The story of what really led to Germany losing the battle of Stalingrad - the inability of the Luftwaffe to keep Sixth Army supplied throughout the winter of 1942–43 - and why this crucial airlift failed. Luftwaffe chief Hermann Goering's failure to deliver his promise to keep Sixth Army supplied at Stalingrad was one of the most hard-hitting strategic air failures of World War II. 300 tons a day of supplies were required to sustain the Sixth Army, flown in against a Soviet fighter force whose capabilities were rapidly being transformed. The Luftwaffe's failure left Sixth Army trapped, vulnerable and too weak to attempt a breakout. The destruction of Sixth Army was one of the major turning points in World War II but the Luftwaffe's crucial role in this disaster has often been overlooked. Some claim the attempt was doomed from the beginning but, in this intriguing book, author William E. Hiestand explains how the Germans had amassed sufficient aircraft to, at least theoretically, provide the supplies needed. Demands of aircraft maintenance, awful weather and, in particular, the Soviet air blockade crippled the airlift operation. In addition, the employment of increasing numbers of modern aircraft by the Soviet Air Force using more flexible tactics, coupled with Chief Marshal Novikov's superior Air Army organisation proved decisive. The Luftwaffe did eventually recover and mounted focused operations for control of limited areas of the Eastern Front, but overall it had lost its dominance. Packed with strategic diagrams and maps, archive photos and artwork of aerial battles over Stalingrad, and including bird's eye views of Operation Winter Storm and airlift operations and tactics, this title clearly demonstrates how the Luftwaffe lost its strategic initiative in the air.

Compiled by one of the world's leading experts on the air war over the Eastern Front, this book is the second in a series of books to cover the major phases of World War II in this theatre of operations.

The second in a three-part series examining the Stalingrad campaign, one of the most decisive military operations in World War II, that set the stage for the ultimate defeat of the Third Reich. By early September 1942, 6.Armee and 4.Panzer-Armee had reached the outskirts of Stalingrad, and Hitler believed it was about to fall. He ordered for the capture of the city as soon as possible, but this was easier said than done. On 13 September, a direct German assault was launched against the city on the Volga and a protracted urban battle followed amid the ruins, already devastated by massive Luftwaffe raids. Although hit hard by the initial German offensive, a ruthless and obstinate Red Army was able to hold onto the city through a costly battle of attrition that sacrificed huge amounts of men and materiel. This second volume in the Stalingrad trilogy, written by a leading expert on the military history of the Eastern Front, brings the fighting in the city to life in full visual detail, including the iconic battles at the Krasny Oktyabr Steel Plant, the Grain Elevator, the Barrikady and STZ factories, the 'Tennis Racquet' and Rynok–Spartanovka. Drawing from sources on both sides, this book offers a truly comprehensive account of history's greatest urban battle.

A highly illustrated account of the battle for the Demyansk Pocket on the Eastern Front in World War II. The fighting around the town of Demyansk was one of the longest encirclement battles on the Eastern Front during World War II, stretching from February 1942 to February 1943. Originally, the German 16. Armee occupied Demyansk in the autumn of 1941 because it was key terrain that would be used as a springboard for an eventual offensive into the Valdai Hills. Instead, the Soviet winter counteroffensive in February 1942 encircled the German II Armeekorps and other units, inside the Demyansk Pocket. Yet despite severe pounding from five Soviet armies, the embattled German troops held the pocket and the Luftwaffe organized a major aerial resupply effort to sustain the defenders. For the first time in military history, an army was supplied entirely by air. In February 1943, Marshal Timoshenko was ordered to launch an offensive to cut off the base of the salient and annihilate the 12 divisions. At the same time, Hitler finally came to his senses after the Stalingrad debacle and authorized the 16. Armee to withdraw from the pocket. This volume will conclude with the drama of a German Army-sized withdrawal under fire in winter, under attack from three sides.

By the time Hitler declared war on the Soviet Union in 1941, he knew that his military machine was running out of fuel. In response, he launched Operation Blau, a campaign designed to protect Nazi oilfields in Romania while securing new ones in the Caucasus. All that stood in the way was Stalingrad.

