"A new history of the British appeasement of the Third Reich on the eve of World War II"--

Drawing on a wide range of material, including primary sources, Frank McDonough re-examines the controversial policy of appeasement, and argues that appeasement was part of a broad consensus in British society at the time.

The Sunday Times Bestseller 'Astonishing' ANTONY BEEVOR 'One of the most promising young historians to enter our field for years' MAX HASTINGS On a wet afternoon in September 1938, Neville Chamberlain stepped off an aeroplane and announced that his visit to Hitler had averted the greatest crisis in recent memory. It was, he later assured the crowd in Downing Street, 'peace for our time'. Less than a year later, Germany invaded Poland and the Second World War began. This is a vital new history of the disastrous years of indecision, failed diplomacy and parliamentary infighting that enabled Nazi domination of Europe. Drawing on previously unseen sources, it sweeps from the advent of Hitler in 1933 to the beaches of Dunkirk, and presents an unforgettable portrait of the ministers, aristocrats and amateur diplomats whose actions and inaction had devastating consequences. 'Brilliant and sparkling . . . Reads like a thriller. I couldn't put it down' Peter Frankopan 'Vivid, detailed and utterly fascinating . . . This is political drama at its most compelling' James Holland 'Bouverie skilfully traces each shameful step to war . . . in moving and dramatic detail' Sunday Telegraph

On September 30, 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain flew back to London from his meeting in Munich with German Chancellor Adolf Hitler. As he disembarked from the aircraft, he held aloft a piece of paper, which contained the promise that Britain and Germany would never go to war with one another again. He had returned bringing “Peace with honour—Peace for our time.” Drawing on a wealth of archival material, acclaimed historian David Faber delivers a sweeping reassessment of the extraordinary events of 1938, tracing the key incidents leading up to the Munich Conference and its immediate aftermath: Lord Halifax’s ill-fated meeting with Hitler; Chamberlain’s secret discussions with Mussolini; and the Berlin scandal that rocked Hitler’s regime. He takes us to Vienna, to the Sudentenland, and to Prague. In Berlin, we witness Hitler inexorably preparing for war, even in the face of opposition from his own generals; in London, we watch as Chamberlain makes one supreme effort after another to appease Hitler. Resonating with an insider’s feel for the political infighting Faber uncovers, Munich, 1938 transports us to the war rooms and bunkers, revealing the covert negotiations and scandals upon which the world’s fate would rest. It is modern history writing at its best.

An engaging range of period texts and theme books for AS and A Level history. This book examines the key roles played by Adolf Hitler and Neville Chamberlain in the events that led to the outbreak of the Second World War. It looks at Hitler's foreign-policy aims, why appeasement became British foreign policy and, most extensively, the role of Chamberlain and appeasement in the unfolding international crisis of the late 1930s. Using a wide range of primary sources, Frank McDonough offers a generally critical interpretation of Chamberlain and appeasement, and suggests that standing up to Hitler earlier may have prevented war. The book also features a detailed analysis of the historical debates surrounding the issue of appeasement.

"The book details the course of that historiographical debate, beginning with the earliest accounts on appeasement from l938 through 1940.".

Neville Chamberlain was a truly pivotal figure in British and International politics, with a long and distinguished career in government. Yet despite this record, he generally is only remembered for his trip to Munich in 1938 and the appeasement of Hitler. In this biography the whole of Chamberlain's political career is examined and put into its national and international context to provide a much fuller and fairer account of his life and career than has hitherto been available.

Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasing Hitler's Germany has been widely condemned. However, historians (and politicians) have been divided about the viability of alternative courses of action. Andrew David Stedman's illuminating new study of British foreign policy before World War II systematically analyses the various alternatives to appeasement - from isolationism to collective security to outright war - and examines their origins, risks and feasibility. It surveys the advocates of other strategies - including key thinkers and decision-makers such as Churchill, Eden, Amery, Beaverbrook and Halifax - and outlines the complexities of the decisions they faced, which have previously been largely overlooked. Marking a valuable new contribution to appeasement historiography, this is the first work to synthesise all the alternatives available to Chamberlain, as well as illuminating policy debate within the British government. Stedman provides a vigorous analysis of Chamberlain's assessment of each rival policy, and shows why ultimately, he opted for appeasement. Also contributing to debates on the use of appeasement in the modern world, this book will be essential reading for historians of World War II and the twentieth century, as well as scholars of International Relations.

Most studies of World War II assume that it was, in some way, a triumph for Britain. John Charmley’s important new reappraisal of the immediate origins of the war is based on extensive new work in the Chamberlain papers. It starts from Chamberlain’s belief that even a victorious war would be a disaster—it would destroy the foundations of British power and hand over Europe to Russian domination. Reconstructing Chamberlain’s policy assumptions, Mr. Charmley argues that they were neither naïve nor foolish. While focusing on the prime minister’s personality, he also shows that Chamberlain’s views were shared by many other leading politicians and diplomats. Mr. Charmley thus resurrects a whole school of thought on foreign policy which was forgotten in the wake of Churchill’s triumph. Unlike Churchill, Chamberlain was not prepared to gamble an empire; but events produced, according to Mr. Charmley, indeed a “human tragedy.” Early British reviews of the book have called it “important,” “entertaining and absorbing,” “concise and spirited,” and “provocative.” The Guardian wrote: “Chamberlain hardly emerges a hero from these pages, but at least there is no excuse left for regarding him as no more than a wimp in a wing-collar.”