Stalingrad is often described as the turning point of the German war with the Soviet Union, or perhaps even the entire European war. This paper argues that the actual turning point was probably earlier in the Barbarossa campaign, and that the decision to hold Stalingrad, while a serious mistake, followed several other strategic blunders of Adolf Hitler. Given that, this essay reflects a study of primary source material collected from key German commanders, as well as numerous documents collected in 1956 as part of the “Karlsruhe Collection.” The focus was to determine where the airlift failed, why it failed, and what could have been done better. Ultimately the failure could be attributed to the lack of a survivable and more capable transport aircraft, difficulties operating out of poorly prepared airfields which were under constant threat from the Red Army, the absolutely miserable weather which frequently prevented any flying at all, enemy action which prevented daylight flights by much of the fleet, supplies which were not ideally suited for airlift, and finally difficulties organizing the airlift at both ends. Many commanders involved knew it was bound to fail and warned Hitler and Paulus, to no avail. In the end, what could have been a tremendous feat ended as tragic folly.

CONTENTS by CHAPTER: 1. STALINGRAD: THE PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE 2. THE BATTLE OF STALINGRAD: PREPARATORY PHASE DOCUMENTS 3. STALINGRAD: URBAN WARFARE 4. A DESPERATE STRUGGLE TO SAVE A CONDEMNED ARMY– A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE STALINGRAD AIRLIFT 5. AN ANALYSIS OF THE GERMAN DEFEAT AT STALINGRAD 6. THE BATTLE OF STALINGRAD: PHOTOGRAPHS AND ORIGINAL MAPS INTRODUCTION: When one visits the huge, “Mother of Russia” war statue in Stalingrad (now renamed Volgograd), Russia, one gets the impression that an epic battle took place there. And, indeed, an epic battle—the World War II Battle of Stalingrad between Germany and the Soviet Union— did take place there. The battle, which lasted six months, produced over 1.5 million casualties and led to the destruction of an entire Germany army and half of another.3 It also at one point tied down seven Soviet armies. The magnitude of these figures makes the battle hard to imagine, but it is clear that Stalingrad was one of the largest and longest single battles in military history. Stalingrad also is significant in that it marked a key turning point in the war on the Eastern Front. While the ultimate outcome of Germany’s war effort in the East probably was determined by its failure to defeat the U.S.S.R. in its 1941 campaign (Operation BARBAROSSA), Stalingrad was the high water mark of Germany’s eastward advance. After its defeat at Stalingrad, the Reich never again occupied as much Soviet territory and, with brief exceptions, was in retreat.

Using the diaries of Luftwaffe commanders, rare contemporary photographs and other previously unpublished sources, Robert Forsyth analyzes the human, strategic, tactical and technical elements of one of the most dramatic operations arranged by the Luftwaffe. Stalingrad ranks as one of the most infamous, savage and emotive battles of the 20th century. It has consumed military historians since the 1950s and has inspired many books and much debate. This book tells the story of the operation mounted by the Luftwaffe to supply, by airlift, the trapped and exhausted German Sixth Army at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942/43. The weather conditions faced by the flying crews, mechanics, and soldiers on the ground were appalling, but against all odds, and a resurgent and active Soviet air force, the transports maintained a determined presence over the ravaged city on the Volga, even when the last airfields in the Stalingrad pocket had been lost. Yet, even the daily figure of 300 tons of supplies, needed by Sixth Army just to subsist, proved over-ambitious for the Luftwaffe which battled against a lack of transport capacity, worsening serviceability, and increasing losses in badly needed aircraft. Using previously unpublished diaries, original Luftwaffe reports and specially commissioned artwork, this gripping battle is told in detail through the eyes of the Luftwaffe commanders and pilots who fought to keep the Sixth Army alive and supplied.

The story of what really led to Germany losing the battle of Stalingrad - the inability of the Luftwaffe to keep Sixth Army supplied throughout the winter of 1942–43 - and why this crucial airlift failed. Luftwaffe chief Hermann Goering's failure to deliver his promise to keep Sixth Army supplied at Stalingrad was one of the most hard-hitting strategic air failures of World War II. 300 tons a day of supplies were required to sustain the Sixth Army, flown in against a Soviet fighter force whose capabilities were rapidly being transformed. The Luftwaffe's failure left Sixth Army trapped, vulnerable and too weak to attempt a breakout. The destruction of Sixth Army was one of the major turning points in World War II but the Luftwaffe's crucial role in this disaster has often been overlooked. Some claim the attempt was doomed from the beginning but, in this intriguing book, author William E. Hiestand explains how the Germans had amassed sufficient aircraft to, at least theoretically, provide the supplies needed. Demands of aircraft maintenance, awful weather and, in particular, the Soviet air blockade crippled the airlift operation. In addition, the employment of increasing numbers of modern aircraft by the Soviet Air Force using more flexible tactics, coupled with Chief Marshal Novikov's superior Air Army organisation proved decisive. The Luftwaffe did eventually recover and mounted focused operations for control of limited areas of the Eastern Front, but overall it had lost its dominance. Packed with strategic diagrams and maps, archive photos and artwork of aerial battles over Stalingrad, and including bird's eye views of Operation Winter Storm and airlift operations and tactics, this title clearly demonstrates how the Luftwaffe lost its strategic initiative in the air.

