This book, first published in 1983, illustrates the domestic and internal dimension of appeasement and explores the political options open to the western powers in the run up to the Second World War. It looks at the factors pointing in the direction of a general settlement with the dictators: limitation of resources and strategic over-commitment by Britain; economic decline and financial exhaustion of France; lack of support from the United States and the Soviet Union.

In this book historian R.J.Q. Adams examines the policy of appeasement as practiced by British Governments in the inter-war years - a programme widely praised in its day and frequently condemned as wrong-headed and even wicked ever since. In this thoroughly accessible work, he reveals the motivations and goals of the men who practiced appeasement as well as of those who opposed it, and makes clear the road to Munich - and to war.

"The Origins of the Second World War explores the reasons why the Second World War broke out in September 1939 and not sooner, and why a European war expanded into world war by 1941. Richard Overy argues that this was not just 'Hitler's War' but one that had its roots and origins in the decline of the old empires of Britain and France and the rise of ambitious new powers in Germany, Italy and Japan. Any explanation of the outbreak of hostilities must be multinational in scope taking into account the basic instability of the international system that had still not recovered from the shocks of the Great War. In this third edition: The role of Italy in the approach to war has been re-evaluated; Overy addresses recent revelations about Soviet policy in the 1930s, particularly exploring Soviet military planning and preparations; Arguments about Chamberlain and his policy of appeasement are rethought and reassessed. This new edition has now been completely overhauled, updated, expanded and reset. With a comprehensive documents section, colour plates, Guide to Who's Who, and a Chronology, The Origins of the Second World War will provide an invaluable introduction to any student of this fascinating period."--Page 4 of cover

The Sunday Times Bestseller 'Astonishing' ANTONY BEEVOR 'One of the most promising young historians to enter our field for years' MAX HASTINGS On a wet afternoon in September 1938, Neville Chamberlain stepped off an aeroplane and announced that his visit to Hitler had averted the greatest crisis in recent memory. It was, he later assured the crowd in Downing Street, 'peace for our time'. Less than a year later, Germany invaded Poland and the Second World War began. This is a vital new history of the disastrous years of indecision, failed diplomacy and parliamentary infighting that enabled Nazi domination of Europe. Drawing on previously unseen sources, it sweeps from the advent of Hitler in 1933 to the beaches of Dunkirk, and presents an unforgettable portrait of the ministers, aristocrats and amateur diplomats whose actions and inaction had devastating consequences. 'Brilliant and sparkling . . . Reads like a thriller. I couldn't put it down' Peter Frankopan 'Vivid, detailed and utterly fascinating . . . This is political drama at its most compelling' James Holland 'Bouverie skilfully traces each shameful step to war . . . in moving and dramatic detail' Sunday Telegraph

The period spanning the two World Wars was unquestionably the most catastrophic in Europe's history. Despite such undeniably progressive developments as the radical expansion of women's suffrage and rising health standards, the era was dominated by political violence and chronic instability. Its symbols were Verdun, Guernica, and Auschwitz. By the end of this dark period, tens of millions of Europeans had been killed and more still had been displaced and permanently traumatized. If the nineteenth century gave Europeans cause to regard the future with a sense of optimism, the early twentieth century had them anticipating the destruction of civilization. The fact that so many revolutions, regime changes, dictatorships, mass killings, and civil wars took place within such a compressed time frame suggests that Europe experienced a general crisis. The Oxford Handbook of European History, 1914-1945 reconsiders the most significant features of this calamitous age from a transnational perspective. It demonstrates the degree to which national experiences were intertwined with those of other nations, and how each crisis was implicated in wider regional, continental, and global developments. Readers will find innovative and stimulating chapters on various political, social, and economic subjects by some of the leading scholars working on modern European history today.

A fascinating study of expansionist visions of Hitler and Mussolini which enlightens our understanding of the dynamics and evolution of the fascist policies of Italy and Germany to the end of the Second World War.

The years from 1934 to 1937 were a time during which the British Empire was confronted with the emergence of the triple threat of Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and Fascist Italy. The goal of British policy was easily defined: the protection and promotion of Britain's vast interests. While Neville Chamberlain and Sir Robert Vansittart agreed on the goal, they disagreed on the means to achieve it. Their disagreement stemmed partly from their different understandings of the nature of the Third Reich; Vansittart understood better than Chamberlain the implications of Hitler's Weltanschauung. But their different strategies also reflected the fact that Chamberlain did not share Vansittart's belief in the necessity of pursuing alliance diplomacy to protect the world-wide security and interests of the British Empire. While the prime minister realized that Britain's problems were global in scope, he thought Britain could solve each problem on a bilateral basis. In other words, Britain should approach Germany, Japan, and Italy directly to settle outstanding disputes. Vansittart did not believe, however, that Britain's problems could be solved on a bilateral basis, for the interdependence of events in every region of the globe militated against bilateral solutions.

This volume contains six new articles by prominent scholars on appeasement during the 1930s. It is still an important issue with international leaders, who referred to the lessons learned at Munich as they plotted their strategies during the Gulf Crisis and War of 1990-91.

Since the 1930s, appeasement has been labeled as a futile and possibly dangerous policy. In this landmark study, Stephen Rock seeks to restore appeasement to its proper place as a legitimate—and potentially successful—diplomatic strategy. Appeasement was discredited by Neville Chamberlain's disastrous attempt to satisfy Adolf Hitler's territorial ambitions and avoid war in 1938. Rock argues, however, that there is very little evidence to support the belief that dissatisfied states and their leaders cannot be appeased or that appeasement undermines a state's credibility in later attempts at deterrence. Rock looks at five case studies from the past 100 years, revealing under what conditions appeasement can achieve its goals. From British appeasement of the United States near the beginning of the twentieth century to American conciliation of North Korea in the early 1990s, Rock concludes that appeasement succeeds or fails depending on the nature of the adversary, the nature of the inducements used on the antagonist, and the existence of other incentives for the adversary to acquiesce. Appeasement in International Politics suggests the type of appeasement strategy most appropriate for various situations. The options range from pure inducements, reciprocity, to a mixture of inducements and threats. In addition to this theoretical framework, Rock's explicit comparison of appeasement and deterrence offers important guidelines for policymakers on when and how to implement a strategy of appeasement. At a time when the strategy of engagement plays an increasingly central—and controversial—role in U.S. foreign policy, Appeasement in International Politics reestablishes the long-discredited use of inducements as an effective means of preventing conflict.

In 1941, the European war became a world war. This book tackles that process in its economic, political and ideological dimensions. Margaret Lamb and Nicholas Tarling explore the significance of the Asian factor and the importance of East Asia in the making of the war in Europe and the transformation of the European war of 1939 into the world war of 1941. This Asian factor has often been neglected, but the policies of all the major powers were affected by their world-wide interests. France had its possessions in North Africa and Asia; Nazi Germany chose to become involved in China and to make an agreement with Japan; Britain's action in Europe and the Mediterranean were conditioned by its commitments elsewhere in the world, and the United States and the Soviet Union were both involved in Europe and Asia. In particular the threat that Japan presented to the status quo in East Asia made it difficult for the war in Europe in turn affected the position in East Asia. The US built a two-ocean navy and encouraged the British to continue their struggle by keeping the resources of South East Asia available, and these steps led to a clash with the Japanese. Lamb and Tarling's global approach throws valuable new light on the origins of the Second World War.