Among postwar political leaders, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt played one of the most significant roles in reconciling Germans with other Europeans and in creating the international framework that enabled peaceful reunification in 1990. Based on extensive archival research, this book provides a comprehensive analysis of Brandt’s Ostpolitik from its inception until the end of the Cold War through the lens of reconciliation. Here, Benedikt Schoenborn gives us a Brandt who passionately insisted on a gradual reduction of Cold War hostility and a lasting European peace, while remaining strategically and intellectually adaptable in a way that exemplified the ‘imaginativeness of history’.

This book provides new and exceptional interpretations in regard to the post-World War 2 history of the East-West conflict and calls for interdisciplinary approaches in analyzing international relations. The systematic and political processes are undoing the division of Europe and restoring an 'organically' interdependent continent. The events of 1989 in Eastern Europe are but a harbinger of a new security order in Europe and, for the first time since the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 Europe tries to look beyond state-centered concepts of security.

This book examines the key relationship between Willy Brandt (the former Mayor of West Berlin and future West German Chancellor) and the administration of President John F. Kennedy. Arne Hofmann focuses on the administration’s influence on the development of Brandt’s ‘policy of small steps’ and the formation of his later Ostpolitik, the centrepiece of European détente. Brandt’s interaction with the Kennedy administration is traced through the Berlin Wall crisis of 1961, together with Kennedy’s search for a modus vivendi based on the status quo, the 1962 crisis in German-American relations, Brandt’s disillusionment campaign, the development of his programmatic statements, Brandt’s three meetings with the President including Kennedy’s famous visit to Berlin, the limited nuclear test ban treaty and Brandt’s Berlin pass agreement of Christmas 1963. While the narrative focuses on the gradual change in Brandt’s position, systematic parts concentrate on Brandt’s and Kennedy’s détente concepts, the triangular relationship between West Berlin, Washington and Bonn with its implication for domestic politics, and the role of images, campaigning and public opinion. The Emergence of Détente in Europe will appeal to students of Cold War history, foreign policy, international relations and international history in general.

Containing essays by leading Cold War scholars, such as Wilfried Loth, Geir Lundestad and Seppo Hentilä, this volume offers a broad-ranging examination of the history of détente in the Cold War. The ten years from 1965 to 1975 marked a deep transformation of the bipolar international system of the Cold War. The Vietnam War and the Prague Spring showed the limits of the two superpowers, who were constrained to embark on a wide-ranging détente policy, which culminated with the SALT agreements of 1972. At the same time this very détente opened new venues for the European countries: French policy towards the USSR and the German Ostpolitik being the most evident cases in point. For the first time since the 1950s, Western Europe began to participate in the shaping of the Cold War. The same could not be said of Eastern Europe, but ferments began to establish themselves there which would ultimately lead to the astounding changes of 1989-90: the Prague Spring, the uprisings in Gdansk in 1970 and generally the rise of the dissident movement. That last process being directly linked to the far-reaching event which marked the end of that momentous decade: the Helsinki conference. The Making of Détente will appeal to students of the Cold War, international history and European contemporary history.

This edited volume uses newly released archival material to show linkages between the development of the European Union and the Cold War. Containing essays by well-known Cold War scholars such as Jussi Hanhimaki, Wilfried Loth and Piers Ludlow, the book looks at: France, where neither de Gaulle nor Pompidou felt committed to the status quo in East-West or West-West relations Germany, where Brandt’s Ostpolitik was acknowledged to be linked to the success of Bonn’s Westpolitik and Britain, where the move towards Community membership was tightly bound up with a variety of calculations about the organization of the West and its approach to the Cold War. Nixon and Kissinger’s policies are set out as the background of US policy against which each of the European players was compelled to operate, explaining how Washington saw European integration as part of the over-arching Cold War. European Integration and the Cold War will appeal to students of Cold War history, European politics, and international history.

This work examines the extent to which German foreign policy and European policy has changed since German unification. Despite significant changes on specific issues, most notably on the deployment of military force outside of the NATO area, there is greater continuity than change in post-unification German policy.

Questions how a unified Germany will use its great power status Draws on numerous confidential interviews with key political actors and on unprecedented access to still classified material

Zaborowski's study is a vivid and authoritative account of Polish-German relations, convincingly analysed using 'Europeanisation' as a conceptual prism. The book evaluates the relationship from both a historical and contemporary perspective, assessing its broader European significance. Zaborowski puts particular emphasis upon EU enlargement, which he sees as a centrepiece of the post-1989 rapprochement between the two states.