Lauded as a hero in his native land for his sensational but ultimately unsuccessful exploits during the 1848 German Revolution, Franz Sigel—who immigrated to the United States in 1852—is among the most misunderstood figures of the American Civil War. He was appointed by Abraham Lincoln as a political general in the Union army, a move that successfully galvanized northern support and provided a huge influx of German recruits who were eager to “fight mit Sigel.” But Sigel proved an inept and ineffectual leader and, unfortunately, is most often remembered for his disappointing failure at the Battle of New Market and his subsequent loss of command. In his insightful biography, Stephen D. Engle provides the first complete portrait of this enigmatic leader and German standard-bearer, showing Sigel to be a disciplined, self-sacrificing idealist who sparked more pride among his fellow èmigrés, aroused more controversy among Americans, and perhaps enjoyed more admiration—despite his military shortcomings—than any other Civil War figure.

Lauded as a hero in his native land for his sensational but ultimately unsuccessful exploits during the 1848 German Revolution, Franz Sigel—who immigrated to the United States in 1852—is among the most misunderstood figures of the American Civil War. He was appointed by Abraham Lincoln as a political general in the Union army, a move that successfully galvanized northern support and provided a huge influx of German recruits who were eager to “fight mit Sigel.” But Sigel proved an inept and ineffectual leader and, unfortunately, is most often remembered for his disappointing failure at the Battle of New Market and his subsequent loss of command. In his insightful biography, Stephen D. Engle provides the first complete portrait of this enigmatic leader and German standard-bearer, showing Sigel to be a disciplined, self-sacrificing idealist who sparked more pride among his fellow èmigrés, aroused more controversy among Americans, and perhaps enjoyed more admiration—despite his military shortcomings—than any other Civil War figure.

At the beginning of the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln sought to bind important political leaders to the Union by appointing them as generals. The task was formidable: he had to find enough qualified officers to command a military that would fight along a front that stretched halfway across the continent. West Point hadn't graduated enough officers, and many of its best chose to fight for the Confederacy. Lincoln needed loyal men accustomed to organization, administration, and command. He also needed soldiers, and political generals brought with them their constituents and patronage power. As the war proceeded, the value of the political generals became a matter of serious dispute. Could politicians make the shift from a political campaign to a military one? Could they be trusted to fight? Could they avoid destructive jealousies and the temptations of corruption? And with several of the generals being Irish or German immigrants, what effect would ethnic prejudices have on their success or failure? In this book, David Work examines Lincoln's policy of appointing political generals to build a national coalition to fight and win the Civil War. Work follows the careers of sixteen generals through the war to assess their contributions and to ascertain how Lincoln assessed them as commander-in-chief. Eight of the generals began the war as Republicans and eight as Democrats. Some commanded armies, some regiments. Among them were some of the most famous generals of the Union--such as Francis P. Blair Jr., John A. Dix, John A. Logan, James S. Wadsworth--and others whose importance has been obscured by more dramatic personalities. Work finds that Lincoln's policy was ultimately successful, as these generals provided effective political support and made important contributions in military administration and on the battlefield. Although several of them proved to be poor commanders, others were effective in exercising influence on military administration and recruitment, slavery policy, and national politics.

The Monuments of a Divided State St. Louis was at the center of several key Civil War events from the Dred Scott decision through the Mississippi Campaign that cut the Confederate States in two. Visit the site from which enslaved people tried to cross the Mississippi River to the free state of Illinois. Discover how hundreds of lawsuits by enslaved people set the stage for the Dred Scott decision that lit the fuse to the Civil War. See the military base that produced over 200 Civil War generals and the arsenal that secessionists and unionists fought to control. Author Peter Downs goes behind the monuments and historic sites to explore the people, relationships and events that influenced the course of civil war in St. Louis and the nation.