After failing to defeat the Soviet Union with Operation Barbarossa in 1941, Adolf Hitler planned a new campaign for the summer of 1942 that was intended to achieve a decisive victory: Operation Blue (Case Blau). In this new campaign, Hitler directed that one army group (Heeresgruppe A) would advance to seize the Soviet oilfields in the Caucasus, while the other (Heeresgruppe B) pushed on to the Volga River. The expectation was for a rapid victory – instead, German forces had to fight hard just to reach the outskirts of Stalingrad, and then found themselves embroiled in a protracted urban battle amid the ruins of a devastated city on the Volga. The Soviet Red Army was hit hard by the initial German offensive but held onto the city and then launched Operation Uranus, a winter counteroffensive that encircled the German 6. Armee at Stalingrad. Despite a desperate German relief operation, the Red Army eventually crushed the German forces and hurled the remnants of the German southern front back in disorder. This first volume in the Stalingrad trilogy covers the period from 28 June to 11 September 1942, including operations around Voronezh. The fighting in the Don Bend, which lasted weeks, comprised some of the largest tank battles of World War II – involving more armour than the tanks employed at Prokhorovka in 1943.

The final part in a three-book series on the Battle of Stalingrad, examining the Soviet encirclement, German relief efforts, and the final surrender of Paulus' 6.Armee. Having fought hard just to reach the outskirts of Stalingrad, the Axis forces found themselves embroiled in a protracted urban battle amid the ruins of a devastated city on the Volga. The Soviet Red Army was able to hold onto the city then mount a surprise winter counter-offensive known as Operation Uranus, which succeeded in encircling the German 6.Armee at Stalingrad. Despite a desperate German relief operation, the Red Army eventually crushed the 6.Armee and hurled the remnants of the German southern front back in disorder. This third and final volume in the Stalingrad trilogy begins just after the German 6.Armee has been isolated at Stalingrad, and covers the period from 24 November 1942 to 2 February 1943. The specially commissioned maps and 3D diagrams guide the reader in step-by-step, easily to follow detail through the German relief operation (Wintergewitter), the fighting on the Chir River, and the Soviet operations Koltso and Little Saturn, and are complimented by the battlescene artworks that vividly depict the harsh conditions experienced by the common soldiers fighting on both sides.

In 1942, the massive Japanese naval base and airfield at Rabaul was a fortress standing in the Allies' path to Tokyo. It was impossible to seize Rabaul, or starve the 100,000-strong garrison out. Instead the US began an innovative, hard-fought two-year air campaign to draw its teeth, and allow them to bypass the island completely. The struggle decided more than the fate of Rabaul. If successful, the Allies would demonstrate a new form of warfare, where air power, with a judicious use of naval and land forces, would eliminate the need to occupy a ground objective in order to control it. As it turned out, the Siege of Rabaul proved to be more just than a successful demonstration of air power – it provided the roadmap for the rest of World War II in the Pacific.

A highly illustrated account of the battle for the Demyansk Pocket on the Eastern Front in World War II. The fighting around the town of Demyansk was one of the longest encirclement battles on the Eastern Front during World War II, stretching from February 1942 to February 1943. Originally, the German 16. Armee occupied Demyansk in the autumn of 1941 because it was key terrain that would be used as a springboard for an eventual offensive into the Valdai Hills. Instead, the Soviet winter counteroffensive in February 1942 encircled the German II Armeekorps and other units, inside the Demyansk Pocket. Yet despite severe pounding from five Soviet armies, the embattled German troops held the pocket and the Luftwaffe organized a major aerial resupply effort to sustain the defenders. For the first time in military history, an army was supplied entirely by air. In February 1943, Marshal Timoshenko was ordered to launch an offensive to cut off the base of the salient and annihilate the 12 divisions. At the same time, Hitler finally came to his senses after the Stalingrad debacle and authorized the 16. Armee to withdraw from the pocket. This volume will conclude with the drama of a German Army-sized withdrawal under fire in winter, under attack from three sides.

The Battle of Stalingrad was a disaster. The German Sixth Army consisted of over 300,000 men when it approached Stalingrad in August 1942. On 2 February 1943, 91,000 remained; only some 5,000 survived Soviet captivity. Largely due to the success of previous aerial resupply operations, Luftwaffe leaders assured Hitler they could successfully supply the Sixth Army after it was trapped. However, the Luftwaffe was not up to the challenge. The primary reason was the weather, but organizational and structural flaws, as well as enemy actions, also contributed to their failure. This thesis will address why the Demyansk and Kholm airlifts convinced the Germans that airlift was a panacea for encircled forces; the lessons learned from these airlifts and how they were applied at Stalingrad; why Hitler ordered the Stalingrad airlift despite the logistical impossibility; and seek out lessons for today’s military. The primary reason for the Stalingrad tragedy was that Germany’s strategic leadership did not apply lessons learned from earlier airlifts to the Stalingrad airlift, and the U.S. military is making similar mistakes with respect to the way it is handling its lessons learned from recent military operations.