Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies explores how unconventional warfare tactics have opposed past and present governments all over the world, from eighteenth-century guerrilla warfare to the urban terrorism of today. Insurgency remains one of the most prevalent forms of conflict and presents a crucial challenge to the international communi

Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies explores how unconventional warfare tactics have opposed past and present governments all over the world, from eighteenth-century guerrilla warfare to the urban terrorism of today. Insurgency remains one of the most prevalent forms of conflict and presents a crucial challenge to the international communi

This book explores how unconventional warfare tactics have opposed governments, from eighteenth-century guerrilla warfare to contemporary urban terrorism. The tactics of guerrilla leaders such as Lawrence, Mao, Guevara and Marighela are examined and the works of counter-insurgency theorists such as Galleni, Callwell, Thompson and Kitson are analysed.

Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies explores how unconventional warfare tactics have opposed past and present governments all over the world, from eighteenth-century guerrilla warfare to the urban terrorism of today. Insurgency remains one of the most prevalent forms of conflict and presents a crucial challenge to the international community, governments and the military.In addition to examining the tactics of guerrilla leaders such as Lawrence, Mao, Guevara and Marighela, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies also analyses the counter-insurgency theories.

Exploring how unconventional warfare tactics have opposed past and present governments all over the world, this text examines the tactics of Lawrence, Mao, Guevara and Marighela and the counterinsurgency theories of Callwell, Thompson and Kitson.

This book provides a historical study of the theory and praxis of modern insurgencies and counterinsurgencies (COIN). Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: A Global History shows that the insurgents can wage a variety of conflicts: at times conventional war which lies at the high end of their spectrum, and terrorism which is located at the lowest end of their scale. When insurgencies reach a certain critical threshold, the insurgents shift their strategy from guerrilla (irregular) war to conventional (regular) war, and at that point the level of conflict escalates to the level of civil war. When the insurgents face intense state repression, they revert to terrorist activities. When the insurgents wage guerrilla war, they can be called guerrillas. The variety of wars conducted by the insurgents is termed as unconventional war. This volume demonstrates that the insurgents in the modern world had been motivated by a trinity: greed, grievances and ideology. Kaushik Roy traces the origin of modern insurgencies and COIN from the sixteenth century by focusing on regions outside Western Eurasia. He also touches on the twin interrelated phenomena of modern insurgencies and COIN metastasising into something new at the beginning of the Information Revolution at the end of the twentieth century. This volume will be of interest to researchers and research students of history, British Empire, imperial studies, Asian studies, security studies, strategic studies, and war and conflict studies.

A study of the evolving 'national styles' of conducting insurgencies and counter-insurgency, as influenced by transnational trends, ideas and practices.

This timely book offers a world history of insurgencies and of counterinsurgency warfare. Jeremy Black moves beyond the conventional Western-centric narrative, arguing that it is crucial to ground contemporary experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq in a global framework. Unlike other studies that begin with the American and French revolutions, this book reaches back to antiquity to trace the pre-modern origins of war within states. Interweaving thematic and chronological narratives, Black probes the enduring linkages between beliefs, events, and people on the one hand and changes over time on the other hand. He shows the extent to which power politics, technologies, and ideologies have evolved, creating new parameters and paradigms that have framed both governmental and public views. Tracing insurgencies ranging from China to Africa to Latin America, Black highlights the widely differing military and political dimensions of each conflict. He weighs how, and why, lessons were “learned” or, rather, asserted, in both insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare. At every stage, he considers lessons learned by contemporaries, the ways in which norms developed within militaries and societies, and their impact on doctrine and policy. His sweeping study of insurrectionary warfare and its counterinsurgency counterpart will be essential reading for all students of military history.

Research Paper (undergraduate) from the year 2007 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Region: USA, Queen's University Belfast, language: English, abstract: This paper analyzes modern insurgency and emphasizes some of the difficulties and dilemmas in contemporary counter-insurgency policy-making in Iraq. The analysis starts with the definition (s) and structural components of an insurgency. Differences between classic and modern insurgencies are underlined with the aim of presenting the evolution and adjustability of insurgent warfare. Modern insurgency is becoming increasingly networked, transnational, tactical and diverse in its methods. Conventional means are increasingly used against soft targets causing maximum loss and damage. A metastasis of warfare from the rural terrain to the urban domain has complicated efforts to counter violence. The paper argues that the question over "doctrine versus flexibility‟ in counter-insurgency policy-making should be thoroughly re-examined. Given that insurgencies are social events, deeply rooted in the social and economic conditions of a society, responses to violence should focus on breaking the very conditions leading to radicalization and recruitment. Expanding the scope of counter-insurgency beyond military engagement, devising timely responses and negotiating with local militant actors are much more important aspects for ending a crisis that could escalate into insurgency or civil war.

When a country is threatened by an insurgency, what efforts give its government the best chance of prevailing? Contemporary discourse on this subject is voluminous and often contentious. Advice for the counterinsurgent is often based on little more than common sense, a general understanding of history, or a handful of detailed examples, instead of a solid, systematically collected body of historical evidence. A 2010 RAND study challenged this trend with rigorous analyses of all 30 insurgencies that started and ended between 1978 and 2008. This update to that original study expanded the data set, adding 41 new cases and comparing all 71 insurgencies begun and completed worldwide since World War II. With many more cases to compare, the study was able to more rigorously test the previous findings and address critical questions that the earlier study could not. For example, it could examine the approaches that led counterinsurgency forces to prevail when an external actor was involved in the conflict. It was also able to address questions about timing and duration, such as which factors affect the duration of insurgencies and the durability of the resulting peace, as well as how long historical counterinsurgency forces had to engage in effective practices before they won.