The current standstill in U.S.-Soviet arms limitation negotiations has raised a number of questions about the effectiveness of arms limitation treaties, whether it is possible to negotiate an arms control agreement that would actually cut back on U.S. and Soviet strategic arsenals, and how such an arms reduction could be accomplished. The authors of this book explore the problems of arms competition in the 1980s and stress the need for a complete reassessment of U.S. security interests lest negotiations become curiously disconnected from defense policy. To protect national interests, they assert, future arms limitation talks must allow for effective unilateral response to new classes of military problems and technologies. Each contributor addresses a specific area of arms negotiations, identifying various options, outlining potential outcomes, and discussing whether the talks actually are focusing on the right military issues. The book also provides an overview of previous U.S. arms limitation strategies and describes the Soviet approach to integrating national security with arms control policies._

Designed to introduce the reader to the critical issues of arms control and international security in the 1980s, this collection of provocative and challenging articles encourages a rethinking of conventional wisdom on strategic policy. The authors succinctly convey the tensions existing between those who would eliminate the weapons on which strategic deterrence has rested and those who see the Soviet nuclear buildup as a challenge that must be met with increased armaments. They reflect, as well, on the conceptual tension between eliminating nuclear weapons and answering the question of how defense can be managed in the nuclear era. Their contributions are at times compelling, at times frustrating, but at all times informative and of critical importance.

Governments have been negotiating about disarmament, or more limited forms of arms control, for forty years. Despite these negotiations, weapons of increasing deadliness and sophistication continue to be developed. Through the use of case studies of particular negotiations (Partial and Comprehensive Test Ban, SALT I and II, INF and START, and MBFR/CFE), the book explores both the reasons for success and the obstacles leading to failure, and assesses the importance of different types of explanation. Dr Carter not only analyses the reasons why negotiations fail, she also examines the conditions under which they are likely to succeed. The result is a balanced comprehensive treatment of the problems and prospects for arms control.

This book explores problems of arms competition in the 1980s and stresses the need for a complete reassessment of U.S. security interests lest negotiations become curiously disconnected from defense policy. It explains the Soviet approach to integrating national security with arms control policies.