This thesis explores the will to win in asymmetric war. Asymmetric war, in which one side has an overwhelming advantage over its opponent, will likely be the war of the future for the United States in the post-Cold War uni- polar world. To win an asymmetric war, the individual and then the masses must be motivated to fight and, ultimately, the will to win must be cultivated and sustained for victory. Religion is a highly effective motivator for both the individual and the masses. This motivation, when properly directed, can provide the will to win in the face of overwhelming odds. This thesis focuses on religion as the primary motivator in an asymmetric war. Religion is a strong motivator for the individual because of four factors: appropriateness, identity, rationality, and religion's strength as an internally consistent logic. With a highly motivated individual, an organization gains specific advantages by focusing on the religious aspects of the conflict. These advantages are: commitment, legitimacy, membership, and longevity. These are the measurable elements that create a strong will to win. Three case studies - Iran and Iraq, Hezbollah and Israel, and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and Algeria - are explored as examples of contemporary asymmetric conflict. These case studies are used to examine the asymmetries between the countries in conflict and test the validity of our theory about the significance of the will to win.

How do the weak win wars? The likelihood of victory and defeat in asymmetric conflicts depends on the interaction of the strategies weak and strong actors use. Using statistical and in-depth historical analyses of conflicts spanning two hundred years, in this 2005 book Ivan Arregúin-Toft shows that, independent of regime type and weapons technology, the interaction of similar strategic approaches favors strong actors, while opposite strategic approaches favors the weak. This approach to understanding asymmetric conflicts allows us to makes sense of how the United States was able to win its war in Afghanistan (2002) in a few months, while the Soviet Union lost after a decade of brutal war (1979–89). Arreguín-Toft's strategic interaction theory has implications not only for international relations theory, but for policy makers grappling with interstate and civil wars, as well as terrorism.

Today more than one hundred small, asymmetric, and revolutionary wars are being waged around the world. This book provides invaluable tools for fighting such wars by taking enemy perspectives into consideration. The third volume of a trilogy by Max G. Manwaring, it continues the arguments the author presented in Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime and Gangs, Pseudo-Militaries, and Other Modern Mercenaries. Using case studies, Manwaring outlines vital survival lessons for leaders and organizations concerned with national security in our contemporary world. The insurgencies Manwaring describes span the globe. Beginning with conflicts in Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s and El Salvador in the 1980s, he goes on to cover the Shining Path and its resurgence in Peru, Al Qaeda in Spain, popular militias in Cuba, Haiti, and Brazil, the Russian youth group Nashi, and drugs and politics in Guatemala, as well as cyber warfare. Large, wealthy, well-armed nations such as the United States have learned from experience that these small wars and insurgencies do not resemble traditional wars fought between geographically distinct nation-state adversaries by easily identified military forces. Twenty-first-century irregular conflicts blur traditional distinctions among crime, terrorism, subversion, insurgency, militia, mercenary and gang activity, and warfare. Manwaring’s multidimensional paradigm offers military and civilian leaders a much needed blueprint for achieving strategic victories and ensuring global security now and in the future. It combines military and police efforts with politics, diplomacy, economics, psychology, and ethics. The challenge he presents to civilian and military leaders is to take probable enemy perspectives into consideration, and turn resultant conceptions into strategic victories.

Principles of Asymmetrical Warfare: How to Beat Islamo-fascists at Their Own Game provides principles, strategies, tactics, and methods available to the Administration in winning and ending the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the War on Terrorism. Some strategies and tactics appear extreme to a civilized country as the United States. However, we should know about and understand these strategies and tactics in case we must use them because the Isfasts are about to annihilate, conquer, or place us in bondage. I have quoted ideas from Sun Tzu, Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., and Dr. Michael Savage, a man of great intellect. Our Administration has made a major mistake by not learning from great warriors like Sun Tzu and Gen. Patton. Our Administration makes an even larger mistake by ignoring Michael Savage's thoughts, ideas, and suggestions. Many ideas are common sense, which seems to be lacking in our politicians, Administration, and military generals. Apparently, they do not know how to fight and win an asymmetrical war. "Principles of Asymmetrical Warfare" provides fresh ideas on fighting the Isfasts and winning. Therefore, if you desire to know how to beat the Isfasts at their own game, read Principles of Asymmetrical Warfare.

