This book interrogates the temporal differences between post-structuralism, analytic philosophy and phenomenology, suggesting that time is the transcendental matrix of contemporary philosophy and the means by which these three major trajectories distinguish themselves from their competitors. It also argues that there are systemic temporal problems (chronopathologies) that afflict each, but especially the post-structuralist tradition (focusing on the prophetic future politics of Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida) and the analytic tradition, focusing on philosophical methodology in general and the tendency to oscillate between forms of atemporality and intuition-oriented "presentism."

During the past decade many review papers and books have been devoted to descriptions and analyses of biological rhythms (chronobiology) in plants and animals. These contributed greatly to demonstrating the impor tance of bioperiodicities in living beings in general. However, the practi cal aspects of chronobiology with regard to human health and improving the treatment of disease have not yet been a major focus of publication. One of our aims is to establish the relevance of biological rhythms to the practice of medicine. Another is to organize and convey in a simple fashion information pertinent to health- and life-science professionals so that students, researchers, and practitioners can achieve a clear and pre cise understanding of chronobiology. We have limited scientific jargon to unavoidable basic and well-defined terms and we have emphasized illus trative examples of facts and concepts rather than theories or hypotheti cal mechanisms. This volume is divided into seven chapters, each of which is compre hensive in its treatment and includes an extensive bibliography. The book is organized to serve as a textbook and/or reference handbook of modem applied chronobiology. Chapter 1 describes the historical development of chronobiology and reviews why, when, and how major concepts were introduced, accepted, and transformed.

This interdisciplinary volume connects the philosophy of history to moral philosophy with a unique focus on time. Taking in a range of intellectual traditions, cultural, and geographical contexts, the volume provides a rich tapestry of approaches to time, morality, culture, and history. By extending the philosophical discussion on the ethical importance of temporality, the editors disentangle some of the disciplinary tensions between analytical and hermeneutic philosophy of history, cultural theory, meta-ethical theory, and normative ethics. The ethical and existential character of temporality reveals itself within a collection that resists the methodological underpinnings of any one philosophical school. The book's distinctive cross-cultural approach ensures a wide range of perspectives with contributions on life and death in Japanese philosophy, ethics and time in Maori philosophy, non-traditional temporalities and philosophical anthropology, as well as global approaches to ethics. These new directions of study highlight the importance of the ethical in the temporal, inviting further points of departure in this burgeoning field.

Having initially not had the attention of Sartre or Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty's work is arguably now more widely influential than either of his two contemporaries. "Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts" presents an accessible guide to the core ideas which structure Merleau-Ponty's thinking as well as to his influences and the value of his ideas to a wide range of disciplines. The first section of the book presents the context of Merleau-Ponty's thinking, the major debates of his time, particularly existentialism, phenomenology, the history of philosophy and the philosophy of history and society. The second section outlines his major contributions and conceptual innovations. The final section focuses upon how his work has been taken up in other fields besides philosophy, notably in sociology, cognitive science, health studies, feminism and race theory.

High blood pressure (BP) (with fats and smoking) is one of the three roots of cardio-cerebro-renovascular disease affecting up to 25% of the adult population. Hence, high blood pressure should be recognized and treated, to reduce any complications and prolong life, as noted by Michael Weber of the Veterans Administration Hospital in Long Beach, California. He further emphasizes the need for monitoring before one starts the treatment of high blood pressure. Indeed, he refers to the results of the Australian study on mild hypertension with a large percentage of placebo responders and rightly suggests that many people are treated who should not be because of 'white-coat-associated high blood pressure'. He also points to the lack of standardization of techniques for data analysis and of methods of BP measurement. Ambulatory monitoring under usual condi tions without concomitant recording of events does not allow even a qualitative assessment of the impact of varying stimuli, in weber's opinion.

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Study Institute, Hannover, Germany, July 13-25, 1979

One of the most influential analytic philosophers of the late twentieth century, William P. Alston is a leading light in epistemology, philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of language. In this volume, twelve leading philosophers critically discuss the central topics of his work in these areas, including perception, epistemic circularity, justification, the problem of religious diversity, and truth. Together with Alston's vigorous responses, these articles make significant new contributions to the literature and will be of interest to a wide range of philosophers and students. In addition, the volume contains a comprehensive introduction and overview of Alston's work and a complete bibliography of his publications

Philosophers often use the term “naturalism’ in order to describe their work. It is commonplace to see a metaphysical, epistemological and/or ethical position self-described and described by others as one that is “naturalized.” But what, if anything, does the term naturalized add--or subtract---to the position being articulated? I demonstrate in The Problem of Naturalism: Analytic and Continental Perspectives, that the term naturalism connotes such a broad meaning that it is difficult to demarcate naturalism from philosophy itself. Still, many philosophers have tried to provide non-trivial and non-vacuous definitions of the term. My book, by and large, argues that such attempts are unsuccessful. Instead, I argue that naturalism is an attitude and neither a methodology nor a substantive position. I then articulate the guidelines the naturalist needs to follow, as well as the virtues he or she needs to practice, in order for the term naturalism to do any meaningful work. Much of the book explains and then critiques the various attempts to define naturalism in the Anglo-American secondary literature. Some of the criticisms I raise seem to emanate from the internal logic of the naturalistic position being expressed. However, others have emerged from gleaning the work of such Continental thinkers as: Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger and Foucault. I use these thinkers in order to expose the unjustified implicit and sometimes explicit assumptions that many naturalistic philosophers presume to hold when they attempt to render a clear, distinct and robust naturalist position.