China's rise as a space power has coincided with its quest for hegemony in the Indo-Pacific. Advances in China's space capabilities constitute a threat to regional states' national security, economic competitiveness, and national prestige. Accordingly, regional space powers have revised their strategies to better compete with China. This thesis examines Japan's, India's, and Vietnam's renewed approaches to space power and space security amidst China's rise. Shifts in military, commercial, and civil space policy are examined among the selected case studies. This thesis finds that Asian states are departing from historical norms by employing militarized space assets to counter the security threat from China. They are also allowing the private sector to play a larger role in their commercial space industry to improve efficiency, innovative capacity, and diplomatic outreach. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation, as well as investments in techno-nationalist space-science projects, also supplement the renewed soft-power response to Chinese space diplomacy. This thesis presents policy prescriptions for the United States to capitalize on the increasing degree of alignment among regional space powers' strategic interests. Recommendations include enhanced military-to-military relations, relaxation of commercial restrictions, and increased cooperation in civil space to balance against China.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.Asian states are growing increasingly concerned over China's growing space capabilities and are devoting renewed attention to their respective space security strategies in response. Demonstrations such as China's 2003 manned Shenzhou V launch and 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test have triggered varying responses from Asian states that perceive these growing space capabilities as threats to national security and regional stability. Though existing research has delved into how Asian states are individually addressing China's space-related capabilities through internal initiatives, and how states are responding to the rise of China in terrestrial-economic and military contexts, a research gap lies in comparative analysis of Asian states' strategic responses to China's growing space power. Accordingly, this thesis aims to address the following question: How have Asian states' space power strategies adapted to China's rise as a space power?Space is presently a far more dynamic and anarchic domain than it was throughout the Cold War. No longer dominated by just the superpowers' civil and military programs, international space activity is now complemented by an array of emerging commercial and military actors, as well as a substantial number of developing states. The rapid increase in international space activity following the Cold War has occurred outside of traditional cooperative norms, increasing the risk and stakes of space-related conflict. The brisk introduction of new actors in space, all with unique motivations and interests, challenges previous understanding of space power and space security, as states craft strategies that account for these post-Cold War shifts. Pursuing more than just military interests, China's space power strategy has particularly responded to these changes, as it has reaped utility from civil and commercial space activity while simultaneously achieving national security objectives. As China continues to employ this multifaceted approach, rival Asian states are devising their own counter-strategies to enhance their national security, maintain technological parity, remain commercially competitive, and reaffirm their status as a regional power.

The Chinese government is using space power to increase its influence at home and abroad and hopes to leverage the political, economic, and military benefits of space to become a great power. The ambivalent nature of the U.S.-China relationship, however, assures that over the long term China's rise as a space power will present challenges to the United States. Militarily, China's improved remote sensing capabilities and launch tempos require the U.S. military to prepare to counteract China's use of space in a potential conflict over Taiwan. Commercially, China's lower labor costs and mercantilist approach to space could establish China as a competitive market force. Politically, U.S. diplomats must recognize the role Chinese space activities plays in diplomacy and be prepared to ameliorate cooperative activities that impinge on U.S. national security. Despite these drawbacks, cooperation with China cannot be ruled out. Cooperation can improve scientific research, increase safety, and make an opaque program more transparent, but should not directly improve China's military or commercial capabilities. Consequently, the U.S. response to China's rise as a space power should take a balanced approach in which challenges are managed and opportunities exploited.

MacDonald recommends options and policies that will promote options and policies that will promote American security interests in space. He argues that the U.S. needs to take priority defensive military space measures to offset potential Chinese anti-satellite and related capabilities.

The Cox Report investigates U.S.-Chinese security interaction and reports that China successfully engaged in harmful espionage and obtained sensitive military technology from the United States.

An analysis of China's nuclear and space capabilities, deployment strategies, and stance in arms control negotiations, and the implications for U.S. defense strategy. In The Minimum Means of Reprisal, Jeffrey Lewis examines China's nuclear and space capabilities and deployment strategies, as well as the Chinese government's stance in arms control negotiations. Lewis finds that Chinese officials hold a "restrained view" about the role of nuclear weapons in national security and maintain a limited nuclear capacity sufficient to deter attack but not large enough for control of these weapons to be compromised. The future of cooperative security arrangements in space will depend largely on the U.S.-Chinese relationship, and Lewis warns that changes in U.S. defense strategy, including the weaponization of space, could signal to China that its capabilities are not sufficient to deter the United States from the use of force. Such a shift could cause China to reconsider its use of restraint in nuclear strategy, further damaging the already weakened arms control regime and increasing the nuclear threat to the United States and the world.

This report analyzes international and domestic factors that will affect China's approach to nuclear deterrence, how those drivers may evolve over the next 15 years, and what impact they are likely to have.

A report by special congressional committee, chaired by Rep. Christopher Cox, that claims The People's Republic of China stole design information on U.S. thermonuclear weapons to enhance their own nuclear capabilities.

Relations between Washington and Beijing improved swiftly in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, especially in comparison to the nadir that had been reached during the April 2001 EP-3 incident. This new tide of cooperation has included counterterrorism initiatives, regional partnership in such complex situations as Afghanistan and North Korea, and even some modest agreement on the importance of maintaining the status quo with respect to Taiwan's status. A strong foundation for this strategic cooperation is, of course, a burgeoning trade relationship, which received a further boost from China's entry into the World Trade Organization in November 2001. In 2003, trade between the United States and China amounted to $191.7 billion, up 23.2 percent from 2002. Remarkably, the total for 2003 was more than double the figure for 1998. The United States is China's second most important trading partner nation (Japan is first). Many reasonable strategists, observing this data, consider armed conflict between Washington and Beijing impossible, given the economic losses that both would incur almost immediately. Unfortunately, history has not been kind to the school of theorizing, known as commercial liberalism, which holds that economic interdependence prevents conflict. Indeed, the belligerent powers prior to both world wars had achieved impressive levels of economic interdependence.