Does Wittgenstein's philosophy lead to atheism? Is it clearly religious? Perplexingly, both of these questions have been answered in the affirmative. Despite the increasing awareness and use of Wittgenstein's philosophy within theological circles the puzzle persists: 'Does his philosophy really fit with theology?' It is helpful to show that Wittgenstein has no agenda towards atheism or religious belief in order to move ahead and properly discuss his philosophy as it stands. A study of Wittgenstein's key concepts of logic and language in his major works from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to the Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty reveals how he came to see in his later work that meaning is not simply intuitive or a consequence of solitary empirical investigation; rather, meaning is shown in how words are woven into the community of concrete life practices. A discussion of Christology and Luther's distinction between the theologian of glory and the theologian of the cross provide clear theological analogies for Wittgenstein's later philosophy. It also provides important evidence to show-through examples of scripture, liturgy, and practice-that Wittgenstein's philosophy is a useful tool that can fit with theology.

Can we talk meaningfully about God? The theological movement known as Grammatical Thomism affirms that religious language is nonsensical, because the reality of God is beyond our capacity for expression. Stephen Mulhall critically evaluates the claims of this movement (as exemplified in the work of Herbert McCabe and David Burrell) to be a legitimate inheritor of Wittgenstein's philosophical methods as well as Aquinas's theological project. The major obstacle to this claim is that Grammatical Thomism makes the nonsensicality of religious language when applied to God a touchstone of Thomist insight, whereas 'nonsense' is standardly taken to be solely a term of criticism in Wittgenstein's work. Mulhall argues that, if Wittgenstein is read in the terms provided by the work of Cora Diamond and Stanley Cavell, then a place can be found in both his early work and his later writings for a more positive role to be assigned to nonsensical utterances—one which depends on exploiting an analogy between religious language and riddles. And once this alignment between Wittgenstein and Aquinas is established, it also allows us to see various ways in which his later work has a perfectionist dimension—in that it overlaps with the concerns of moral perfectionism, and in that it attributes great philosophical significance to what theology and philosophy have traditionally called 'perfections' and 'transcendentals', particularly concepts such as Being, Truth, and Unity or Oneness. This results in a radical reconception of the role of analogous usage in language, and so in the relation between philosophy and theology.

"Intended primarily to introduce Wittgenstein to students of theology, but aimed also at philosophers interested in religion, the book focuses on those of Wittgenstein's writings (primarily in the Philosophical investigations) that relate to theological issues such as the inner life, the immortality of the soul and the relationship of the believer to church and tradtion. By taking up the main points raised by reviewers of the first edition, the author responds in his new material to a wide range of recent literature and other interpretations of Wittengenstein's -- often seemingly ambiguous -- religious positions, and in so doing paints an absorbing picture, for a fresh set of readers, of how theology might look 'after Wittgenstein'."--Last page of cover.

Ludwig Wittgenstein was an outstanding 20th-century philosopher whose influence has reverberated throughout not only philosophy but also numerous other areas of inquiry, including theology and the study of religions. Exemplifying how Wittgenstein's thought can be engaged with both sympathetically and critically, Wittgenstein, Religion and Ethics pushes forward our thinking about religion and ethics and their place in the modern world. Bringing Wittgenstein's ideas into productive dialogue with several other important thinkers, including Elizabeth Anscombe, St Thomas Aquinas, Georg Cantor, Søren Kierkegaard and George Orwell, this collection fosters a highly informative picture of how different strands of contemporary and historical thought intersect and bear upon one another. Chapters are written by leading scholars in the field and tackle current debates concerning religious and ethical matters, with particular attention to the nature of religious language. This is a substantial contribution to religion and ethics, demonstrating the significance of Wittgenstein's ideas for these and related subjects.

Wittgenstein: From Mysticism to Ordinary Language presents the Tractatus as a work of mystic theology intended to direct the reader to a transcendental plane from which human existence can be viewed from the divine perspective. More than any other work on Wittgenstein, this study integrates text material with personal biographical information, especially information dealing with his spiritual and psychological states. The result is a fresh, coherent, and extremely illuminating picture of Wittgenstein, successfully avoiding the pitfalls of either psychological reductionism or unfaithfulness to the text. It is bold without being reckless, passionately argued without being doctrinaire, and makes a very powerful and persuasive case for its main thesis.

