Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasing Hitler's Germany has been widely condemned. However, historians (and politicians) have been divided about the viability of alternative courses of action. Andrew David Stedman here charts the origins, development and viability of the various alternatives to Chamberlain's policy of appeasement. Using a wide range of sources, many previously unpublished, he provides a fascinating study of British foreign policy before World War II, surveying the main advocates of the other strategies available and outlining the complexities of each rival option. Providing a valuable new contribution to appeasement historiography, this is the first work to offer a comprehensive synthesis of all the alternatives available to Chamberlain, as well as to illuminate the policy debate within Government itself. Stedman provides a unique analysis of how realistic Chamberlain deemed each policy to be, as well as a bold assessment of strengths and weaknesses. Stedman asserts that it was understandable that Chamberlain rejected the other policies he had available to him and that, contrary to popular belief, Chamberlain did in fact consider and explore each alternative as part of his wider strategy and his foreign policy often contained elements of the rival options. Ultimately, this book shows that none of the alternatives would have maintained a lasting peace in the troubled conditions of the 1930s. Although some might have affected the favourability, timing and circumstances of conflict, war could not have been avoided given the rapid rise of Hitler and Nazi Germany. Also contributing to debates on the use of appeasement in the modern world, this book will be essential reading for historians of World War II and the twentieth century, as well as scholars of International Relations.

Appeasement alternatives to World War II have been the subject of intense debate and this volume addresses the vital phenomenon of elite and intellectual opinion. Representing a wide-ranging selection of individuals with considerable wealth and public service, the unique All Souls 'think-tank' deliberated for almost two years to develop an alternative foreign policy for a country facing the menacing threat of World War II. This volume analyzes the think-tank's struggles to establish a consensus for a foreign policy document to guide public debate in the avoidance of another world war.

This book examines Lloyd George’s attitudes to Germany during the inter-war period and beyond. As Prime Minister until October 1922 and a leading player in the shaping of postwar Europe, Lloyd George maintained an active critical interest in Britain’s European policy almost until his death in 1945. After a brief survey of his role at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the book considers Lloyd George’s policy towards Germany during the rest of his premiership. It then examines his interventions across the remaining inter-war years, concluding with an evaluation of his advocacy of a compromise peace with Hitler during World War Two. In 1941 Churchill likened Lloyd George’s attitude to Germany to that of Marshal Pétain. The evidence in some ways vindicates that comparison. It shows that, after 1918, Lloyd George supported appeasement on most issues involving Germany—even during Hitler’s chancellorship, and even after World War Two began. His belief that Germany had just grievances, his suspicion of French motives, his admiration for Hitler and his growing conviction that Germany had been treated unfairly at Versailles, led him to see her as a long-suffering under-dog. The book also sheds light on the evolution of the appeasement policies of successive British governments throughout the inter-war period; and, by comparing Lloyd George’s views with those of contemporary leaders and opinion-formers, it highlights ideas for alternatives to appeasement as conceived at the time rather than by historians in hindsight.

Examines Iran's current nuclear potential while charting America's future course of action, recounting the prolonged clash between both nations to outline options for American policymakers.

This book argues that during the Spanish Civil War, the European democracies deployed a policy of 'non-intervention', the effect of which wiped out Spanish democracy and led to the rise of international fascism.

Updates Lentz's previous work (which Library journal said was producers, screenwriters, cinematographers, special effects technicians, make-up artists, art directors. III: film index. IV: TV series index. V: alternate title index. Science fiction writer Spinrad presents 13 essays, some previously published, examining particular works in the genre, aspects of the industry, and how they influence each other. Topics include critical standards, the visual expression in comic books and movies, modes of content, politics, and profiles of individual authors. No bibliography. Paper edition (unseen), $14.95. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

How aggressive military strategies win wars, from ancient times to today The goal of war is to defeat the enemy's will to fight. But how this can be accomplished is a thorny issue. Nothing Less than Victory provocatively shows that aggressive, strategic military offenses can win wars and establish lasting peace, while defensive maneuvers have often led to prolonged carnage, indecision, and stalemate. Taking an ambitious and sweeping look at six major wars, from antiquity to World War II, John David Lewis shows how victorious military commanders have achieved long-term peace by identifying the core of the enemy's ideological, political, and social support for a war, fiercely striking at this objective, and demanding that the enemy acknowledges its defeat. Lewis examines the Greco-Persian and Theban wars, the Second Punic War, Aurelian's wars to reunify Rome, the American Civil War, and the Second World War. He considers successful examples of overwhelming force, such as the Greek mutilation of Xerxes' army and navy, the Theban-led invasion of the Spartan homeland, and Hannibal's attack against Italy—as well as failed tactics of defense, including Fabius's policy of delay, McClellan's retreat from Richmond, and Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler. Lewis shows that a war's endurance rests in each side's reasoning, moral purpose, and commitment to fight, and why an effectively aimed, well-planned, and quickly executed offense can end a conflict and create the conditions needed for long-term peace. Recognizing the human motivations behind military conflicts, Nothing Less than Victory makes a powerful case for offensive actions in pursuit of peace.

Challenges the assumption of the rationality of foreign policy makers in international relations, showing how leaders systematically vary in the rationality of their thinking.