With the end of the Cold War and the visibility of U.S. Patriot missile defenses during the 1991 Gulf War, the cost and benefits of ballistic missile defense systems (BMD) need to be re-evaluated. In this detailed and balanced study, David Denoon assesses new types of short-range and intercontinental missile defenses. In the post Cold War era, two fundamental changes have made missile defense for the United States and its military forces more compelling: The United States and Russia no longer see each other as direct threats and there has been a dramatic proliferation of ballistic missile capability in the Third World. Consequently, U.S. forces deployed overseas are more likely to be at risk and, eventually, the United States itself could become vulnerable to missile threats. With these changes in mind, David Denoon analyzes the current BMD dilemma, arguing that active defenses against missiles should be seen as a form of insurance against catastrophe. He assesses the likelihood of missile attacks and the appropriate level of investment for the United States to defend against such attacks. The book provides an assessment of deterrence and the performance of the Patriot missiles during the 1991 Gulf War, critiques the Strategic Defense Initiative, and analyzes the prospects for new types of short-range and intercontinental missile defenses.

With the end of the Cold War and the visibility of U.S. Patriot missile defenses during the 1991 Gulf War, the cost and benefits of ballistic missile defense systems (BMD) need to be re-evaluated. In this detailed and balanced study, David Denoon assesses new types of short-range and intercontinental missile defenses. In the post Cold War era, two fundamental changes have made missile defense for the United States and its military forces more compelling: The United States and Russia no longer see each other as direct threats and there has been a dramatic proliferation of ballistic missile capability in the Third World. Consequently, U.S. forces deployed overseas are more likely to be at risk and, eventually, the United States itself could become vulnerable to missile threats. With these changes in mind, David Denoon analyzes the current BMD dilemma, arguing that active defenses against missiles should be seen as a form of insurance against catastrophe. He assesses the likelihood of missile attacks and the appropriate level of investment for the United States to defend against such attacks. The book provides an assessment of deterrence and the performance of the Patriot missiles during the 1991 Gulf War, critiques the Strategic Defense Initiative, and analyzes the prospects for new types of short-range and intercontinental missile defenses.

This book discusses most recent developments in the area of US ballistic missile defense with an eye on its battlefield capacities since the Kuwait war, analyzed from the perspective of deterrence postures encompassing the key post-Cold War security challenges (Middle East, Far East, Eastern Europe). The analyzed cases of missile defense engagements included (after the Desert Storm), Operation Iraqi Freedom, Israeli operations against Hamas and Yemen war. The theoretical base of the book relied on the waves of deterrence theory since the early years of the nuclear age through the deployment of thermonuclear warheads, nuclear plenty and the late Cold War revisions of deterrence paradigms. The main body of the book is exploring the historical and probabilistic evidence on missile defense accuracy in various scenarios of its employment and differing layered short, medium and long range systems of the US counter-ballistic technologies. Historically, the missile defense investments since the early thermonuclear range were challenging the Mutual Assured Destruction paradigm. Notably, after partial marginalization of US long range missile defense concepts of the 1960s, seen as incompatible with 1972 Anti-ballistic missile treaty between the US and USSR, missile defense constructions were reinvigorated through Reagan's 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative, while post-1976 Patriot tactical air and missile defense were gradually winning arms contracts, as in the post Cold War age the value of extended deterrence grew. New post-Cold War missile defense investments included the Middle Eastern US allies, as well as Japan and South Korea threatened by DPRK nuclear and ballistic experiments. Importantly, the value of extended missile defense engagements became broader visible in the era of New Cold War between Russia and the West, when new Aegis Ashore bases in Romania and Poland proved the theater range missile defense capacity of new NATO members. Grzegorz Nycz, Ph.D. is adjunct professor at the Pedagogical University of Cracow's Institute of Political Science. He graduated from Jagiellonian University and Cracow University of Economics. Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund Fellow 2007/2008. His research refers to U.S. security and foreign policy, with a special focus on nuclear deterrence and ballistic missile defense postures. His recent publications include monographs on strategic balance and U.S. national security policy and texts in periodicals related to ballistic missile defense investments, as well as U.S. military-political engagements in Eastern Europe, Middle East and East Asia in the time of the "New Cold War" between Russia and the West.

