In 'The End of Grand Strategy', Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski challenge this common view. They eschew prescription in favour of describing and explaining what America's military actually does. They argue that each presidental administration inevitably resorts to each of the six variant of grand strategy that they implement simultaneously as a result of a series of fundamental recent changes - what they term 'calibrated strategies.' Reich and Dombrowski support their controversial argument by examining six major maritime operations, stretching from America's shores to every region of the globe. Each of these operations reflects one major variant of strategy. They conclude that grand strategy, as we know it, is dead.

At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the United States is involved in two ongoing wars, faces a significant international terrorist threat, and is witnessing an escalation of international resistance to its leadership of the global world order. Looking out to 2025, many see the potential for a prolonged period of instability as a result of competing economic models, demographics, the rise of new international actors and the resurgence old ones, climate change, and the scarcity of resources. The range of stability challenges will stretch the capabilities of any military force structure and require innovative thinking on the part of policymakers and military professionals alike on the appropriate development and use of the military element of power. In this anthology, 16 students of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2008 offer their perspectives on the use of military power across the spectrum of conflict in the 21st century, short of or following general war, and provide insights into the necessary force structure, policy, strategy, and doctrinal approaches for future success. Beyond a focus on operations short of general war, these writings share in common a worthwhile idea or set of ideas that can materially contribute to how the U.S. military can best conduct full spectrum operations. Collectively, these essays reveal the innovative thinking and diversity and depth of thought of the U.S. and foreign military and civilian agency personnel that comprise each student body at the U.S. Army War College as they prepare themselves to become senior leaders and fulfill their roles in their militaries or agencies. This resource offers 16 students of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2008 perspectives and forecasts for the use of military power through year 2025. Scholars and policymakers, alike, may find these essays beneficial for long-term strategy planning. Related products: Navies and Soft Power: Historical Case Studies of Naval Power and the Nonuse of Military Force can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-046-00290-8 Lessons Encountered: Learning From the Long War can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00619-7 The Asia-Pacific Century: Challenges and Opportunities can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-070-00868-8 Other products produced by the U.S. Army, Strategic Studies Institute are available here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/agency/1609

The Department of Defense (DoD) launched in 1997/98 an ambitious planning initiative that could have a major impact upon how resources are allocated among the military departments and the combatant commanders-in-chief (CINCs). The National Command Authorities have directed the geographic CINCs to implement the administration's strategy of "shaping" within their areas of responsibility. In the past, no single, unifying planning mechanism existed within the Joint Strategic Planning System to address shaping. As a result, the DoD now seeks to ensure that all shaping activities conducted by the U.S. armed forces are executed to further U.S. policy and national security objectives. The Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) system has been in existence for almost 4 years. From its early problematic initiation and the reluctance of many in the DoD and the armed forces to take it seriously, the TEP has become a major agenda item particularly for the geographic CINCs. Many in the combatant commands see the TEP as providing an important instrument that strengthens their respective positions in the never ending struggle to obtain the forces and capabilities needed to implement theater strategies. Therefore, the TEP must be consistent with military department Title 10 responsibilities to raise, train and equip the U.S. armed forces.

The author analyzes the role of landpower in the 170 smaller-scale contingencies conducted by the United States during the last decade. He divides such contingencies into engagement, enhanced deterrence, hostility, and stabilization phases, and discusses the military's role in each one. The author especially emphasizes the recurring problems in the planning, execution, and force structure for stabilization tasks, including nation-building. He concludes that, despite the desire of American leaders to limit military involvement in such missions, it is unavoidable because of the capability mismatch between military and civilian organizations, combined with the requirements of peace operations and the character of American soldiers. Recommendations include acceptance of some degree of nation-building as the Army's mission and adapting its force structure, training, and planning accordingly.