Paul Kennedy's classic naval history, now updated with a new introduction by the author This acclaimed book traces Britain's rise and fall as a sea power from the Tudors to the present day. Challenging the traditional view that the British are natural 'sons of the waves', he suggests instead that the country's fortunes as a significant maritime force have always been bound up with its economic growth. In doing so, he contributes significantly to the centuries-long debate between 'continental' and 'maritime' schools of strategy over Britain's policy in times of war. Setting British naval history within a framework of national, international, economic, political and strategic considerations, he offers a fresh approach to one of the central questions in British history. A new introduction extends his analysis into the twenty-first century and reflects on current American and Chinese ambitions for naval mastery. 'Excellent and stimulating' Correlli Barnett 'The first scholar to have set the sweep of British Naval history against the background of economic history' Michael Howard, Sunday Times 'By far the best study that has ever been done on the subject ... a sparkling and apt quotation on practically every page' Daniel A. Baugh, International History Review 'The best single-volume study of Britain and her naval past now available to us' Jon Sumida, Journal of Modern History

The region between the Baltic and the Black Sea was marked by a set of crises and conflicts in the 1920s and 1930s, demonstrating the diplomatic, military, economic or cultural engagement of France, Germany, Russia, Britain, Italy and Japan in this highly volatile region, and critically damaging the fragile post-Versailles political arrangement. The editors, in naming this region as "Middle Europe" seek to revive the symbolic geography of the time and accentuate its position, situated between Big Powers and two World Wars. The ten case studies in this book combine traditional diplomatic history with a broader emphasis on the geopolitical aspects of Big-Power rivalry to understand the interwar period. The essays claim that the European Big Powers played a key role in regional affairs by keeping the local conflicts and national movements under control and by exploiting the region's natural resources and military dependencies, while at the same time strengthening their prestige through cultural penetration and the cultivation of client networks. The authors, however, want to avoid the simplistic view that the Big Powers fully dominated the lesser players on the European stage. The relationship was indeed hierarchical, but the essays also reveal how the "small states" manipulated Big-Power disagreements, highlighting the limits of the latters' leverage throughout the 1920s and the 1930s.

Although much has been written on international crises, the literature suffers from a lack of historical depth, and a proliferation of competing theoretical frameworks. Through case studies drawing on the rich historical experience of crisis diplomacy, James Richardson offers an integrated analysis based on a critical assessment of the main theoretical approaches. Due weight is given to systemic and structural factors, but also to the specific historical factors of each case, and to theories which do not presuppose rationality as well as those which do. Crisis diplomacy the major political choices made by decision makers, and their strategies, judgments and misjudgments - is found to play a crucial role in each of the case studies. This broad historical inquiry is especially timely when the ending of the Cold War has removed the settled parameters within which the superpowers conducted their crisis diplomacy.

In 1840, conflict within the Ottoman Empire gave rise to a serious all-European crisis which led to a diplomatic rupture between France and other Great Powers. The crisis was given the name of the natural frontier which divided France from the rest of Europe: the Rhine. Although the Rhine Crisis did not lead to armed conflict, many states were deeply worried by the unfolding events and by the failure of the peace so carefully negotiated at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Combined with accumulated political, social, national and economic problems, there were fears of general social upheaval and perhaps even revolution. This book uses the Rhine Crisis to evaluate the stability of the European States System and the functionality of the Concert of Europe in this period. In doing so, Miroslav edivy offers an original and deeply-researched insight into the history of international relations in the pivotal years between 1815 and 1848."

About national and international power in the "modern" or Post Renaissance period. Explains how the various powers have risen and fallen over the 5 centuries since the formation of the "new monarchies" in W. Europe.

