How do the weak win wars? The likelihood of victory and defeat in asymmetric conflicts depends on the interaction of the strategies weak and strong actors use. Using statistical and in-depth historical analyses of conflicts spanning two hundred years, in this 2005 book Ivan Arregúin-Toft shows that, independent of regime type and weapons technology, the interaction of similar strategic approaches favors strong actors, while opposite strategic approaches favors the weak. This approach to understanding asymmetric conflicts allows us to makes sense of how the United States was able to win its war in Afghanistan (2002) in a few months, while the Soviet Union lost after a decade of brutal war (1979–89). Arreguín-Toft's strategic interaction theory has implications not only for international relations theory, but for policy makers grappling with interstate and civil wars, as well as terrorism.

This thesis builds on the research and ideas of the school of thought that believes strategy is the most important factor in predicting war outcomes. One shortcoming of that school is the inability to explain why strong actors would implement a strategy that does not provide the highest probability of victory. The thesis uses game theory to illustrate how a seemingly nonoptimal strategy may be rational for the initial phases of a conflict (this rationale would not apply beyond the initial stages of the conflict). To explain nonoptimal strategy selection in prolonged conflicts, the author analyzes strategy drivers -- factors that influence strategy selection and implementation. Probability of victory is only one of the factors that has been found to influence strategy implementation. The author finds that the institutional predisposition of a military is the most important factor because it is the most consistent and the most controllable by the military. Using this conceptual basis, the author analyzes U.S. involvement in Afghanistan since 2001, U.S. operations in Iraq since 2003, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, and the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The model and case studies illustrate a U.S. military institutional predisposition towards direct attack. As such, the thesis recommends that the U.S. military take action to adopt a more neutral institutional predisposition.

Twenty-second century historians will note that a new World War began on 9/11/2001. In reality, it began much earlier. Competing value systems and the lust for natural resources will precipitate an inevitable clash of civilizations. Currently, we face elusive foes-foes who play by other rules-and in fact, we are already engaged in brutal, truly asymmetric conflict with varied forms of fighting; terrorism is but an isolated part. The increasing number of polymorphic hostilities requires revolutionary and unconventional responses. Special operations are the norm. Nanoscale, biological, and digital technologies have transformed how we fight future wars. Tactical lasers that zap pinpoint targets at twenty kilometers are being developed, as is the millimeter-wave Active Denial System that causes intense pain to those exposed. The "Mother of all Bombs" has been dropped, as have thermobaric weapons that destroy caves and bunkers. Robots roam the battlefield while exotic sensors catalogue nearly every facet of our lives. Paralyzing electrical shock weapons are in the hands of police. Even phasers on stun are closer than you think. Winning the War details the technologies and concepts necessary to ultimately determine the outcome of this global conflict. Via realistic scenarios from recovering tourists kidnapped by terrorists, to bringing down drug cartels in the Amazon, and even preventing Armageddon in the Middle East, Winning the War provides an insider's view into how these futuristic weapons will be used and into the complexities of modern warfare. Bold and controversial measures are prescribed, including the essential nature of absolute domination of space. Winning the War makes clear that drastic and innovative actions will be necessary to ensure our national survival.

This book examines a question generally neglected in the study of international relations: why does a militarily and economically less powerful state initiate conflict against a relatively strong state? T. V. Paul analyses this phenomenon by focusing on the strategic and political considerations, domestic and international, which influence a weaker state to initiate war against a more powerful adversary. The key argument of deterrence theory is that the military superiority of the status quo power, coupled with a credible retaliatory threat, will prevent attack by challengers. The author challenges this assumption by examining six twentieth-century asymmetric wars, from the Japanese offensive against Russia in 1904 to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982. The book's findings have wide implications for the study of war, power, deterrence, coercive diplomacy, strategy, arms races, and alliances.

The first documented, systematic study of a truly revolutionary subject, this 1937 text remains the definitive guide to guerrilla warfare. It concisely explains unorthodox strategies that transform disadvantages into benefits.

This report builds on the research and ideas of the school of thought that believes strategy is the most important factor in predicting war outcomes. One shortcoming of that school is the inability to explain why strong actors would implement a strategy that does not provide the highest probability of victory. This project uses a game theoretic model to illustrate how a seemingly non-optimal strategy may be rational for initial phases of the conflict. However, this rationale does not apply beyond initial stages of conflict. To explain non-optimal strategy selection in prolonged conflicts, this project analyzes strategy drivers--factors that influence strategy selection and implementation. Probability of victory is only one of the factors found to influence strategy implementation. Other than probability of victory, this study finds that the institutional predisposition of a military is the most important because it is the most consistent and the most controllable by the military. With this conceptual basis, the project analyzes U.S. involvement in Afghanistan since 2001. It also takes a cursory look at U.S. operations in Iraq since 2003, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, and the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The model and case studies illustrate a U.S. military institutional predisposition with an excessive disposition towards direct attack. As such, this thesis recommends taking action to provide the U.S. military with a more neutral institutional predisposition.CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION * A. AVOIDANCE IS NOT AN OPTION * B. NEED FOR A THEORY * C. THESIS * CHAPTER II - REVIEW OF WAR OUTCOME EXPLANATIONS * CHAPTER III - A CLOSER LOOK AT ARREGUIN-TOFT * A. STRONG AND WEAK * B. DIRECT ATTACK * C. INDIRECT ATTACK * D. DIRECT DEFENSE * E. INDIRECT DEFENSE * F. SHORTCOMINGS * CHAPTER IV - GAME THEORETIC MODEL * A. ORDINAL VALUES FOR STRONG ACTORS * B. ORDINAL VALUES FOR WEAK ACTORS * C. THE RESULTING GAME * D. PREDICTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS FROM THE GAME * CHAPTER V - STRATEGY DRIVERS * A. DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS THAT DRIVE STRATEGY * B. RELATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF STRATEGY FACTORS * CHAPTER VI - AFGHANISTAN CASE STUDY * A. STRATEGIC INTERACTION #1 * B. STRATEGIC INTERACTION #2 * C. ATTEMPTED STRATEGIC INTERACTION #3 * CHAPTER VII - OTHER CONFLICTS AT A GLANCE * A. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM * B. USSR IN AFGHANISTAN * C. U.S. INTERACTIONS IN VIETNAM * D. INSIGHTS FROM CASE STUDIES * CHAPTER VIII - DISCUSSION * CHAPTER IX - RECOMMENDATIONS * CHAPTER X - CONCLUSION

How can you achieve victory in war if you don't have a clear idea of your political aims and a vision of what victory means? In this provocative challenge to US political aims and strategy, Donald Stoker argues that America endures endless wars because its leaders no longer know how to think about war, particularly wars fought for limited aims, taking the nation to war without understanding what they want or valuing victory and thus the ending of the war. He reveals how flawed ideas on so-called 'limited war' and war in general evolved against the backdrop of American conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. These ideas, he shows, undermined America's ability to understand, wage, and win its wars, and to secure peace. Now fully updated to incorporate the American withdrawal from Afghanistan, Why America Loses Wars dismantles seventy years of misguided thinking and lays the foundations for a new approach to the wars of tomorrow.

Keen investigates why conflicts are so prevalent and so intractable, even when one side has much greater military resources. He asks who benefits from wars-- whether economically, politically, or psychologically-- and argues that in order to bring them successfully to an end we need to understand the complex vested interests on all sides.