Among postwar political leaders, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt played one of the most significant roles in reconciling Germans with other Europeans and in creating the international framework that enabled peaceful reunification in 1990. Based on extensive archival research, this book provides a comprehensive analysis of Brandt’s Ostpolitik from its inception until the end of the Cold War through the lens of reconciliation. Here, Benedikt Schoenborn gives us a Brandt who passionately insisted on a gradual reduction of Cold War hostility and a lasting European peace, while remaining strategically and intellectually adaptable in a way that exemplified the ‘imaginativeness of history’.

Despite the consensus that economic diplomacy played a crucial role in ending the Cold War, very little research has been done on the economic diplomacy during the crucial decades of the 1970s and 1980s. This book fills the gap by exploring the complex interweaving of East–West political and economic diplomacies in the pursuit of détente. The focus on German chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik reveals how its success was rooted in the usage of energy trade and high tech exchanges with the Soviet Union. His policies and visions are contrasted with those of U.S. President Richard Nixon and the Realpolitik of Henry Kissinger. The ultimate failure to coordinate these rivaling détente policies, and the resulting divide on how to deal with the Soviet Union, left NATO with an energy dilemma between American and European partners—one that has resurfaced in the 21st century with Russia’s politicization of energy trade. This book is essential for anyone interested in exploring the interface of international diplomacy, economic interest, and alliance cohesion.

This edited volume uses newly released archival material to show linkages between the development of the European Union and the Cold War. Containing essays by well-known Cold War scholars such as Jussi Hanhimaki, Wilfried Loth and Piers Ludlow, the book looks at: France, where neither de Gaulle nor Pompidou felt committed to the status quo in East-West or West-West relations Germany, where Brandt’s Ostpolitik was acknowledged to be linked to the success of Bonn’s Westpolitik and Britain, where the move towards Community membership was tightly bound up with a variety of calculations about the organization of the West and its approach to the Cold War. Nixon and Kissinger’s policies are set out as the background of US policy against which each of the European players was compelled to operate, explaining how Washington saw European integration as part of the over-arching Cold War. European Integration and the Cold War will appeal to students of Cold War history, European politics, and international history.

The book examines the rapprochement between Greece and Eastern Europe during the Cold War. ''Ostpolitik'', which translates to ‘‘Opening to the East’’ is used to describe the policy of conducting affairs with the Soviet Bloc. Using primary sources from Greece, Eastern European States, Cyprus, NATO, the United States, Germany and United Kingdom, this book provides historical and foreign policy analysis of a tumultuous period in the Eastern Mediterranean. The book first illustrates Greece's position in the Cold War confrontation before moving to more detailed analysis of the Eastern Bloc's policies towards Greece and Cyprus with an emphasis in the harmonious relationship between the Greek military dictatorship and the Communist countries (1967-1974). It analyses the U-turn in Greek foreign and defence policy and the replacement of the Communist ''devil'' by a new one, an equally capitalist country and NATO-ally, Turkey. The book also covers Greece's efforts to elicit the Communist countries' support against a member of its own Western alliance, as well as the NATO response to this existential threat against its coherence. A comprehensive study of the East-West competition in South-Eastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean during the Cold War, this volume is ideal for researchers and students interested in the international relations of twentieth century Europe and the historical background of the still hot Greek-Turkish Conflict.

This book examines the Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik and its global impact in the years 1969-1974.

Using new archival sources--including previously secret documents of the East German secret police and Communist Party--M. E. Sarotte goes behind the scenes of Cold War Germany during the era of detente, as East and West tried negotiation instead of confrontation to settle their differences. In Dealing with the Devil, she explores the motives of the German Democratic Republic and its Soviet backers in responding to both the detente initiatives, or Ostpolitik, of West Germany and the foreign policy of the United States under President Nixon. Sarotte focuses on both public and secret contacts between the two halves of the German nation during Brandt's chancellorship, exposing the cynical artifices constructed by negotiators on both sides. Her analysis also details much of the superpower maneuvering in the era of detente, since German concerns were ever present in the minds of leaders in Washington and Moscow, and reveals the startling degree to which concern over China shaped European politics during this time. More generally, Dealing with the Devil presents an illuminating case study of how the relationship between center and periphery functioned in the Cold War Soviet empire.

This book examines the key relationship between Willy Brandt (the former Mayor of West Berlin and future West German Chancellor) and the administration of President John F. Kennedy. Arne Hofmann focuses on the administration’s influence on the development of Brandt’s ‘policy of small steps’ and the formation of his later Ostpolitik, the centrepiece of European détente. Brandt’s interaction with the Kennedy administration is traced through the Berlin Wall crisis of 1961, together with Kennedy’s search for a modus vivendi based on the status quo, the 1962 crisis in German-American relations, Brandt’s disillusionment campaign, the development of his programmatic statements, Brandt’s three meetings with the President including Kennedy’s famous visit to Berlin, the limited nuclear test ban treaty and Brandt’s Berlin pass agreement of Christmas 1963. While the narrative focuses on the gradual change in Brandt’s position, systematic parts concentrate on Brandt’s and Kennedy’s détente concepts, the triangular relationship between West Berlin, Washington and Bonn with its implication for domestic politics, and the role of images, campaigning and public opinion. The Emergence of Détente in Europe will appeal to students of Cold War history, foreign policy, international relations and international history in general.

Seminar paper from the year 2003 in the subject History Europe - Other Countries - Newer History, European Unification, grade: B, Vrije University Brussel (Vesalius College), language: English, abstract: The rising threat of a nuclear war The conflict between the two superpowers eventually emerging after the second World War, brought the world on the verge of a nuclear war during the Cuban Missile crisis 1962. During these five days between 22.-27. 10. 1962 the leaders of the two blocks realised the danger of aggressive policies and established a direct phone line between the headquarters in Washington DC and the Kremlin in Moscow. The position of Germany during the beginning of the Cold War Since the Cold War had its origins in the destruction of the German "Drittes Reich" (Engl. "Third Reich") Europe and especially Germany played a special role during the Cold War. Immediately after the occupation of the Allies the signs of the Potsdam conference signalised a separation of Germany. Eventually the creation of the German Federal Republic (BRD) in the Zones of France, Britain and the USA was responded by the Soviet military administration with a socialist German state, the German Democratic Republic (DDR). During the first years of the Cold War the gap between the two German states had widened up. The BRD became a member of NATO in 1955 while DDR was forced to join the Warsaw Pact in the same year. The separation of Germany was brought to a climax as Nikita Khrushchev, the leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union after Stalin, decided to set up a wall in Berlin on August 13th to separate the eastern part from the western part, in order to prevent East- German citizens from escaping into the West.