A broad consensus exists that weapon system problems are serious, but efforts at reform have had limited impact. Last year, it was reported that DoD's portfolio of weapon programs experienced cost growth of $295 billion from first estimates, were delayed by an average of 21 months, and delivered fewer quantities and capabilities to the war-fighter than originally planned. This testimony describes the systemic problems that contribute to the cost, schedule, and performance problems in weapon system programs, recent actions that DoD has taken to address these problems, proposed reform legislation that has recently been introduced, and additional steps needed to improve future performance of acquisition programs. Charts and tables.

Defense acquisitions : DOD must balance its needs with available resources and follow an incremental approach to acquiring weapon systems : testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate

Since FY 2000, the DoD has significantly increased the number of major defense acquisition programs and its overall investment in them. However, acquisition outcomes have not improved. In most cases, the programs failed to deliver capabilities when promised -- often forcing warfighters to spend additional funds on maintaining legacy systems. This testimony describes the systemic problems that have contributed to poor cost and schedule outcomes in DoD¿s acquisition of major weapon systems; recent actions DoD has taken to address these problems; and steps that Congress and DoD need to take to improve the future performance of DoD¿s major weapon programs. Illustrations.

In 2006, the cumulative cost growth in DoD¿s portfolio of 96 major defense acquisition programs was $296 billion and the average delay in delivering promised capabilities to the warfighter was 22 months. These are very poor outcomes. The auditor has used metrics to review the mgmt. and health of these programs from within the framework of best practices. This testimony discusses: (1) ¿knowledge metrics,¿ used to determine how well programs manage tech., design, and manufacturing risks; (2) outcome metrics -- concerning cost, schedule, and capability -- that serve as ¿health indicators¿ of how well programs are being executed in terms of predicted outcomes; and (3) the prerequisites that must be met in order for a program¿s plans and goals to be realistic.

DoD weapon programs often experience significant cost and schedule problems because they are allowed to start with too many technical unknowns and not enough knowledge about the development and production risks they entail. This report reviews DoD's Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) process -- intended to assess the operational effectiveness, costs, and risks of alternative weapon system solutions. This report: (1) examines whether AOAs have been effective in identifying the most promising options and providing a sound rationale for weapon program initiation; (2) determines what factors have affected the scope and quality of AOAs; and (3) assesses whether recent DoD policy changes will enhance the effectiveness of AOAs. Illus.

In June 2009, following the expenditure of close to $3 billion, the DoD terminated the Navy's VH-71 presidential helicopter acquisition program and contract because of cost growth, schedule delays, and projected system performance. The Presidential Helicopter VXX program is a successor Navy program to the terminated VH-71 program acquisition and has been initiated to develop aircraft to replace the current, aging presidential helicopter fleet. This report discusses: (1) major lessons learned from the terminated VH-71 program that should be applied to the follow-on VXX program; and (2) the current acquisition approach of the VXX program and sufficiency of the underlying acquisition plans. Illus. A print on demand report.

Includes observations on the performance of DoD's 2010 portfolio of 98 major defense acquisition programs; data on selected factors that can affect program outcomes; an assessment of the knowledge attained by key junctures in the acquisition process for a subset of 40 programs; and observations on the implementation of acquisition reforms. To conduct this review, the auditor analyzed cost, schedule, and quantity data and collected data from program offices on performance requirements and software development; technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge; and the implementation of DoD's acquisition policy and acquisition reforms. He also compiled assessments of 71 weapon programs. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand report.

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