This paper analyzes the evolution of bank funding structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and studies the implications for financial stability, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 banks in the U.S. and Europe during 2001?09. The results show that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. The likelihood of bank failure also increases with bank risk-taking. In the cross-section, the smaller domestically-oriented banks were relatively more vulnerable to liquidity risk, while the large cross-border banks were more susceptible to solvency risk due to excessive leverage. The results support the proposed Basel III regulations on structural liquidity and leverage, but suggest that emphasis should be placed on the latter, particularly for the systemically-important institutions. Macroeconomic and monetary conditions are also shown to be related with the likelihood of bank failure, providing a case for the introduction of a macro-prudential approach to banking regulation.

The recent turmoil on financial markets has made evident the importance of efficient liquidity risk management for the stability of banks. The measurement and management of liquidity risk must take into account economic factors such as the impact area, the timeframe of the analysis, the origin and the economic scenario in which the risk becomes manifest. Basel III, among other things, has introduced harmonized international minimum requirements and has developed global liquidity standards and supervisory monitoring procedures. The short book analyses the economic impact of the new regulation on profitability, on assets composition and business mix, on liabilities structure and replacement effects on banking and financial products.​

We identify different sources of risk as important determinants of banks' corporate structures when expanding into new markets. Subsidiary-based corporate structures benefit from greater protection against economic risk because of affiliate-level limited liability, but are more exposed to the risk of capital expropriation than are branches. Thus, branch-based structures are preferred to subsidiary-based structures when expropriation risk is high relative to economic risk, and vice versa. Greater cross-country risk correlation and more accurate pricing of risk by investors reduce the differences between the two structures. Furthermore, the corporate structure affects bank risk taking and affiliate size.

Gain a deeper understanding of the issues surrounding financial risk and regulation Foundations of Financial Risk details the various risks, regulations, and supervisory requirements institutions face in today's economic and regulatory environment. Written by the experts at the Global Association of Risk Professionals (GARP), this book represents an update to GARP's original publication, Foundations of Banking Risk. You'll learn the terminology and basic concepts surrounding global financial risk and regulation, and develop an understanding of the methods used to measure and manage market, credit, and operational risk. Coverage includes traded market risk and regulation, treasury risk and regulation, and much more, including brand new coverage of risk management for insurance companies. Clear explanations, focused discussion, and comprehensive relevancy make this book an ideal resource for an introduction to risk management. The textbook provides an understanding of risk management methodologies, governance structures for risk management in financial institutions and the regulatory requirements dictated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. It provides thorough coverage of the issues surrounding financial risk, giving you a solid knowledgebase and a practical, applicable understanding. Understand risk measurement and management Learn how minimum capital requirements are regulated Explore all aspects of financial institution regulation and disclosure Master the terminology of global risk and regulation Financial institutions and supervisors around the world are increasingly recognizing how vital sound risk management practices are to both individual firms and the capital markets system as a whole. Savvy professionals recognize the need for authoritative and comprehensive training, and Foundations of Financial Risk delivers with expert-led education for those new to risk management.

Using a sample of over 700 banks in Latin America, we show that international financial liberalization lowers bank capital ratios and increases the shares of short-term funding. Following liberalization, large banks substitute interbank borrowing for equity and long-term funding, whereas small banks increase the proportions of retail funding in their liabilities, which have been particularly vulnerable to flight-to-quality during periods of financial distress in much of Latin America. We also find evidence that riskier bank funding in the aftermath of financial liberalizations is exacerbated by asymmetric information, which rises on geographical distance and the opacity of balance sheets.

This text comprises a selection of papers that provide state of the art insights into bank performance, risk and firm financing post crisis that were presented at the European Association of University Teachers of Banking and Finance Conference (otherwise known as the Wolpertinger Conference) held at Bangor University, Wales, 2010.

As part of Basel III reforms, the NSFR is a new prudential liquidity rule aimed at limiting excess maturity transformation risk in the banking sector and promoting funding stability. The revised package has been issued for public consultation with a plan of making the rule binding in 2018. This paper complements earlier quantitative impact studies by discussing the potential impact of introducing the NSFR based on empirical analysis of end-2012 financial data for over 2000 banks covering 128 countries. The calculations show that a sizeable percentage of the banks in most countries would meet the minimum NSFR prudential requirement at end-2012, and, further, that larger banks tend to be more vulnerable to the introduction of the NSFR. Additionally, by comparing the NSFR to other structural funding mismatch indicators, we find that the NSFR is a relatively consistent regulatory measure for capturing banks’ funding risk. Finally, the paper discusses key policy issues for consideration in implementing the NSFR.

As part of Basel III reforms, the NSFR is a new prudential liquidity rule aimed at limiting excess maturity transformation risk in the banking sector and promoting funding stability. The revised package has been issued for public consultation with a plan of making the rule binding in 2018. This paper complements earlier quantitative impact studies by discussing the potential impact of introducing the NSFR based on empirical analysis of end-2012 financial data for over 2000 banks covering 128 countries. The calculations show that a sizeable percentage of the banks in most countries would meet the minimum NSFR prudential requirement at end-2012, and, further, that larger banks tend to be more vulnerable to the introduction of the NSFR. Additionally, by comparing the NSFR to other structural funding mismatch indicators, we find that the NSFR is a relatively consistent regulatory measure for capturing banks’ funding risk. Finally, the paper discusses key policy issues for consideration in implementing the NSFR.

This paper analyzes the evolution of bank funding structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and studies the implications for financial stability, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 banks in the U.S. and Europe during 2001?09. The results show that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. The likelihood of bank failure also increases with bank risk-taking. In the cross-section, the smaller domestically-oriented banks were relatively more vulnerable to liquidity risk, while the large cross-border banks were more susceptible to solvency risk due to excessive leverage. The results support the proposed Basel III regulations on structural liquidity and leverage, but suggest that emphasis should be placed on the latter, particularly for the systemically-important institutions. Macroeconomic and monetary conditions are also shown to be related with the likelihood of bank failure, providing a case for the introduction of a macro-prudential approach to banking regulation.