In 2006, the cumulative cost growth in DoD¿s portfolio of 96 major defense acquisition programs was $296 billion and the average delay in delivering promised capabilities to the warfighter was 22 months. These are very poor outcomes. The auditor has used metrics to review the mgmt. and health of these programs from within the framework of best practices. This testimony discusses: (1) ¿knowledge metrics,¿ used to determine how well programs manage tech., design, and manufacturing risks; (2) outcome metrics -- concerning cost, schedule, and capability -- that serve as ¿health indicators¿ of how well programs are being executed in terms of predicted outcomes; and (3) the prerequisites that must be met in order for a program¿s plans and goals to be realistic.

In FY 2008, the DoD obligated over $200 billion on contracts for services, which accounted for more than half of its total contract obligations. Given the serious budget pressures facing the nation, it is critical that DoD obtain value when buying these services. Yet DoD does not always use sound practices when acquiring services, and the dep¿t. lacks sufficient people with the right skills to support its acquisitions. This report addresses challenges facing DoD in measuring the value from and risks associated with its contracting for services. Specifically it focuses on: (1) challenges DoD faces in following sound contract and contracting management practices; and (2) recent actions DoD has taken to improve its management of service contracting. Illustrations.

The nation's ability to project and sustain military power depends on effective logistics. As the DoD'¿¿s largest combat support agency, providing worldwide logistics support in both peacetime and wartime, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) supplies almost every consumable item the military services need to operate, from Meals Ready-to Eat to jet fuel. This testimony identifies the challenges DoD faces in ensuring DLA gets value for the taxpayer's dollar and obtains quality commodities in a cost-efficient and effective manner. It focuses on sound practices that have been identified regarding obtaining value when contracting and how they can also apply to DLA's acquisition of commodities. Charts and tables.

In June 2009, following the expenditure of close to $3 billion, the DoD terminated the Navy's VH-71 presidential helicopter acquisition program and contract because of cost growth, schedule delays, and projected system performance. The Presidential Helicopter VXX program is a successor Navy program to the terminated VH-71 program acquisition and has been initiated to develop aircraft to replace the current, aging presidential helicopter fleet. This report discusses: (1) major lessons learned from the terminated VH-71 program that should be applied to the follow-on VXX program; and (2) the current acquisition approach of the VXX program and sufficiency of the underlying acquisition plans. Illus. A print on demand report.

Includes observations on the performance of DoD's 2010 portfolio of 98 major defense acquisition programs; data on selected factors that can affect program outcomes; an assessment of the knowledge attained by key junctures in the acquisition process for a subset of 40 programs; and observations on the implementation of acquisition reforms. To conduct this review, the auditor analyzed cost, schedule, and quantity data and collected data from program offices on performance requirements and software development; technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge; and the implementation of DoD's acquisition policy and acquisition reforms. He also compiled assessments of 71 weapon programs. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand report.

Defense Acquisitions: Measuring the Value of DOD's Weapon Programs Requires Starting with Realistic Baselines

Since 1995, the Dept. of Defense's (DoD) multibillion dollar business systems modernization program has been designated as high risk, and it continues to do so today. To assist in addressing DoD's modernization challenges, the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2005 requires the DoD to, among other things, report specific information about business system investments, including: (1) milestones and actual performance against specified measures and any revisions; and (2) actions taken to certify that a modernization investment involving more than $1 million meets defined conditions before obligating funds. This report focused on the FY 2010 report's compliance with, these provisions of the act. Illus. This is a print-on-demand publication; it is not an original.

The DoD has had long-standing difficulties developing and delivering space systems on time and within budget. Attempts to reform DoD space acquisitions in the past have sought to leverage commercial approaches or rely more on the commercial sector to meet DoD needs. This report examined the following questions: (1) What are the differences between commercial and national security space system missions, requirements, and technology development? (2) What acquisition practices adopted by commercial co¿s. could be used for national security space system acquisitions? (3) Which acquisition practices adopted by commercial co¿s. may not be readily adaptable for national security space system acquisitions? Charts and tables.