MacDonald recommends options and policies that will promote options and policies that will promote American security interests in space. He argues that the U.S. needs to take priority defensive military space measures to offset potential Chinese anti-satellite and related capabilities.

The proliferation of counterspace weapons across the globe often calls into question what can be done to best protect satellites from attack. This analysis from the CSIS Aerospace Security Project addresses different methods and technologies that can be used by the United States government, and others, to deter adversaries from attack. A wide range of active and passive defenses are available to protect space systems and the ground infrastructure they depend upon from different types of threats. This report captures a range of active and passive defenses that are theoretically possible and discusses the advantages and limitations of each. A group of technical space and national security experts supported the analysis by working through several plausible scenarios that explore a range of defenses that may be needed, concepts for employing different types of defenses, and how defensive actions in space may be perceived by others. These scenarios and the findings that resulted from subsequent conversations with experts are reported in the penultimate chapter of the report. Finally, the CSIS Aerospace Security Project team offers conclusions drawn from the analysis, actionable recommendations for policymakers, and additional research topics to be explored in future work.

The first two parts of this study present the results of a survey of Chinese writings that discovered 30 proposals that China should acquire several types of anti satellite weapons. Many foreign observers have mistakenly claimed that China is a pacifistic nation and has no interest such weapons. The Director of the US National Reconnaissance Office Donald Kerr confirmed a Chinese laser had illuminated a US satellite in 2006. These skeptical observers dismissed that laser incident, but then appeared to be stunned by the reported Chinese destruction of a satellite January 11, 2007. China declined to confirm the event, but many foreign governments immediately protested, including Japan, South Korea, Australia, Canada and Britain, while Russia's defense minister suggested the report may not be fully accurate.

The world’s most populous nation views space as an asset, not only from a technological and commercial perspective but also from a political one. The repercussions of this ideology already extend far beyond Washington. China vs. the United States explores future Chinese aspirations in space and the implications of a looming space race. Dr. Seedhouse provides background information on the fifteen-year history of the China National Space Administration and its long list of accomplishments. Sino-U.S. technological and commercial interests in space are discussed, including their interest in encouraging a potential space race. The national security objectives of the U.S. and China are also examined.

This overview aims to inform the public discussion of space-based weapons by examining their characteristics, potential attributes, limitations, legality, and utility. The authors do not argue for or against space weapons, nor do they estimate the potential costs and performance of specific programs, but instead sort through the realities and myths surrounding space weapons in order to ensure that debates and discussions are based on fact.

The U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China offers access in PDF format to the three volume, unclassified version of its final report. The report asserts that China has stolen design information about American thermonuclear weapons.

The militarization of space began as a rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union and grew to enormous proportions during the height of the Cold War. Satellite reconnaissance, navigation and weapons guidance, and electronic intelligence comprise only a few of the efforts taken to militarize and dominate space. Today as the prominence of information technology, computing, and telecommunications advances, so does the concept of space as a battlefield. In The Militarization and Weaponization of Space, Matthew Mowthorpe diligently analyzes the military space policies of the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, and the People's Republic of China from the Cold War period to the present day. Mowthorpe focuses on the development of the ballistic missile defense and other anti-satellite systems and aptly assesses to what degree space will become armed. This work cogently addresses an issue of increasing urgency to scholars of international politics.

An analysis of China's nuclear and space capabilities, deployment strategies, and stance in arms control negotiations, and the implications for U.S. defense strategy. In The Minimum Means of Reprisal, Jeffrey Lewis examines China's nuclear and space capabilities and deployment strategies, as well as the Chinese government's stance in arms control negotiations. Lewis finds that Chinese officials hold a "restrained view" about the role of nuclear weapons in national security and maintain a limited nuclear capacity sufficient to deter attack but not large enough for control of these weapons to be compromised. The future of cooperative security arrangements in space will depend largely on the U.S.-Chinese relationship, and Lewis warns that changes in U.S. defense strategy, including the weaponization of space, could signal to China that its capabilities are not sufficient to deter the United States from the use of force. Such a shift could cause China to reconsider its use of restraint in nuclear strategy, further damaging the already weakened arms control regime and increasing the nuclear threat to the United States and the world.