This collection examines the relationship between Augustine and Wittgenstein and demonstrates the deep affinity they share, not only for the substantive issues they treat but also for the style of philosophizing they employ. Wittgenstein saw certain salient Augustinian approaches to concepts like language-learning, will, memory, and time as prompts for his own philosophical explorations, and he found great inspiration in Augustine’s highly personalized and interlocutory style of writing philosophy. Each in his own way, in an effort to understand human experience more fully, adopts a mode of philosophizing that involves questioning, recognizing confusions, and confronting doubts. Beyond its bearing on such topics as language, meaning, knowledge, and will, their analysis extends to the nature of religious belief and its fundamental place in human experience. The essays collected here consider a broad range of themes, from issues regarding teaching, linguistic meaning, and self-understanding to miracles, ritual, and religion.

This volume argues that Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion and his thought in general continue to be highly relevant for present and future research on interreligious relations. Spanning several (sub)disciplines - from philosophy of religion, philosophy of language, comparative philosophy, comparative theology, to religious studies - the contributions engage with recent developments in interpretation of Wittgenstein and those in the philosophy and theology of interreligious encounter. The book shows that there is an important and under-explored potential for constructive and fruitful engagement between these academic fields. It explores, and attempts to realize, some of this potential by involving both philosophers and theologians, and critically assesses previous applications of Wittgenstein's work in interreligious studies. Contributors are Gorazd Andrejč, Guy Bennett-Hunter, Mikel Burley, Thomas D. Carroll, Paul Cortois, Rhiannon Grant, Randy Ramal, Klaus von Stosch, Varja Strajn, Nuno Venturinha, Sebastjan V r s and Daniel H. Weiss.

Wittgenstein's religious thought is not well understood. And Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion is charged with fideism, religious non-realism, and even crypto-atheism. These charges, however, are borne of misunderstandings that are a result of the critics' being oblivious of apophatic theology. This book is intended to help clear some of those misunderstandings and neutralize the above-mentioned charges. It argues that Wittgenstein's religious thought shares kinship with the thought of apophaticists in Christendom such as the Pseudo-Dionysius and St. Thomas Aquinas. What appear to be fideism, non-realism, or crypto-atheism to the critics appear differently to those who see Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion from the apophaticists' point of view--Wittgenstein's religious point of view.

Does Wittgenstein's philosophy lead to atheism? Is it clearly religious? Perplexingly, both of these questions have been answered in the affirmative. Despite the increasing awareness and use of Wittgenstein's philosophy within theological circles the puzzle persists: 'Does his philosophy really fit with theology?' It is helpful to show that Wittgenstein has no agenda towards atheism or religious belief in order to move ahead and properly discuss his philosophy as it stands. A study of Wittgenstein's key concepts of logic and language in his major works from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to the Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty reveals how he came to see in his later work that meaning is not simply intuitive or a consequence of solitary empirical investigation; rather, meaning is shown in how words are woven into the community of concrete life practices. A discussion of Christology and Luther's distinction between the theologian of glory and the theologian of the cross provide clear theological analogies for Wittgenstein's later philosophy. It also provides important evidence to show-through examples of scripture, liturgy, and practice-that Wittgenstein's philosophy is a useful tool that can fit with theology.

In this book, Rupert Read offers the first outline of a resolute reading, following the highly influential New Wittgenstein ‘school’, of the Philosophical Investigations. He argues that the key to understanding Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is to understand its liberatory purport. Read contends that a resolute reading coincides in its fundaments with what, building on ideas in the later Gordon Baker, he calls a liberatory reading. Liberatory philosophy is philosophy that can liberate the user from compulsive (and destructive) patterns of thought, freeing one for possibilities that were previously obscured. Such liberation is our prime goal in philosophy. This book consists in a sequential reading, along these lines, of what Read considers the most important and controversial passages in the Philosophical Investigations: 1, 16, 43, 95 & 116 & 122, 130–3, 149–151, 186, 198–201, 217, and 284–6. Read claims that this liberatory conception is simultaneously an ethical conception. The PI should be considered a work of ethics in that its central concern becomes our relation with others. Wittgensteinian liberations challenge widespread assumptions about how we allegedly are independent of and separate from others. Wittgenstein’s Liberatory Philosophy will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Wittgenstein, and to scholars of the political philosophy of liberation and the ethics of relation.