The study of asymmetrical warfare extends from the earliest known writings of man to the present day. While the term «asymmetrical warfare» may be unfamiliar to the lay person, the concept is by no means strange to any who have even minimal exposure to historical events. From the biblical story of David and Goliath to Herodotus' account of the Battle of Thermopylae to the American Revolution asymmetrical warfare has been recounted or documented throughout human history. Latest since 9/11 the phenomenon of asymmetric warfare has become a subject within the international relations. The essays in the book offer a detailed look at various aspects of asymmetrical warfare from the theoretical to the practical to manifestations of asymmetry in recent history. While not a comprehensive list of all the contemporary avenues of research on the subject, the authors provide a sample of the broad range of approaches to the study of asymmetrical warfare.

There is a wide spectrum of potential threats to the U.S. homeland that do not involve overt attacks by states using long-range missiles or conventional military forces. Such threats include covert attacks by state actors, state use of proxies, independent terrorist and extremist attacks by foreign groups or individuals, and independent terrorist and extremist attacks by residents of the United States. These threats are currently limited in scope and frequency, but are emerging as potentially significant issues for future U.S. security. In this comprehensive work, Cordesman argues that new threats require new thinking, and offers a range of recommendations, from expanding the understanding of what constitutes a threat and bolstering Homeland defense measures, to bettering resource allocation and improving intelligence gathering and analysis. No pattern of actual attacks on U.S. territory has yet emerged that provides a clear basis for predicting how serious any given form of attack might be in the future, what means of attack might be used, or how lethal new forms of attack might be. As a result, there is a major ongoing debate over the seriousness of the threat and how the U.S. government should react. This work is an invaluable contribution to that debate.

In recent years, the nature of conflict has changed. Through asymmetric warfare radical groups and weak state actors are using unexpected means to deal stunning blows to more powerful opponents in the West. From terrorism to information warfare, the Wests air power, sea power and land power are open to attack from clever, but much weaker, enemies. In this clear and engaging introduction, Rod Thornton unpacks the meaning and significance of asymmetric warfare, in both civilian and military realms, and examines why it has become such an important subject for study. He seeks to provide answers to key questions, such as how weaker opponents apply asymmetric techniques against the Western world, and shows how the Wests military superiority can be seriously undermined by asymmetric threats. The book concludes by looking at the ways in which the US, the state most vulnerable to asymmetric attack, is attempting to cope with some new battlefield realities. This is an indispensable guide to one of the key topics in security studies today.

PART I The superpower and asymmetry PART II Jus ad bellum, jus in bello, jus post bellum PART III Leadership and accountability PART IV Soldiers perspectives PART V Ethical Education and Decision-making for the Military PART VI Stress and trauma PART VII The media PART VIII Democracy under Scrutiny PART IX In Hindsight

Since the end of World War II a paradigm shift has occurred in armed conflict. Asymmetric, or fourth-generation warfareùthe challenge of nonstate belligerents to the authority and power of the stateùhas become the dominant form of conflict, while interstate conventional war has become an increasingly irrelevant instrument of statecraft. In asymmetric conflicts the enemy is often a fellow citizen with a different vision for the future of the countryùwaging war among the people, maneuvering on the borderlines between parliamentary politics, street politics, criminal activity, and combat operations. Winning Wars amongst the People analyzes the special circumstances of asymmetric conflicts in the domestic context and seeks to identify those principles that allow a democratic stateÆs security forces to meet the challenge, while at the same time obey their homelandÆs laws, protect its culture, observe its values, and maintain its liberties, traditions, and way of life. Using five detailed case studies, Peter A. Kiss explains the fundamental differences between the paradigm of conventional warfare and that of asymmetric warfare as well as the latterÆs political, social, and economic roots and main characteristics. Most important, he identifies the measures a government must take to prepare its security forces and other institutions of state for an asymmetric conflict.

Possible asymmetrical warfare scenarios include launching chemical, biological, or suicide attacks; taking indiscriminate actions against critical infrastructure; using hostages or human shields; deliberately destroying the environment; and targeting noncombatants.".