The accumulation of large foreign asset positions by many central banks through sustained foreign exchange (FX) intervention has raised questions about its associated fiscal costs. This paper clarifies conceptual issues regarding how to measure these costs both from an ex-post and an ex-ante (relevant for decision making) perspective, and estimates both marginal and total costs for 73 countries over the period 2002-13. We find ex-ante marginal costs for the median emerging market economy (EME) in the inter-quartile range of 2-5.5 percent per year; while ex-ante total costs (of sustaining FX positions) in the range of 0.2-0.7 percent of GDP per year for light interveners and 0.3-1.2 percent of GDP per year for heavy interveners. These estimates indicate that fiscal costs of sustained FX intervention (via expanding central bank balance sheets) are not negligible.

Using panel data for 15 economies from 2001-12, I identify determinants of central bank foreign exchange intervention in emerging markets (“EMs”) with flexible to moderately managed exchange rates. Similar to other studies, I find that central banks tend to “lean against the wind,” buying/selling more foreign exchange in response to greater short-run and medium-run appreciation/depreciation pressures. The panel structure provides a framework to test whether other macroeconomic variables influence the different rates of reserve accumulation between economies. In testing other variables, I find evidence of both precautionary and external competitiveness motives for reserve accumulation.

This paper analyzes the effects of intervention on the level and volatility of the exchange rate in Mexico and Turkey, two emerging countries that have floating exchange rate regimes. The paper finds mixed evidence on the effectiveness of intervention. In Mexico, foreign exchange sales have a small impact on the exchange rate level and raise short-term volatility, while in Turkey, intervention does not appear to affect the exchange rate level but reduces its shortterm volatility. In both cases, the findings are consistent with officially stated policy objectives, which aim to minimize the effect of intervention on the exchange rate, but cast doubt on claims that intervention is a useful tool for smoothing volatility. Although these findings cannot be generalized to other emerging markets, intervention's apparently limited effectiveness highlights the need for central banks to use their scarce foreign reserves selectively and parsimoniously.

Staff Discussion Notes showcase the latest policy-related analysis and research being developed by individual IMF staff and are published to elicit comment and to further debate. These papers are generally brief and written in nontechnical language, and so are aimed at a broad audience interested in economic policy issues. This Web-only series replaced Staff Position Notes in January 2011.

Based on evidence obtained from the IMF's 2001 Survey on Foreign Exchange Market Organization, the author argues that, for several reasons, some central banks in developing and transition economies may be able to conduct foreign exchange intervention more effectively than the central banks of developed countries issuing the major international currencies. First, these central banks do not always fully sterilize their foreign exchange interventions. In addition, they issue regulations and conduct their foreign exchange operations in a way that increases the central bank's information advantage and the size of their foreign exchange intervention relative to foreign exchange market turnover. Some of the central banks also use moral suasion to support their foreign exchange interventions.

The paper documents the use of foreign exchange intervention (FXI) across countries and monetary regimes, with special attention to its use under inflation targeting (IT). We find significant differences between advanced and emerging market economies, with the former group conducting FXI limitedly and broadly symmetrically, while the use of this policy instrument in emerging market countries is pervasive and mostly asymmetric (biased towards purchasing foreign currency, even after taking into account precautionary motives). Within emerging markets, the use of FXI is common both under IT and non-IT regimes. We find no evidence of FXI being used in response to inflation developments, while there is strong evidence that FXI responds to exchange rates, indicating that IT central banks in EMDEs have dual inflation/exchange rate objectives. We also find a higher propensity to overshoot inflation targets in emerging market economies where FXI is more pervasive.

In the wake of the Lehman crisis, intervention in the foreign exchange market has been a topic of increasing relevance in central banking, particularly for small and medium open economies like Argentina. This has implied a change in focus to deal with some problems arising from the combination of the international financial crisis and the monetary policies implemented by developed countries. Therefore, the policies implemented by EMEs to cope with the crisis have included direct central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market, either in the spot or in the forward market, the build-up of international reserves, the adoption of administered floating exchange rate regimes and the regulation of capital inflows and outflows. Argentina followed those policy guidelines well before the crisis erupted, allowing it to reduce nominal exchange rate volatility and maintaining monetary stability.Full publication: "http://ssrn.com/abstract=2420030" Market Volatility and Foreign Exchange Intervention in EMEs: What Has Changed?

This paper presents a rule for foreign exchange interventions (FXI), designed to preserve financial stability in floating exchange rate arrangements. The FXI rule addresses a market failure: the absence of hedging solution for tail exchange rate risk in the market (i.e. high volatility). Market impairment or overshoot of exchange rate between two equilibria could generate high volatility and threaten financial stability due to unhedged exposure to exchange rate risk in the economy. The rule uses the concept of Value at Risk (VaR) to define FXI triggers. While it provides to the market a hedge against tail risk, the rule allows the exchange rate to smoothly adjust to new equilibria. In addition, the rule is budget neutral over the medium term, encourages a prudent risk management in the market, and is more resilient to speculative attacks than other rules, such as fixed-volatility rules. The empirical methodology is backtested on Banco Mexico’s FXIs data between 2008 and 2016.

Foreign exchange intervention is frequently being used by central banks in countries which have a floating exchange rate. Most theoretical monetary policy models, however, do not take this phenomenon into account. This book contributes to close this gap between theory and practice by interpreting foreign exchange intervention as an additional monetary policy instrument for inflation targeting central banks. In-depth empirical analyses of the foreign exchange operations and interest rate policy of five inflation targeting countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom) demonstrate how foreign exchange intervention is used in practice.