This distinguished book offers fresh perspectives on British appeasement, grand strategy, and policymaking in a crucial and much-debated period of history. Innovative in both his interpretation and his method, Gaines Post, Jr., reexamines how British leaders planned foreign policy and imperial defense as they faced the increasing likelihood of war with the dictatorial regimes of Germany, Italy, and Japan. He clarifies the ways in which the dynamics of the machinery of government affected the choice of policies, delimited the management of crises, and restricted the pace of rearmament. Post provides a novel and intricate synthesis of what we know about British foreign policy in the 1930s: rearmament, deterrence, decisionmaking, and the question of timing. Analyzing the Ethiopian and Rhineland crises as case studies, he shows how they defeated British efforts to develop a comprehensive strategy of conventional and extended deterrence. London's unsuccessful attempts to deter Hitler and Mussolini, he demonstrates, were frustrated by confusion in the decisionmaking machinery of government, by conflicting notions of how to buy time, by unpredictable international crises, and by the plans of Neville Chamberlain for correlating airpower, economic stability at home, and conciliation overseas. Challenging the generally accepted interpretation of British grand strategy in the 1930s, Dilemmas of Appeasement will be important reading for historians, especially of modern Britain and Europe, political scientists, and defense studies specialists.

"A new history of the British appeasement of the Third Reich on the eve of World War II"--

On September 30, 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain flew back to London from his meeting in Munich with German Chancellor Adolf Hitler. As he disembarked from the aircraft, he held aloft a piece of paper, which contained the promise that Britain and Germany would never go to war with one another again. He had returned bringing “Peace with honour—Peace for our time.” Drawing on a wealth of archival material, acclaimed historian David Faber delivers a sweeping reassessment of the extraordinary events of 1938, tracing the key incidents leading up to the Munich Conference and its immediate aftermath: Lord Halifax’s ill-fated meeting with Hitler; Chamberlain’s secret discussions with Mussolini; and the Berlin scandal that rocked Hitler’s regime. He takes us to Vienna, to the Sudentenland, and to Prague. In Berlin, we witness Hitler inexorably preparing for war, even in the face of opposition from his own generals; in London, we watch as Chamberlain makes one supreme effort after another to appease Hitler. Resonating with an insider’s feel for the political infighting Faber uncovers, Munich, 1938 transports us to the war rooms and bunkers, revealing the covert negotiations and scandals upon which the world’s fate would rest. It is modern history writing at its best.

The Sunday Times Bestseller 'Astonishing' ANTONY BEEVOR 'One of the most promising young historians to enter our field for years' MAX HASTINGS On a wet afternoon in September 1938, Neville Chamberlain stepped off an aeroplane and announced that his visit to Hitler had averted the greatest crisis in recent memory. It was, he later assured the crowd in Downing Street, 'peace for our time'. Less than a year later, Germany invaded Poland and the Second World War began. This is a vital new history of the disastrous years of indecision, failed diplomacy and parliamentary infighting that enabled Nazi domination of Europe. Drawing on previously unseen sources, it sweeps from the advent of Hitler in 1933 to the beaches of Dunkirk, and presents an unforgettable portrait of the ministers, aristocrats and amateur diplomats whose actions and inaction had devastating consequences. 'Brilliant and sparkling . . . Reads like a thriller. I couldn't put it down' Peter Frankopan 'Vivid, detailed and utterly fascinating . . . This is political drama at its most compelling' James Holland 'Bouverie skilfully traces each shameful step to war . . . in moving and dramatic detail' Sunday Telegraph

British women were deeply invested in foreign policy between the wars. This study casts new light on the turn to international affairs in feminist politics, the gendered representation and experience of the Munich Crisis, and the profound impression made by female public opinion on PM Neville Chamberlain in his negotiations with the dictators.

The years from 1934 to 1937 were a time during which the British Empire was confronted with the emergence of the triple threat of Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and Fascist Italy. The goal of British policy was easily defined: the protection and promotion of Britain's vast interests. While Neville Chamberlain and Sir Robert Vansittart agreed on the goal, they disagreed on the means to achieve it. Their disagreement stemmed partly from their different understandings of the nature of the Third Reich; Vansittart understood better than Chamberlain the implications of Hitler's Weltanschauung. But their different strategies also reflected the fact that Chamberlain did not share Vansittart's belief in the necessity of pursuing alliance diplomacy to protect the world-wide security and interests of the British Empire. While the prime minister realized that Britain's problems were global in scope, he thought Britain could solve each problem on a bilateral basis. In other words, Britain should approach Germany, Japan, and Italy directly to settle outstanding disputes. Vansittart did not believe, however, that Britain's problems could be solved on a bilateral basis, for the interdependence of events in every region of the globe militated against bilateral solutions.

Appeasement's reputation as a bankrupt policy stems from the unpredictable catastrophes of the Russo-German Pact in 1939 and the Fall of France in 1940; in fact, it was an honourable, reasonable and sensible response to an appalling and unprecedented threat.

"The book details the course of that historiographical debate, beginning with the earliest accounts on appeasement from l938 through 1940.".

World War II was the quintessential “good war.” It was not, however, a conflict free of moral ambiguity, painful dilemmas, and unavoidable compromises. Was the bombing of civilian populations in Germany and Japan justified? Were the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials legally scrupulous? What is the legacy bequeathed to the world by Hiroshima? With wisdom and clarity, Michael Bess brings a fresh eye to these difficult questions and others, arguing eloquently against the binaries of honor and dishonor, pride and shame, and points instead toward a nuanced reckoning with one of the most pivotal conflicts in human history.

This book, first published in 1983, illustrates the domestic and internal dimension of appeasement and explores the political options open to the western powers in the run up to the Second World War. It looks at the factors pointing in the direction of a general settlement with the dictators: limitation of resources and strategic over-commitment by Britain; economic decline and financial exhaustion of France; lack of support from the United States and the Soviet Union.