Since 2008, many countries across the globe have witnessed the introduction of new recovery and resolution regimes for banks. Whereas much may have been achieved on regional levels, this has not been perfect, and many global challenges remain unsolved. The Research Handbook on Cross-Border Bank Resolution analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the current regulatory framework for cross-border bank crises with contributions from eminent experts from the US, EU, Japan and China. The topic is addressed from both economic, and legal perspectives, with a special section devoted to real-life cases.

Financial Crisis Management and Bank Resolution provides an analysis of the responses to the recent crisis that has beset the international financial markets taking a top down approach looking at the mechanisms to manage a financial crisis, to the practicalities of dealing with the resolution of a bank experiencing distress. This work is an interdisciplinary analysis of the law and policy surrounding crisis management and bank resolution. It comprises contributions from a team of leading experts in the field that have been carefully selected from across the globe. These experts are drawn from the law, central banks, government, financial services and academia. This edited collection will provide a new and important contribution to the subject at a crucial time in the debate around banking resolution and crisis management regimes, and help to plug the gap in our knowledge and understanding of the law of bank resolution and restructuring.

In the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis, regulators have rushed to strengthen banking supervision and implement bank resolution regimes. While such resolution regimes are welcome to reintroduce market discipline and reduce the reliance on taxpayer-funded bailouts, the effects on the wider banking system have not been properly considered. This paper proposes a macro approach to resolution, which should consider:(i) the contagion effects of bail-in and,(ii) the continuing need for a fiscal backstop to the financial system.For bail-in to work, it is important that bail-inable bank bonds are largely held outside the banking sector, which is currently not the case. Stricter capital requirements could push them out of the banking system. The organisation of the fiscal backstop is crucial for the stability of the global banking system. Single-point-of-entry resolution of international banks is only possible for the very largest countries or for countries working together, including in terms of sharing the burden of a potential bank bailout. The euro area has adopted the latter approach in its Banking Union. Other countries have taken a stand-alone approach, which leads to multiple-point-of-entry resolution of international banks and contributes to fragmentation of the global banking system.

The Great Financial Crisis of 2007-2010 has had a major impact on large cross-border banks, which are widely blamed for the start and severity of the crisis. As a result, much public policy, both in the United States and elsewhere, has been directed at making these banks safer and less influential by reducing their size and permissible powers through increased government regulation.At the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's 18th annual International Banking Conference, held in November 2015, the status of these large cross-border banks was critically evaluated. In collaboration with the World Bank, the conference held discussions on the current regulatory landscape for large and internationally active financial institutions; the impact of regulation on bank permissible activities and international trade; improvements in risk management; necessary repairs to the bank safety net; the resolution of insolvent banks operating across national borders; corporate governance for banks in the new environment; implications for market and government discipline; and, progress in achieving international cooperation.Contributors include international policymakers, practitioners, researchers, and academics from more than 30 countries. The papers from the conference are collected in this volume.

In the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis, regulators have rushed to strengthen banking supervision and implement bank resolution regimes. While such resolution regimes are welcome to reintroduce market discipline and reduce the reliance on taxpayer-funded bailouts, the effects on the wider banking system have not been properly considered. This paper proposes a macro approach to resolution, which should consider (i) the contagion effects of bail-in, and (ii) the continuing need for a fiscal backstop to the financial system. For bail-in to work, it is important that bail-inable bank bonds are largely held outside the banking sector, which is currently not the case. Stricter capital requirements could push them out of the banking system. The organisation of the fiscal backstop is crucial for the stability of the global banking system. Single-point-of-entry resolution of international banks is only possible for the very largest countries or for countries working together, including in terms of sharing the burden of a potential bank bailout. The euro area has adopted the latter approach in its Banking Union. Other countries have taken a stand-alone approach, which leads to multiple-point-of-entry resolution of international banks and contributes to fragmentation of the global banking system.

Global Bank Regulation: Principles and Policies covers the global regulation of financial institutions. It integrates theories, history, and policy debates, thereby providing a strategic approach to understanding global policy principles and banking. The book features definitions of the policy principles of capital regularization, the main justifications for prudent regulation of banks, the characteristics of tools used regulate firms that operate across all time zones, and a discussion regarding the 2007-2009 financial crises and the generation of international standards of financial institution regulation. The first four chapters of the book offer justification for the strict regulation of banks and discuss the importance of financial safety. The next chapters describe in greater detail the main policy networks and standard setting bodies responsible for policy development. They also provide information about bank licensing requirements, leading jurisdictions, and bank ownership and affiliations. The last three chapters of the book present a thorough examination of bank capital regulation, which is one of the most important areas in international banking. The text aims to provide information to all economics students, as well as non-experts and experts interested in the history, policy development, and theory of international banking regulation. - Defines the over-arching policy principles of capital regulation - Explores main justifications for the prudent regulation of banks - Discusses the 2007-2009 financial crisis and the next generation of international standards of financial institution regulation - Examines tools for ensuring the adequate supervision of a firm that operates across all time zones

This paper analyzes the evolution of bank funding structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and studies the implications for financial stability, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 banks in the U.S. and Europe during 2001?09. The results show that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. The likelihood of bank failure also increases with bank risk-taking. In the cross-section, the smaller domestically-oriented banks were relatively more vulnerable to liquidity risk, while the large cross-border banks were more susceptible to solvency risk due to excessive leverage. The results support the proposed Basel III regulations on structural liquidity and leverage, but suggest that emphasis should be placed on the latter, particularly for the systemically-important institutions. Macroeconomic and monetary conditions are also shown to be related with the likelihood of bank failure, providing a case for the introduction of a macro-prudential approach to banking regulation.

Developing an effective framework for cross-border resolution is a key priority in international regulatory reform. Large bank failures during the global financial crisis brought home the lack of adequate tools for resolving “too-big-to-fail” institutions. In cross-border cases, misaligned incentives and lack of robust mechanisms for resolution and cross-border cooperation left some country authorities with little choice but to take unilateral actions, which contributed to the high fiscal costs of the crisis and resulted in disorderly resolution in some cases