A companion to Grant's Lieutenants: From Cairo to Vicksburg, this new volume assesses Union generalship during the final two years of the Civil War. Steven Woodworth, one of the war's premier historians, is joined by a team of distinguished scholars-Mark Grimsley, John Marszalek, and Earl Hess, among others-who critique Ulysses S. Grant's commanders in terms of both their working relationship with their general-in-chief and their actual performances. The book covers well-known Union field generals like William T. Sherman, George Thomas, George Meade, and Philip Sheridan, as well as the less-prominent Franz Sigel, Horatio Wright, Edward Ord, and Benjamin Butler. In addition, it includes an iconoclastic look at Grant's former superior and wartime chief of staff Henry W. Halleck, focusing on his wise counsel concerning Washington politics, the qualities of various subordinates, and the strategic environment. Each of these probing essays emphasizes the character and accomplishments of a particular general and shows how his relationship with Grant either helped or hindered the Union cause. The contributors highlight the ways Grant's lieutenants contributed to or challenged their commander's own success and development as a general. In addition to revisiting Grant's key collaboration with Sherman, the essays illuminate the hostile relationship between Grant and Thomas, commander of the Army of the Cumberland; Grant's almost daily contact with "Old Snapping Turtle" Meade, whose expertise relieved Grant of the close tactical direction of the Army of the Potomac; and the development of a highly successful command partnership between Grant and Sheridan, his new commander of the Army of the Shenandoah. Readers will also learn how Grant handled the relative incompetence of his less sterling leaders-perhaps failing to give Butler adequate direction and overlooking Ord's suspect political views in light of their long relationship. Like its companion volume, Grant's Lieutenants: From Chattanooga to Appomattox is an essential touchstone for Civil War scholars and aficionados. It offers new and profound insights into the command relationships that fundamentally shaped both the conduct of the war and its final outcome.

The XI Corps served in the Army of the Potomac for just twelve months (September 1862-August 1863), during which it played a pivotal role in the critical battles of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. Thereafter, the corps hastened westward to reinforce a Union army in besieged Chattanooga, and marched through brutal December weather without adequate clothing, shoes, or provisions to help rescue a second Northern army under siege in Knoxville, Tennessee. Despite its sacrifices in the Eastern campaigns and successes in Tennessee, the reputation of the XI Corps is one of cowardice and failure. James S. Pula sets the record straight in his two-volume study Under the Crescent Moon: The XI Corps in the American Civil War, 1862-1864. Under the Crescent Moon (a reference to the crescent badge assigned to the corps) is the first study of this misunderstood organization. The first volume, From the Defenses of Washington to Chancellorsville, opens with the organization of the corps and a lively description of the men in the ranks, the officers who led them, the regiments forming it, and the German immigrants who comprised a sizable portion of the corps. Once this foundation is set, the narrative flows briskly through the winter of 1862-63 on the way to the first major campaign at Chancellorsville. Although the brunt of Stonewall Jackson’s flank attack fell upon the men of the XI Corps, the manner in which they fought and many other details of that misunderstood struggle are fully examined here for the first time, and at a depth no other study has attempted. Pula’s extraordinary research and penetrating analysis offers a fresh interpretation of the Chancellorsville defeat while challenging long-held myths about that fateful field. The second volume, From Gettysburg to Victory, offers seven chapters on the XI Corps at Gettysburg, followed by a rich exploration of the corps’ participation in the fighting around Chattanooga, the grueling journey into Eastern Tennessee in the dead of winter, and its role in the Knoxville Campaign. Once the corps’ two divisions are broken up in early 1864 to serve elsewhere, Pula follows their experiences through to the war’s successful conclusion. Under the Crescent Moon draws extensively on primary sources and allows the participants to speak directly to readers. The result is a comprehensive personalized portrait of the men who fought in the “unlucky” XI Corps, from the difficulties it faced to the accomplishments it earned. As the author demonstrates time and again, the men of the XI Corps were good soldiers unworthy of the stigma that has haunted them to this day. This long overdue study will stand as the definitive history of the XI Corps.

In the summer of 1861, Americans were preoccupied by the question of which states would join the secession movement and which would remain loyal to the Union. This question was most fractious in the border states of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri. In Mi

Highlights the Pennsylvania Dutch regiments and post-1820 immigrant Germans at the Battle of Gettysburg.