We examine whether shared collective experiences can help build a national identity, by looking at the impact of national football teams' victories in sub- Saharan Africa. Combining individual survey data with information on official matches played between 2000 and 2015, we find that individuals interviewed in the days after a victory of their country's national team are less likely to identify with their ethnic group than with the country as a whole and more likely to trust people of other ethnicities than those interviewed just before. The effect is sizable and robust and is not explained by generic euphoria or optimism. Crucially, we find that national victories not only affect attitudes but also reduce violence: using plausibly exogenous variation from close qualifications to the African Cup of Nations, we find that countries that (barely) qualified experience significantly less conflict in the following six months than countries that (barely) did not. Our findings indicate that, even when divisions are deeply rooted, shared experiences can work as an effective nation-building tool, bridge cleavages, and have a tangible effect on violence.

A new and comprehensive look at the reasons behind successful or failed nation building Nation Building presents bold new answers to an age-old question. Why is national integration achieved in some diverse countries, while others are destabilized by political inequality between ethnic groups, contentious politics, or even separatism and ethnic war? Traversing centuries and continents from early nineteenth-century Europe and Asia to Africa from the turn of the twenty-first century to today, Andreas Wimmer delves into the slow-moving forces that encourage political alliances to stretch across ethnic divides and build national unity. Using datasets that cover the entire world and three pairs of case studies, Wimmer’s theory of nation building focuses on slow-moving, generational processes: the spread of civil society organizations, linguistic assimilation, and the states’ capacity to provide public goods. Wimmer contrasts Switzerland and Belgium to demonstrate how the early development of voluntary organizations enhanced nation building; he examines Botswana and Somalia to illustrate how providing public goods can bring diverse political constituencies together; and he shows that the differences between China and Russia indicate how a shared linguistic space may help build political alliances across ethnic boundaries. Wimmer then reveals, based on the statistical analysis of large-scale datasets, that these mechanisms are at work around the world and explain nation building better than competing arguments such as democratic governance or colonial legacies. He also shows that when political alliances crosscut ethnic divides and when most ethnic communities are represented at the highest levels of government, the general populace will identify with the nation and its symbols, further deepening national political integration. Offering a long-term historical perspective and global outlook, Nation Building sheds important new light on the challenges of political integration in diverse countries.

Brilliant and engagingly written, Why Nations Fail answers the question that has stumped the experts for centuries: Why are some nations rich and others poor, divided by wealth and poverty, health and sickness, food and famine? Is it culture, the weather, geography? Perhaps ignorance of what the right policies are? Simply, no. None of these factors is either definitive or destiny. Otherwise, how to explain why Botswana has become one of the fastest growing countries in the world, while other African nations, such as Zimbabwe, the Congo, and Sierra Leone, are mired in poverty and violence? Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson conclusively show that it is man-made political and economic institutions that underlie economic success (or lack of it). Korea, to take just one of their fascinating examples, is a remarkably homogeneous nation, yet the people of North Korea are among the poorest on earth while their brothers and sisters in South Korea are among the richest. The south forged a society that created incentives, rewarded innovation, and allowed everyone to participate in economic opportunities. The economic success thus spurred was sustained because the government became accountable and responsive to citizens and the great mass of people. Sadly, the people of the north have endured decades of famine, political repression, and very different economic institutions—with no end in sight. The differences between the Koreas is due to the politics that created these completely different institutional trajectories. Based on fifteen years of original research Acemoglu and Robinson marshall extraordinary historical evidence from the Roman Empire, the Mayan city-states, medieval Venice, the Soviet Union, Latin America, England, Europe, the United States, and Africa to build a new theory of political economy with great relevance for the big questions of today, including: - China has built an authoritarian growth machine. Will it continue to grow at such high speed and overwhelm the West? - Are America’s best days behind it? Are we moving from a virtuous circle in which efforts by elites to aggrandize power are resisted to a vicious one that enriches and empowers a small minority? - What is the most effective way to help move billions of people from the rut of poverty to prosperity? More philanthropy from the wealthy nations of the West? Or learning the hard-won lessons of Acemoglu and Robinson’s breakthrough ideas on the interplay between inclusive political and economic institutions? Why Nations Fail will change the way you look at—and understand—the world.

This book aims to promote greater understanding of social cohesion amidst existing complexities of faith and identity, and what it portends for our future.Social cohesion defies easy definition; yet, every pursuit of social cohesiveness requires nurture, patience and a consensus that it is germane to the success of any community. Indeed, challenges abound, developments such as the COVID-19 pandemic, evolving geopolitical tensions, and a rise in access to technology impact social cohesion. In such times, it is pertinent to maintain on-going conversations revolving around social cohesion to bridge the divides through diversity and technology.This book continues to build on the conversations from the second edition of the International Conference of Cohesive Society (ICCS), held from 6-8 September 2022 in Singapore. Over 25 essays across three ICCS 2022 themes — How Faith Can Bridge Divides, Diversity, and Technology — present international and interdisciplinary perspectives in building confident identities and connected communities.

