A systematic critical survey of American strategic thinking and the strategic culture in which it is formed. In particular, this book seeks to interrogate the theory and strategy of nuclear deterrence, and its relationship to the concept of missile defence. Drawing widely on the theoretical literature in international relations and strategic studies, it identifies the key groups that have competed over America's nuclear policy post-1945 and examines how the concept of missile defence went through a process of gestation and intellectual contestation, leading to its eventual legitimization in the late 1990s. Steff sheds light on the individuals, groups, institutions and processes that led to the decision by the Bush administration to deploy a national missile defence shield. Additionally, Steff systematically examines the impact deployment had on the calculations of Russia and China. In the process he explains that their reactions under the Bush administration have continued into the Obama era, revealing that a new great power security dilemma has broken out. This, Steff shows, has led to a decline in great power relations as a consequence.

There is a large body of scholarly work on deterrence theory, specifically as it relates to nuclear weapons. The interaction between strategic ballistic missile defense and nuclear deterrence has been extensively debated, but the majority of those debates and the broader discussion of nuclear deterrence has been done predominantly within the context of the Cold War. The post-Cold War era includes so called "rogue nations" and non-state actors which have, or will have, access to nuclear weapons, some of which are deliverable via ballistic missiles. A fundamental pillar of deterrence theory is that the parties involved are rational actors. In the post-Cold War era, "rogue nations" and non-state actors may not be rational, and thus, may or may not be deterrable. This situation makes a strong case for a strategic ballistic missile defense system, both as a hedge against a non-rational actor, and to introduce an element of uncertainty into their calculus. Provided this missile defense system remains small, it will improve U.S. national security while not undermining traditional nuclear deterrence.

With the end of the Cold War and the visibility of U.S. Patriot missile defenses during the 1991 Gulf War, the cost and benefits of ballistic missile defense systems (BMD) need to be re-evaluated. In this detailed and balanced study, David Denoon assesses new types of short-range and intercontinental missile defenses. In the post Cold War era, two fundamental changes have made missile defense for the United States and its military forces more compelling: The United States and Russia no longer see each other as direct threats and there has been a dramatic proliferation of ballistic missile capability in the Third World. Consequently, U.S. forces deployed overseas are more likely to be at risk and, eventually, the United States itself could become vulnerable to missile threats. With these changes in mind, David Denoon analyzes the current BMD dilemma, arguing that active defenses against missiles should be seen as a form of insurance against catastrophe. He assesses the likelihood of missile attacks and the appropriate level of investment for the United States to defend against such attacks. The book provides an assessment of deterrence and the performance of the Patriot missiles during the 1991 Gulf War, critiques the Strategic Defense Initiative, and analyzes the prospects for new types of short-range and intercontinental missile defenses.

Defense against nuclear attack—so natural and seemingly so compelling a goal—has provoked debate for at least twenty years. Ballistic missle defense systems, formerly called antiballistic missile systems, offer the prospect of remedying both superpowers' alarming vulnerability to nuclear weapons by technological rather than political means. But whether ballistic missile defenses can be made to work and whether it is wise to build them remain controversial. The U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 restricts testing and deployment of ballistic missile defenses but has not prohibited more than a decade of research and development on both sides. As exotic new proposals are put forward for space-based directed-energy systems, questions about the effectiveness and wisdom of missile defense have again become central to the national debate on defense policy. This study, jointly sponsored by the Brookings Institution and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, examines the strategic, technological, and political issues raised by ballistic missile defense. Eight contributors take an analytical approach to their areas of expertise, which include the relationship of missile defense to nuclear strategy, the nature and potential applications of current and future technologies, the views on missile defense in the Soviet Union and among the smaller nuclear powers, the meaning of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty for today's technology, and the present role and historical legacy of ballistic missile defense in the context of East-West relations. The volume editors give a comprehensive introduction to this wide range of subjects and an assessment of future prospects. In the final chapter, nine knowledgeable observers offer their varied personal views on the ballistic missile defense question.

A clear and lively account of the space-weapons issue. The authors examine all aspects of the Strategic Defense Initiative proposal its historical background, current and forthcoming technologies, and international political implications. The book is divided into three main sections. The first part describes the historical development of space-weapons technology from the 1920s to the present day. The second part provides a detailed technical assessment of the anti-missile systems being pursued as part of the Strategic Defense Initiative. It also considers the countermeasures to SDI that are currently in existence or are being developed by the United States and the Soviet Union. The third part examines the international political and strategic implications of SDI and their probable consequences for arms-control policies.