This volume in the Weapons of Mass Destruction series makes the case that the United States’ expansive missile defence policy has eroded both its own security and that of its allies. These findings are based on an examination of the response of a number of key states to U.S. policy, including Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. Situating their argument in the theoretical debate on balancing in unipolarity, the authors contrast their view to influential perspectives that see little evidence of hard balancing against the U.S. in the post-Cold War era. Adopting a neorealist perspective, the authors demonstrate the clear presence of this inter-state practice, providing insight into the international politics of unipolarity, showing how hard balancing and security dilemma-related dynamics operate in the contemporary strategic environment.

Deterrence as a strategic concept evolved during the Cold War. During that period, deterrence strategy was aimed mainly at preventing aggression against the United States and its close allies by the hostile Communist power centers--the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies, Communist China and North Korea. In particular, the strategy was devised to prevent aggression involving nuclear attack by the USSR or China. Since the end of the Cold War, the risk of war among the major powers has subsided to the lowest point in modern history. Still, the changing nature of the threats to American and allied security interests has stimulated a considerable broadening of the deterrence concept. Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence examines the meaning of deterrence in this new environment and identifies key elements of a post-Cold War deterrence strategy and the critical issues in devising such a strategy. It further examines the significance of these findings for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Quantitative and qualitative measures to support judgments about the potential success or failure of deterrence are identified. Such measures will bear on the suitability of the naval forces to meet the deterrence objectives. The capabilities of U.S. naval forces that especially bear on the deterrence objectives also are examined. Finally, the book examines the utility of models, games, and simulations as decision aids in improving the naval forces' understanding of situations in which deterrence must be used and in improving the potential success of deterrence actions.

This book examines the transformation in US thinking about the role of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) in national security policy since the end of the Cold War. The evolution of the BMD debate after the Cold War has been complex, complicated and punctuated. As this book shows, the debate and subsequent policy choices would often appear to reflect neither the particular requirements of the international system for US security at any given time, nor indeed the current capabilities of BMD technology. Ballistic Missile Defence and US National Security Policy traces the evolution of policy from the zero-sum debates that surrounded the Strategic Defense Initiative as Ronald Reagan left office, up to the relative political consensus that exists around a limited BMD deployment in 2012. The book shows how and why policy evolved in such a complex manner during this period, and explains the strategic reasoning and political pressures shaping BMD policy under each of the presidents who have held office since 1989. Ultimately, this volume demonstrates how relative advancements in technology, combined with growth in the perceived missile threat, gradually shifted the contours and rhythm of the domestic missile defence debate in the US towards acceptance and normalisation. This book will be of much interest to students of missile defence and arms control, US national security policy, strategic studies and international relations in general.

As part of a larger study of the strategic arms competition which developed after World War II between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., this study of the two countries¿ strategies for air and ballistic missile defense addresses two broad subjects: (1) How did each country approach the problem of defense against the threat from the air? (2) Why did each country accent particular elements of an air defense strategy at various periods between 1945 and 1972? The first question concerns the means that leaders chose for defense against an increasingly sophisticated offensive threat. Includes several appendices of chronologies, tables, charts, maps and notes.

Ballistic missile defenses (BMD) have been an issue in U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Russian arms control talks since the 1970s. During the Cold War, the nations sought to balance limits on offensive weapons and defensive weapons so that they could maintain ¿strategic stability,¿ which refers to the ability of each side to launch a retaliatory strike after absorbing a first strike by the other side. Contents of this report: (1) Intro.; (2) Strategic Stability and the Relationship Between Offensive and Defensive Forces; (3) BMD and the 1991 START Treaty: The Negotiating Framework; START Ratification; Resolving Competing Priorities; BMD Programs and Budgets; BMD in the 1980s, and 1990s; Current BMD Plans and Programs; (4) BMD Budgets Over Time.