Here is a comprehensive analysis of rearmament under the Baldwin and Chamberlain governments. It reveals the primary determinants of events and provides important new information regarding the principal considerations underlying Chamberlain's policy of appeasement. The author concentrates on a problem that was of central concern to the government. For this reason, and because he draws on the recently opened Cabinet and Treasury papers at the Public Record Office in London, he is able to offer a broader view than that of the existing studies. He describes in detail the interaction of the Cabinet, Treasury, and Armed Services, and the influence of the financial and industrial communities. Originally published in 1977. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Standing against conventional wisdom, historian James Levy reevaluates Britain's twin policies of appeasement and rearmament in the late 1930s. By carefully examining the political and economic environment of the times, Levy argues that Neville Chamberlain crafted an active, logical and morally defensible foreign policy designed to avoid and deter a potentially devastating war. Levy shows that through Chamberlain's experience as Chancellor of the Exchequer, he knew that Britain had not yet fully recovered from the first World War and the longer an international confrontation could be avoided, the better Britain's chances of weathering the storm. In the end, Hitler could be neither appeased nor deterred, and recognizing this, Britain and France went into war better armed and better prepared to fight.

This book is the first to challenge current orthodoxy that Chamberlain's appeasement policy before World War Two was justified by Britain's inability to pay for rearmament. The book shows that British war potential was actually massive, with a solid foundation in the existing Imperial economy. Using previously unconsidered and recently declassified documents from British and American archives the author demonstrates that the deliberate and political rejection of rearmament in the hope of eventual American support proved catastrophic for Britain.

Wesley K. Wark catalogs the many misperceptions about Nazi Germany that were often fostered by British intelligence.

Food for War is a ground-breaking study of Britain's food and agricultural preparations in the 1930s as the nation once again made ready for war. Historians writing about 1930s Britain have usually focused on the Depression, appeasement, or political, military, and industrial concerns. None have dealt adequately with another significant topic, food and agriculture, as the nation moved, albeit reluctantly, from peace to war. In this new account Alan F. Wilt makes right this omission by examining in depth the relationship between food, agriculture, and the nation's preparations for war. He reveals how food and agriculture became closely linked to rearmament as early as 1936; that the government's preparations in this sector, as contrasted with other areas of the economy, were relatively well-developed when war broke out in 1936; and that rural and farm interests well understood the effect that war would have on their way of life. He argues that food and agriculture need to be integrated into the more general historical discourse, for what happened in Britain in the 1930s not only set the stage for World War II, but also contributed to a more robust agriculture in the decades that followed.

From statesmen and military commanders to ordinary Britons, a bold, sweeping history of Britain's entrance into World War II—and its efforts to survive it—illuminating the ways in which the war permanently transformed a nation and its people “Might be the single best examination of British politics, society and strategy in these four years that has ever been written.” —The Wall Street Journal Here is the many-faceted, world-historically significant story of Britain at war. In looking closely at the military and political dimensions of the conflict’s first crucial years, Alan Allport tackles pressing questions such as whether the war could have been avoided, how it could have been lost, how well the British lived up to their own values, and ultimately, what difference the war made to the fate of the nation. In answering these questions, he reexamines our assumptions and paints a vivid portrait of the ways in which the Second World War transformed British culture and society. This bracing account draws on a lively cast of characters—from the political and military leaders who made the decisions, to the ordinary citizens who lived through them—in a comprehensible and compelling single history of forty-six million people. A sweeping and groundbreaking epic, Britain at Bay gives us a fresh look at the opening years of the war, and illuminates the integral moments that, for better or for worse, made Britain what it is today.

This distinguished book offers fresh perspectives on British appeasement, grand strategy, and policymaking in a crucial and much-debated period of history. Innovative in both his interpretation and his method, Gaines Post, Jr., reexamines how British leaders planned foreign policy and imperial defense as they faced the increasing likelihood of war with the dictatorial regimes of Germany, Italy, and Japan. He clarifies the ways in which the dynamics of the machinery of government affected the choice of policies, delimited the management of crises, and restricted the pace of rearmament. Post provides a novel and intricate synthesis of what we know about British foreign policy in the 1930s: rearmament, deterrence, decisionmaking, and the question of timing. Analyzing the Ethiopian and Rhineland crises as case studies, he shows how they defeated British efforts to develop a comprehensive strategy of conventional and extended deterrence. London's unsuccessful attempts to deter Hitler and Mussolini, he demonstrates, were frustrated by confusion in the decisionmaking machinery of government, by conflicting notions of how to buy time, by unpredictable international crises, and by the plans of Neville Chamberlain for correlating airpower, economic stability at home, and conciliation overseas. Challenging the generally accepted interpretation of British grand strategy in the 1930s, Dilemmas of Appeasement will be important reading for historians, especially of modern Britain and Europe, political scientists, and defense studies specialists.