This book discusses most recent developments in the area of US ballistic missile defense with an eye on its battlefield capacities since the Kuwait war, analyzed from the perspective of deterrence postures encompassing the key post-Cold War security challenges (Middle East, Far East, Eastern Europe). The analyzed cases of missile defense engagements included (after the Desert Storm), Operation Iraqi Freedom, Israeli operations against Hamas and Yemen war. The theoretical base of the book relied on the waves of deterrence theory since the early years of the nuclear age through the deployment of thermonuclear warheads, nuclear plenty and the late Cold War revisions of deterrence paradigms. The main body of the book is exploring the historical and probabilistic evidence on missile defense accuracy in various scenarios of its employment and differing layered short, medium and long range systems of the US counter-ballistic technologies. Historically, the missile defense investments since the early thermonuclear range were challenging the Mutual Assured Destruction paradigm. Notably, after partial marginalization of US long range missile defense concepts of the 1960s, seen as incompatible with 1972 Anti-ballistic missile treaty between the US and USSR, missile defense constructions were reinvigorated through Reagan's 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative, while post-1976 Patriot tactical air and missile defense were gradually winning arms contracts, as in the post Cold War age the value of extended deterrence grew. New post-Cold War missile defense investments included the Middle Eastern US allies, as well as Japan and South Korea threatened by DPRK nuclear and ballistic experiments. Importantly, the value of extended missile defense engagements became broader visible in the era of New Cold War between Russia and the West, when new Aegis Ashore bases in Romania and Poland proved the theater range missile defense capacity of new NATO members. Grzegorz Nycz, Ph.D. is adjunct professor at the Pedagogical University of Cracow's Institute of Political Science. He graduated from Jagiellonian University and Cracow University of Economics. Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund Fellow 2007/2008. His research refers to U.S. security and foreign policy, with a special focus on nuclear deterrence and ballistic missile defense postures. His recent publications include monographs on strategic balance and U.S. national security policy and texts in periodicals related to ballistic missile defense investments, as well as U.S. military-political engagements in Eastern Europe, Middle East and East Asia in the time of the "New Cold War" between Russia and the West.

Are NATO’s mutual security commitments strong enough today to deter all adversaries? Is the nuclear umbrella as credible as it was during the Cold War? Backed by the full range of US and allied military capabilities, NATO’s mutual defense treaty has been enormously successful, but today’s commitments are strained by military budget cuts and antinuclear sentiment. The United States has also shifted its focus away from European security during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and more recently with the Asia rebalance. Will a resurgent Russia change this? The Future of Extended Deterrence brings together experts and scholars from the policy and academic worlds to provide a theoretically rich and detailed analysis of post–Cold War nuclear weapons policy, nuclear deterrence, alliance commitments, nonproliferation, and missile defense in NATO but with implications far beyond. The contributors analyze not only American policy and ideas but also the ways NATO members interpret their own continued political and strategic role in the alliance. In-depth and multifaceted, The Future of Extended Deterrence is an essential resource for policy practitioners and scholars of nuclear deterrence, arms control, missile defense, and the NATO alliance.

With the end of the Cold War and the visibility of U.S. Patriot missile defenses during the 1991 Gulf War, the cost and benefits of ballistic missile defense systems (BMD) need to be re-evaluated. In this detailed and balanced study, David Denoon assesses new types of short-range and intercontinental missile defenses. In the post Cold War era, two fundamental changes have made missile defense for the United States and its military forces more compelling: The United States and Russia no longer see each other as direct threats and there has been a dramatic proliferation of ballistic missile capability in the Third World. Consequently, U.S. forces deployed overseas are more likely to be at risk and, eventually, the United States itself could become vulnerable to missile threats. With these changes in mind, David Denoon analyzes the current BMD dilemma, arguing that active defenses against missiles should be seen as a form of insurance against catastrophe. He assesses the likelihood of missile attacks and the appropriate level of investment for the United States to defend against such attacks. The book provides an assessment of deterrence and the performance of the Patriot missiles during the 1991 Gulf War, critiques the Strategic Defense Initiative, and analyzes the prospects for new types of short-range and intercontinental missile defenses.

Since the early 1960s, the U.S. strategic nuclear posture has been composed of a triad of nuclear-certified long-range bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Since the early 1970s, U.S. nuclear forces have been subject to strategic arms control agreements. The large numbers and diversified nature of the U.S. nonstrategic (tactical) nuclear forces, which cannot be ignored as part of the overall nuclear deterrent, have decreased substantially since the Cold War. While there is domestic consensus today on the need to maintain an effective deterrent, there is no consensus on precisely what that requires, especially in a changing geopolitical environment and with continued reductions in nuclear arms. This places a premium on having the best possible analytic tools, methods, and approaches for understanding how nuclear deterrence and assurance work, how they might fail, and how failure can be averted by U.S. nuclear forces. U.S. Air Force Strategic Deterrence Analytic Capabilities identifies the broad analytic issues and factors that must be considered in seeking nuclear deterrence of adversaries and assurance of allies in the 21st century. This report describes and assesses tools, methods - including behavioral science-based methods - and approaches for improving the understanding of how nuclear deterrence and assurance work or may fail in the 21st century and the extent to which such failures might be averted or mitigated by the proper choice of nuclear systems, technological capabilities, postures, and concepts of operation of American nuclear forces. The report recommends criteria and a framework for validating the tools, methods, and approaches and for identifying those most promising for Air Force usage.