Although much has been written on international crises, the literature suffers from a lack of historical depth, and a proliferation of competing theoretical frameworks. Through case studies drawing on the rich historical experience of crisis diplomacy, James Richardson offers an integrated analysis based on a critical assessment of the main theoretical approaches. Due weight is given to systemic and structural factors, but also to the specific historical factors of each case, and to theories which do not presuppose rationality as well as those which do. Crisis diplomacy the major political choices made by decision makers, and their strategies, judgments and misjudgments - is found to play a crucial role in each of the case studies. This broad historical inquiry is especially timely when the ending of the Cold War has removed the settled parameters within which the superpowers conducted their crisis diplomacy.

These essays from the journal International Security examine the effects of the nuclear revolution on the international system and the role nuclear threats have played in international crises. The authors offer important new interpretations of the role of nuclear weapons in preventing a third world war, of the uses of atomic superiority, and of the effectiveness of nuclear threats.Sean M. Lynn-Jones is the Managing Editor of International Security. Steven E. Miller is a Senior Research Fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and co-editor of the journal. Stephen Van Evera is an Adjunct Fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University.Contributors: John Mueller. Robert Jervis. Richard K. Betts. Marc Trachtenberg. Roger Digman. Scott D. Sagan. Gordon Chang. H. W. Brands, Jr. Barry Blechman and Douglas Hart.

Diane Kunz describes here how the United States employed economic diplomacy to affect relations among states during the Suez Crisis of 1956-57. Using political and financial archival material from the United States and Great Britain, and drawing from pers

Using documents only recently available, this pioneering book explores the interaction of German, British, French, and American policy at a time when the great depression and the growing political power of the Nazis had created a European crisis--the only such crisis between 1910 and 1941 in which the United States played a leading role. The author uses contemporary records to rectify the later accounts of such participants as Herbert Hoover, Julius Curtius, and Paul Schmidt. He describes the negotiations of the major powers arising out of the Austro-German plans for a customs union, and relates this problem to the question of terminating reparations and war debts. He shows how the Governor of the Bank of England directed British foreign policy into bitter opposition to France and how the German government sought to exploit the German private debt to Wall Street. Edward Bennett comes to the conclusion that the Br ning government, contrary to widely held opinion, received fully as much help as it deserved, while the Western powers were already showing the disunity and irresponsibility which proved so disastrous in later years. Although primarily a diplomatic history, this book also offers fresh information on pre-Hitler Germany, MacDonald's Britain, the Hoover administration, and the early career of Pierre Laval.

This book contributes to the ongoing debate in IR on the role of security communities and formulates a new mechanism-based analytical framework. It argues that the question we need to ask is how security communities work at a time when armed conflicts among states have become significantly less frequent compared to other non-military threats and trans-boundary risks (e.g. terrorism and the adverse effects of climate change). Drawing upon recent advances in practice theory, the book suggests that the emergence and spread of cooperative security practices, ranging from multilateral diplomacy to crisis management, are as important for understanding how security communities work as more traditional confidence-building measures. Using the EU, Spain and Morocco as an in-depth case study, this volume reveals that through the institutionalization of multilateral venues, the EU has provided cooperative frameworks that otherwise would not have been available, and that the de-territorialized notion of security threats has created a new rationale for practical cooperation between Spanish and Moroccan diplomats, armed forces and civilian authorities. Within the broader context, this book provides a mechanism-based framework for studying regional organizations as security community-building institutions, and by utilizing that framework it shows how practice theory can be applied in empirical research to generate novel and thought-provoking results of relevance for the broader field of IR. This book will be of much interest to students of multilateral diplomacy, European Politics, foreign policy, security studies and IR in general.

Essay from the year 2012 in the subject Politics - Topic: Peace and Conflict, Security, , language: English, abstract: This paper will argue that though the character of crises occupying the international agenda may have changed, the skills and expertise possessed by professional diplomats have proven to be irreplaceable in addressing crisis situations. It will do this in two parts. First, it will briefly examine traditional formations of ‘international crisis’ and ‘crisis diplomacy’, arguing that these concepts need to be adjusted to encompass the contemporary global environment. Second, it will compare the efficacy of state and non-state agents in mediating crisis situations, demonstrating that professional diplomats are still without equal.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, observers and players of American foreign policy have been wrestling with what US policy is and, more importantly, what it should be in the post-Cold War era. The breakdown of communism in the East has coincided with the outbreak of warfare in the former Yugoslavia to add a new sense of urgency for those seeking a direction for US foreign policy. This work seeks to demonstrate how reactive rather than proactive measures by the US, in both democracy promotion and in crisis management have been short-sighted, resulting in the present failure.

Experiencing a major crisis from different viewpoints, step by step. The Suez crisis of 1956—now little more than dim history for many people—offers a master class in statecraft. It was a potentially explosive Middle East confrontation capped by a surprise move that reshaped the region for years to come. It was a diplomatic crisis that riveted the world's attention. And it was a short but startling war that ended in unexpected ways for every country involved. Six countries, including two superpowers, had major roles, but each saw the situation differently. From one stage to the next, it could be hard to tell which state was really driving the action. As in any good ensemble, all the actors had pivotal parts to play. Like an illustration that uses an exploded view of an object to show how it works, this book uses an unprecedented design to deconstruct the Suez crisis. The story is broken down into three distinct phases. In each phase, the reader sees the issues as they were perceived by each country involved, taking into account different types of information and diverse characteristics of each leader and that leader's unique perspectives. Then, after each phase has been laid out, editorial observations invite the reader to consider the interplay. Developed by an unusual group of veteran policy practitioners and historians working as a team, Suez Deconstructed is not just a fresh way to understand the history of a major world crisis. Whether one's primary interest is statecraft or history, this study provides a fascinating step-by-step experience, repeatedly shifting from one viewpoint to another. At each stage, readers can gain rare experience in the way these very human leaders sized up their situations, defined and redefined their problems, improvised diplomatic or military solutions, sought ways to influence each other, and tried to change the course of history.

George examines seven cases--from Pearl Harbor to the Persian Gulf--in which the United States has used coercive diplomacy in the past half-century.