The Battle of Stalingrad was a disaster. The German Sixth Army consisted of over 300,000 men when it approached Stalingrad in August 1942. On 2 February 1943, 91,000 remained; only some 5,000 survived Soviet captivity. Largely due to the success of previous aerial resupply operations, Luftwaffe leaders assured Hitler they could successfully supply the Sixth Army after it was trapped. However, the Luftwaffe was not up to the challenge. The primary reason was the weather, but organizational and structural flaws, as well as enemy actions, also contributed to their failure. This thesis will address why the Demyansk and Kholm airlifts convinced the Germans that airlift was a panacea for encircled forces; the lessons learned from these airlifts and how they were applied at Stalingrad; why Hitler ordered the Stalingrad airlift despite the logistical impossibility; and seek out lessons for today’s military. The primary reason for the Stalingrad tragedy was that Germany’s strategic leadership did not apply lessons learned from earlier airlifts to the Stalingrad airlift, and the U.S. military is making similar mistakes with respect to the way it is handling its lessons learned from recent military operations.

Following World War II, the Soviet Union drew an Iron Curtain across Europe, crowning its efforts with a blockade of West Berlin in a desperate effort to prevent the creation of an independent, democratic West Germany. The United States and Great Britain, aided by France, responded with a daring air logistical operation that in fifteen months delivered almost three million tons of coal, food, and other necessities to the people of Berlin. Now, drawing on rare U.S. Air Force files, recently declassified documents from the National Archives, records released since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the memories of airlift veterans themselves, Roger G. Miller provides an original study of the Berlin Airlift. The Berlin Airlift was an enterprise of epic proportions that demonstrated the power of air logistics as a political instrument. What began as a hastily organized operation by a small number of warweary cargo airplanes evolved into an intricate bridge of aircraft that flowed in and out of Berlin through narrow air corridors. Hour after hour, day after day, week after week, a stream of airplanes delivered everything from food and medicine to coal and candy in defiance of breakdowns, inclement weather, and Soviet hostility. And beyond the airlift itself, a complex system of transportation, maintenance, and supply stretching around the world sustained operations. Historians, veterans, and general readers will welcome this history of the first Western victory of the Cold War. Maps, diagrams, and more than forty photographs illustrate the mechanical inner workings and the human faces that made that triumph possible.

Contents: The Prewar Experience; Evolution of Airborne Forces During World War II; Operational Employment: Vyaz'ma, January-February 1942; Operational Employment: Vyaz'ma, February-June 1942; Operational Employment: On the Dnepr, September 1943; Tactical Employment; The Postwar Years.

n this extremely comprehensive overview of airlift and air mobility, Colonel Miller shows how the worldwide orientation of American foreign policy, the numerous threats to free-world interests, and the speed and complexity of modern warfare have combined with political and resource constraints to produce today's airlift doctrine and force structure. Airlift is the movement of goods and people to where they are needed, when they are needed there. Since the 1920s there has been an evolving awareness and articulation of how to best organize, train, and equip airlift forces for that mission. The worldwide orientation of American foreign policy, the numerous threats to free world interests, and the speed and complexity of modern warfare have combined with political and resource constraints to produce today's airlift doctrine and force structure. Colonel Miller's study traces these many interrelationships to discover what critical airlift decisions were made, why they were made, and what they may mean in the future. Airlift is the backbone of deterrence. A properly structured and equipped airlift force is critical to the successful execution of the national military strategy. How we think about airlift and how we translate those thoughts into a meaningful expression of how to develop, deploy, and employ airlift forces is vital to the national defense. Colonel Miller's study is a definitive step in that important process.

Offers the first detailed review of Carl A. Spaatz as a commander. Examines how the highest ranking U.S. airman in the European Theater of Operations of World War II viewed the war, worked with the British, and wielded the formidable air power at his disposal. Identifies specifically those aspects of his leadership that proved indispensable to the Allied Victory over Nazi Germany. Chapters: Carrying the Flame: From West Point to London, 1891-1942; Tempering the Blade: The North African Campaign, 1942-1943; Mediterranean Interlude: From Pantelleria to London, 1943; The Point of the Blade: Strategic Bombing and the Cross-Channel Invasion, 1944; and The Mortal Blow: From Normandy to Berlin, 1944-1945. Maps, charts and b & w photos.

First published by the Combat Studies Institute Press. The resulting anthology begins with a general overview of urban operations from ancient times to the midpoint of the twentieth century. It then details ten specific case studies of U.S., German, and Japanese operations in cities during World War II and ends with more recent Russian attempts to subdue Chechen fighters in Grozny and the Serbian siege of Sarajevo. Operations range across the spectrum from combat to humanitarian and disaster relief. Each chapter contains a narrative account of a designated operation, identifying and analyzing the lessons that remain relevant today.