Management: Modelling Business Decisions and Their Consequences, author Michael Hatfield presents a series of mathematically structured analogies to real-life business and economic interaction scenarios, and then, using modern game theory, he shows how to test common managerial technical approaches for their effectiveness. His results are astonishing: if game theory is correct then many commonly-held and taught management approaches and techniques are not only less effective than thought, they are actually detrimental in many areas where they are held to be beneficial. Game Theory in Management also examines managerial implications from network theory, cartage schemes, risk management theory, management information system epistemology, and other areas where the quantification and testing of business decisions can be employed to identify winning and losing stratagems. While the topic may seem complex, Game Theory in Management is a readable and fast-paced book; readers will come away with an entirely new perspective on the objectives, tactics, even purpose of management, and ways of evaluating the selected strategies and decisions of those within the team, inside the macro organization, and among competitors. Easily-employed tests for the validity and efficacy of management information systems are also addressed, as are those environments where cartage schemes can be most effective, and where they are not. In the areas of asset, project, and strategic management, Game Theory in Management is certain to become a game-changer.