Hybrid Warfare involves a state or state-like actor's use of all available diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means to destabilize an adversary. Whole-of-government by nature, Hybrid Warfare as seen in the Russian and Iranian cases places a particular premium on unconventional warfare (UW). As such, a response capitalizing on America's own irregular and unconventional warfare skills, as part of a whole-of-government and multinational strategy, can best counter actions of emergent adversaries to destabilize global security. Counter-Unconventional Warfare (C-UW) should thus prove central to U.S./NATO security policy and practice over the next several decades.

India is the world's tenth largest economy and possesses the world's fourth largest military. The subcontinent houses about one-fifth of the world's population and its inhabitants are divided into various tribes, clans and ethnic groups following four great religions: Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam. Framing the debate using case studies from across the region as well as China, Afghanistan and Burma and using a wealth of primary and secondary sources this incisive volume takes a closer look at the organization and doctrines of the 'shadow armies' and the government forces which fight the former. Arranged in a thematic manner, each chapter critically asks; Why stateless marginal groups rebel? How do states attempt to suppress them? What are the consequences in the aftermath of the conflict especially in relation to conflict resolution and peace building? Unconventional Warfare in South Asia is a welcomed addition to the growing field of interest on civil wars and insurgencies in South Asia. An indispensable read which will allow us to better understand whether South Asia is witnessing a 'New War' and whether the twenty-first century belongs to the insurgents.

This book offers an analysis of key individuals who have contributed to both the theory and the practice of counterinsurgency (COIN). Insurgencies have become the dominant form of armed conflict around the world today. The perceptible degeneration of the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan into insurgent quagmires has sparked a renewal of academic and military interest in the theory and practice of counterinsurgency. In light of this, this book provides a rigorous analysis of those individuals who have contributed to both the theory and practice of counterinsurgency: ‘warrior-scholars’. These are soldiers who have bridged the academic-military divide by influencing doctrinal and intellectual debates about irregular warfare. Irregular warfare is notoriously difficult for the military, and scholarly understanding about this type of warfare is also problematic; especially given the residual anti-intellectualism within Western militaries. Thus, The Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare is dedicated to analysing the best perceivable bridge between these two worlds. The authors explore the theoretical and practical contributions made by a selection of warrior-scholars of different nationalities, from periods ranging from the French colonial wars of the mid-twentieth century to the Israeli experiences in the Middle East; from contributions to American counter-insurgency made during the Iraq War, to the thinkers who shaped the US war in Vietnam. This book will be of much interest to students of counterinsurgency, strategic studies, defence studies, war studies and security studies in general.

This handbook comprises essays by leading scholars and practitioners on the topic of U.S. counterterrorism and irregular warfare campaigns and operations around the globe. Terrorist groups have evolved substantially since 9/11, with the Islamic State often described as a pseudo-state, a terrorist group, and insurgency all at the same time. While researchers', analysts', and policymakers’ understanding of terrorism has grown immensely over the past two decades, similar advancements in the understanding of counterterrorism lag. As such, this handbook explains why it is necessary to take a broader view of counterterrorism which can, and often does, include irregular warfare. The volume is divided into three thematic sections: Part I examines modern terrorism in the Islamic world and gives an overview of the major terrorist groups from the past three decades; Part II provides a wide variety of case studies of counterterrorism and irregular warfare operations, spanning from the 1980s to the irregular warfare campaign against the Islamic State in northern Syria in 2018; Part III examines the government instruments used to combat terrorism and wage irregular warfare, such as drones, Theater Special Operations Commands, and Theater Commands. The handbook fills a gap in the traditional counterterrorism literature by its inclusion of irregular warfare and by providing analyses from academic experts as well as practitioners. It will be of much interest to students of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, U.S. national security, military affairs, and International Relations. The Open Access version of this book, available at https://www.routledge.com/Routledge-Handbook-of-US-Counterterrorism-and-Irregular-Warfare-Operations/Sheehan-Marquardt-Collins/p/book/9780367758363, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.

A thought provoking essay on the possible implications of irregular warfare in national military strategy.

This book examines the complex practice of counter-insurgency warfare through the prism of the British experiences of irregular war in the post-war era, from Malaya up to the current Iraq war.

Long considered the masters of counterinsurgency, the British military encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when confronted with insurgent violence. In their effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past campaigns, they failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence. By juxtaposing the deterioration of these situations against Britain's celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume conducts an unprecedented assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. In calling attention to the enduring effectiveness of insurgent methods and the threat posed by undergoverned spaces, David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell underscore the need for military organizations to meet the irregular challenges of future wars in new ways.

Product Description: Since the tragic events of 9/11 and the consequent advent of the Global War on Terrorism, there has been a remarkable surge of interest in counterinsurgency. This anthology presents 27 articles on counterinsurgency and irregular warfare, particularly highlighting and examining the U.S. Marine Corps' roles in conflicts from 1898 through 2007. It also includes an extensive bibliography of works on these conflicts. Continuing discussion and study of these subjects is of critical importance to the ongoing efforts of the United States and its allies in the Global War on Terrorism. The anthology is divided broadly into two halves: the first half presents historical examples of counterinsurgency involving the United States-from the Philippines and the "Banana Wars" up through Vietnam-while the second half addresses the nation's contemporary efforts in this regard. Articles cover the situations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. The selected bibliography addresses a broad range of subjects: on higher-end operational/strategic level of war considerations, on geopolitical context, and on a varied array of related topics-political theory, historical case studies, failed states, cultural studies and analysis, and many others-that all provide context or play a role in conducting a counterinsurgency and achieving success in the realm of irregular warfare. Colonel Stephen S. Evans, USMCR, researched and compiled this work as a field historian with the Marine Corps History Division. He has experience at various operational levels, both joint and multinational, in CONUS and overseas, and has performed duty with all three MEFs, MARFORLANT, MARFOREUR, and U.S. forces in Korea. He has also held a range of positions in administrative and educational roles at Quantico and the Pentagon. Colonel Evans holds a doctorate in history from Temple University and has published two historical monographs.

This book explores how unconventional warfare tactics have opposed governments, from eighteenth-century guerrilla warfare to contemporary urban terrorism. The tactics of guerrilla leaders such as Lawrence, Mao, Guevara and Marighela are examined and the works of counter-insurgency theorists such as Galleni, Callwell, Thompson and Kitson are analysed.

Rogue regimes have extracted an inordinate amount of energy, blood, and treasure from the world's militaries in the past century. Overthrowing these regimes is a major policy decision - fraught with peril and unknown downstream implications. The United States painfully re-learned these lessons following the invasion in Iraq and after deposing the Taliban in Afghanistan. Unconventional warfare (UW) is the flip side of counter-insurgency, in which external military elements enable surrogate guerrilla forces against an incumbent government. An updated concept for UW campaigns may offer a more palatable option for regime change in certain situations. Global instantaneous communications, social media, and the application of precision munitions from conventional forces have radically altered this age old method of warfare. Recent UW campaigns in Libya and Syria demonstrated the pros and cons of jump-starting a revolution and how non-state actors have made these already chaotic conflicts even more so. Unconventional Warfare 2.0 describes how demographic trends, rapid technological changes, and an adaptive enemy will drive new and innovative UW approaches.