The authors of this monograph argue that the lynch-pin in the power projection strategy of the United States is a completely transformed U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM). The monograph details how USACOM has been allowed to "evolve" since its inception in 1993 but is yet to achieve its full potential for implementing the CONUS-based power projection strategy. Recognizing USACOM as a principal actor in support of this new strategy, the authors recommend that USACOM should be further transformed into a "Joint Forces Command." Their analysis exposes the need for a significant review of Title 10 of the U.S. Code and a reexamination of some of the fundamental tenets underlying the structure and command of the U.S. armed forces. The reappraisals they propose will impact the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the Military Departments, and the unified combatant commands in important ways.

For more than 3 decades, the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Department of National Security and Strategy has faced the challenge of educating future strategic leaders on the subject of national security, or grand strategy. Fitting at the top of an officer's or government official's career-long professional development program, this challenge has been to design a course on strategy that incorporates its many facets in a short period of time, all within the 1-year, senior service college curriculum. To do this, a conceptual approach has provided the framework to think about strategy formulation. The purpose of this volume is to present the USAWC strategy formulation model to students and practitioners. This book serves as a guide to one method for the formulation, analysis, and study of strategy--an approach which we have found to be useful in providing generations of strategists with the conceptual tools to think systematically, strategically, critically, creatively, and big. Balancing what is described in the chapters as ends, ways, and means remains at the core of the Army War College's approach to national security and military strategy and strategy formulation.

One could argue strongly that since the end of the Second World War .power projection. has been an indispensable characteristic of the U.S. armed forces. Since the early 1990s, however, it has become a fundamental strategic concept in support of the President.s National Security Strategy of the United States. Over 80 percent of U.S. combat forces are now based in the continental United States (CONUS). Forces stationed overseas number only about 200,000, contrasted with over 500,000 during the Cold War. The strategic ambiguity of the post-Cold War era justifies concentrating U.S. forces in CONUS to enable them to respond more effectively to unforeseen crises erupting within a volatile international security environment. But, how are these CONUS-based forces trained, integrated, and packaged to enable them to support optimally the geographic CINCs. requirements? The authors of this monograph argue that the lynch-pin in the power projection strategy of the United States is a completely transformed U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM). The monograph details how USACOM has been allowed to .evolve. since its inception in 1993 but is yet to achieve its full potential for implementing the CONUS-based power projection strategy. Recognizing USACOM as a principal actor in support of this new strategy, the authors recommend that USACOM should be further transformed into a .Joint Forces Command.. Their analysis exposes the need for a significant review of Title 10 of the U.S. Code and a reexamination of some of the fundamental tenets underlying the structure and command of the U.S. armed forces. The reappraisals they propose will impact the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the Military Departments, and the unified combatant commands in important ways. To be sure, the very subject of power projection and the authors. recommendations address some of the most basic aspects of the roles and missions of the Services and raise issues very sensitive among the unified combatant commands. Nevertheless, their arguments are unconstrained but persuasive. Although they do not pose solutions in every case, they illuminate the most important and troubling issues.

Many thought that the 'German question', that had shaped European history so catastrophically in the last century, had been solved for good in 1990. And the last elections seemed to confirm that Germany was on the road to 'normalcy'. However, at the beginning of the new century, many see Germany as a problem case in Europe. This raises the question about the future of Germany and the performance of the incumbent government. The book addresses these issues by examining the policies and politics of the Red-Green government and by putting recent changes and developments in this country in a long-term perspective.

The authors argue that the lynch pin in the power projection strategy of the United States is a completely transformed U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM). The monograph details how USACOM has been allowed to evolve since its inception in 1993 but is yet to achieve its full potential for implementing the CONUS based power projection strategy. Recognizing USACOM as a principal actor in support of this new strategy, the authors recommend that USACOM should be further transformed into a Joint Forces Command. Their analysis exposes the need for a significant review of Title 10 of the U.S. Code and a reexamination of some of the fundamental tenets underlying the structure and command of the U.S. armed forces. The reappraisals they propose will impact the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the Military Departments, and the unified combatant commands in important ways.