"One of the defining features of twenty-first century American politics has been the rise of affective polarization: Americans increasingly report that they distrust and dislike those from the other party and want to avoid interacting with them in a wide range seemingly non-political contexts, from Thanksgiving dinners to dating. This has damaging downstream consequences: many studies and evidence from our everyday lives shows that affective polarization reduces electoral accountability, weakens support for the democratic norms, and makes it more difficult for Americans to responded to crises, such as COVID-19. What, if anything, can be done? Our Common Bonds shows that-although affective polarization has multiple causes and there is no silver bullet that will eradicate it-there are concrete interventions that can reduce it. Matthew Levendusky argues that partisan animus stems in part from individuals misperceiving how much they have in common with those from the other party. Survey and experimental evidence show that priming shared identities and connections outside of politics can help people to reframe the lens through which they evaluate the out-party and, in so doing, turn down the partisan temperature"--

"A new global history of nationalism. Today, almost all countries are considered nation-states, but only a handful conform to the original nationalist ideal of a unitary state which governs an ethnically homogenous nation, an ideal which has rarely been realized in the past. Given this disjunction between the ideal and reality, what explains the extraordinary success of the nation-state model - a form of statehood based on popular sovereignty - and the seductive power of the myth of national homogeneity? Most existing studies focus on the activities of nationalist movements, their views on the nation's identity and the wars and revolutions that produced nation-states. This has served to overemphasize the singularity of each case, producing a very fragmented picture overall. In this book, author Eric Storm takes a global approach by examining the structural changes that were engendered by the advance of the nation-state model and the nationalization of culture. Emphasizing how conceptions of the nation changed profoundly over time, the book details how the rise of nationalism fundamentally affected the everyday life of ordinary people across the globe. Storm explores four interrelated topics chronologically: the rise, dissemination, and evolution of the nation-state model, which was first developed during the Atlantic Revolutions; the implications of national citizenship for citizens and the attempt by nation-states to expand the ambit of citizenship, even while more strictly excluding outsiders; the allure of nationalism, as the existence of differentiated nations was increasingly taken for granted in the humanities, social sciences and high culture; and, finally, the process whereby nationalism became ingrained in daily life and the physical environment. In making use of a global comparative approach, Storm makes clear that no nation has been unique; rather, they have all conformed to the nation-state model"--

Using historical and anthropological analysis, this book examines the changing characteristics of nations globally; nation-building in Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia; and the history of multi-culturalism in the Global South as an advantage to development in post-colonial conceptions of the nation.

“Why We Fight reflects Blattman’s expertise in economics, political science, and history… Blattman is a great storyteller, with important insights for us all.” —Richard H. Thaler, winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences and coauthor of Nudge “Engaging and profound, this deeply searching book explains the true origins of warfare, and it illustrates the ways that, despite some contrary appearances, human beings are capable of great goodness.”—Nicholas A. Christakis author of Blueprint: The Evolutionary Origins of a Good Society Why did Russia attack Ukraine? Will China invade Taiwan and launch WWIII? Why has the number of civil wars reached their highest level in decades? Why are so many cities in the Americas plagued with violence? And finally, what can any of us do about it? It feels like we’re surrounded by violence. Each conflict seems unique and insoluble. With a reason for every war and a war for every reason, what hope is there for peace? Fortunately, it’s simpler than that. Why We Fight boils down decades of economics, political science, psychology, and real-world interventions, giving us some counterintuitive answers to the question of war. The first is that most of the time we don’t fight. Around the world, there are millions of hostile rivalries, yet only a fraction erupt into violence. Most enemies loathe one another in peace. The reason is simple: war is too costly to fight. It’s the worst way to settle our differences. In those rare instances when fighting ensues, that means we have to ask ourselves: What kept rivals from the normal, grudging compromise? The answer is always the same: It’s because a society or its leaders ignored those costs of war, or were willing to pay them. Why We Fight shows that there are just five ways this happens. From warring states to street gangs, ethnic groups and religious sects to political factions, Christopher Blattman shows that there are five reasons why violent conflict occasionally wins over compromise. Through Blattman’s time studying Medellín, Chicago, Liberia, Northern Ireland, and more, we learn the common logics driving vainglorious monarchs, dictators, mobs, pilots, football hooligans, ancient peoples, and fanatics. Why We Fight shows that war isn’t a series of errors, accidents, and emotions gone awry. There are underlying strategic, ideological, and institutional forces that are too often overlooked. So how to get to peace? Blattman shows that societies are surprisingly good at interrupting and ending violence when they want to—even gangs do it. The best peacemakers tackle the five reasons, shifting incentives away from violence and getting rivals back to dealmaking. And they do so through tinkering, not transformation. Realistic and optimistic, this is a book that lends new meaning to the adage “Give peace a chance.”

Building the Nation draws from foreign-policy reports and interviews with U.S. military officers to investigate recent U.S.-led efforts to "nation-build" in Iraq and Afghanistan. Heather Selma Gregg argues that efforts to nation-build in both countries focused more on what should be called state-building, or how to establish a government, rule of law, security forces, and a viable economy. Considerably less attention was paid to what might truly be called nation-building--the process of developing a sense of shared identity, purpose, and destiny among a population within a state's borders and popular support for the state and its government. According to Gregg, efforts to stabilize states in the modern world require two key factors largely overlooked in Iraq and Afghanistan: popular involvement in the process of rebuilding the state that gives the population ownership of the process and its results and efforts to foster and strengthen national unity. Gregg offers a hypothetical look at how the United States and its allies could have used a population-centric approach to build viable states in Iraq and Afghanistan, focusing on initiatives that would have given the population buy-in and agency. Moving forward, Gregg proposes a six-step program for state and nation-building in the twenty-first century, stressing that these efforts are as much about how state-building is done as they are about specific goals or programs.

Industrialization and Assimilation examines the process of ethnic identity change in a broad historical context. Green explains how and why ethnicity changes across time, showing that, by altering the basis of economic production from land to labour and removing people from the 'idiocy of rural life', industrialization makes societies more ethnically homogenous. More specifically, the author argues that industrialization lowers the relative value of rural land, leading people to identify less with narrow rural identities in favour of broader identities that can aid them in navigating the formal urban economy. Using large-scale datasets that span the globe as well as detailed case studies ranging from mid-twentieth-century Turkey to contemporary Botswana, Somalia and Uganda, as well as evidence from Native Americans in the United States and the Māori in New Zealand, Industrialization and Assimilation provides a new framework to understand the origins of modern ethnic identities.