This book addresses the issue of grand strategic stability in the 21st century, and examines the role of the key centres of global power - US, EU, Russia, China and India - in managing contemporary strategic threats. This edited volume examines the cooperative and conflictual capacity of Great Powers to manage increasingly interconnected strategic threats (not least, terrorism and political extremism, WMD proliferation, fragile states, regional crises and conflict and the energy-climate nexus) in the 21st century. The contributors question whether global order will increasingly be characterised by a predictable interdependent one-world system, as strategic threats create interest-based incentives and functional benefits. The work moves on to argue that the operational concept of world order is a Concert of Great Powers directing a new institutional order, norms and regimes whose combination is strategic-threat specific, regionally sensitive, loosely organised, and inclusive of major states (not least Brazil, Turkey, South Africa and Indonesia). Leadership can be singular, collective or coalition-based and this will characterise the nature of strategic stability and world order in the 21st century. This book will be of much interest to students of international security, grand strategy, foreign policy and IR. Graeme P. Herd is Co-Director of the International Training Course in Security Policy at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP). He is co-author of several books and co-editor of The Ideological War on Terror: World Wide Strategies for Counter Terrorism (2007), Soft Security Threats and European Security (2005), Security Dynamics of the former Soviet Bloc (2003) and Russia and the Regions: Strength through Weakness (2003).

In 1840, conflict within the Ottoman Empire gave rise to a serious all-European crisis which led to a diplomatic rupture between France and other Great Powers. The crisis was given the name of the natural frontier which divided France from the rest of Europe: the Rhine. Although the Rhine Crisis did not lead to armed conflict, many states were deeply worried by the unfolding events and by the failure of the peace so carefully negotiated at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Combined with accumulated political, social, national and economic problems, there were fears of general social upheaval and perhaps even revolution. This book uses the Rhine Crisis to evaluate the stability of the European States System and the functionality of the Concert of Europe in this period. In doing so, Miroslav edivy offers an original and deeply-researched insight into the history of international relations in the pivotal years between 1815 and 1848."

A leading foreign policy thinker uses Chinese political theory to explain why some powers rise as others decline and what this means for the international order Why has China grown increasingly important in the world arena while lagging behind the United States and its allies across certain sectors? Using the lens of classical Chinese political theory, Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers explains China’s expanding influence by presenting a moral-realist theory that attributes the rise and fall of great powers to political leadership. Yan Xuetong shows that the stronger a rising state’s political leadership, the more likely it is to displace a prevailing state in the international system. Yan shows how rising states like China transform the international order by reshaping power distribution and norms, and he considers America’s relative decline in international stature even as its economy, education system, military, political institutions, and technology hold steady. Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers offers a provocative, alternative perspective on the changing dominance of states.

"A superb book.…Mearsheimer has made a significant contribution to our understanding of the behavior of great powers."—Barry R. Posen, The National Interest The updated edition of this classic treatise on the behavior of great powers takes a penetrating look at the question likely to dominate international relations in the twenty-first century: Can China rise peacefully? In clear, eloquent prose, John Mearsheimer explains why the answer is no: a rising China will seek to dominate Asia, while the United States, determined to remain the world's sole regional hegemon, will go to great lengths to prevent that from happening. The tragedy of great power politics is inescapable.

This book is the first of its kind to examine the role of great powers in the international politics of climate change. It develops a novel analytical framework for studying environmental power in international relations, what counts as a great power in the environmental field, and what their special environmental responsibilities are. In doing so, the book connects International Relations (IR) debates on power inequality, great powers and great power management, with global environmental politics (GEP) scholarship. The book brings together leading scholars in IR and GEP whose contributions focus on major environmental powers (United States, China, European Union, India, Brazil, Russia) and international institutions and issue areas (UN Security Council, multilateral environmental agreements, international climate leadership, coal politics). The contributors to this volume examine how individual great powers have responded to the global climate challenge and whether they have accepted a special responsibility for stabilizing the global climate. They place emerging discourses on great power responsibility in the context of wider debates about international environmental leadership and climate change securitization. And they provide new insights into how international power inequality intersects with the global ecological crisis, and what special role great powers could and should play in the international fight against global warming.