In the contentious debate among contemporary epistemologists and philosophers regarding justification, there is one consensus: justification is distinct from knowledge; there are justified beliefs that do not amount to knowledge, even if all instances of knowledge are instances of justified belief. In Without Justification, Jonathan Sutton forcefully opposes this claim. He proposes instead that justified belief simply is knowledge—not because there is more knowledge than has been supposed, but because there are fewer justified beliefs. There are, he argues, no false justified beliefs. Sutton suggests that the distinction between justified belief and knowledge is drawn only in contemporary epistemology, and suggests furter that classic philosophers of both ancient and modern times would not have questioned the idea that justification is identical to knowledge. Sutton argues both that we do not (perhaps even cannot) have a serviceable notion of justification that is distinct from knowledge and that we do not need one. We can get by better in epistemology, he writes, without it. Sutton explores the topics of testimony and evidence, and proposes an account of these two key epistemological topics that relies on the notion of knowledge alone. He also addresses inference (both deductive and inductive), internalism versus externalism in epistemology, functionalism, the paradox of the preface, and the lottery paradox. Sutton argues that all of us—philosopher and nonphilosopher alike—should stick to what we know; we should believe something only if we know it to be so. Further, we should not believe what someone tells us unless we know that he knows what he is talking about. These views are radical, he argues, only in the context of contemporary epistemology's ill-founded distinction between knowledge and justification.

Michael Bergmann provides a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism, developing his theory of justification by imposing both a proper function and a no-defeater requirement.

Can political theorists justify their ideas? Do sound political theories need foundations? What constitutes a well-justified argument in political discourse? Don Herzog attempts to answer these questions by investigating the ways in which major theorists in the Anglo-American political tradition have justified their views. Making use of a wide range of primary texts, Herzog examines the work of such important theorists as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, the utilitarians (Jeremy Bentham, J. S. Mill. Henry Sidgwick, J. C. Harsanyi, R. M. Hare, and R. B. Brandt), David Hume, and Adam Smith. Herzog argues that Hobbes, Locke, and the utilitarians fail to justify their theories because they try to ground the volatile world of politics in immutable aspects of human nature, language, theology, or rationality. Herzog concludes that the works of Adam Smith and David Hume offer illuminating examples of successful justifications. Basing their political conclusions on social contexts, not on abstract principles, Hume and Smith develop creative solutions to given problems.

Catholic in response to Protestant attacks against the Catholic Church's teaching on faith and justification in more than 100 years! As never before, the Catholic Church has been called upon to be the defender of Scripture and preserver of truth in modern times. Not by Faith Alone will set the biblical and historical record straight. But more important, as you learn the real truth about salvation and all that it embraces, this book will offer you the means to come to one of the deepest relationships with God that you have ever experienced. Faith alone? Is it justifiable? Not biblically, and Robert Sungenis shows why. Imprimatur.

Contemporary philosophical pluralism recognizes the inevitability and legitimacy of multiple ethical perspectives and values, making it difficult to isolate the higher-order principles on which to base a theory of justice. Rising up to meet this challenge, Rainer Forst, a leading member of the Frankfurt School's newest generation of philosophers, conceives of an "autonomous" construction of justice founded on what he calls the basic moral right to justification. Forst begins by identifying this right from the perspective of moral philosophy. Then, through an innovative, detailed critical analysis, he ties together the central components of social and political justice--freedom, democracy, equality, and toleration--and joins them to the right to justification. The resulting theory treats "justificatory power" as the central question of justice, and by adopting this approach, Forst argues, we can discursively work out, or "construct," principles of justice, especially with respect to transnational justice and human rights issues. As he builds his theory, Forst engages with the work of Anglo-American philosophers such as John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Amartya Sen, and critical theorists such as Jürgen Habermas, Nancy Fraser, and Axel Honneth. Straddling multiple subjects, from politics and law to social protest and philosophical conceptions of practical reason, Forst brilliantly gathers contesting claims around a single, elastic theory of justice.

"Living by faith" is much more than a general Christian precept; it is the fundamental posture of believers in a world rife with suffering and injustice. In this penetrating reflection on the meaning of "justification," Oswald Bayer shows how this key religious term provides a comprehensive horizon for discussing every aspect of Christian theology, from creation to the end times. Inspired by and interacting with Martin Luther, the great Christian thinker who grappled most intensely with the concept of justification, Bayer explores anew the full range of traditional dogmatics (sin, redemption, eschatology, and others), placing otherwise complex theological terms squarely within their proper milieu -- everyday life. In the course of his discussion, Bayer touches on such deep questions as the hidden nature of God, the hope for universal justice, the problem of evil, and -- one of the book's most engaging motifs -- Job's daring lawsuit with God.

Why do people dodge responsibility when things fall apart? Why the parade of public figures unable to own up when they make mistakes? Why the endless marital quarrels over who is right? Why can we see hypocrisy in others but not in ourselves? Are we all liars? Or do we really believe the stories we tell? Renowned social psychologists Carol Tavris and Elliot Aronson take a compelling look into how the brain is wired for self-justification. When we make mistakes, we must calm the cognitive dissonance that jars our feelings of self-worth. And so we create fictions that absolve us of responsibil.

As fallen human beings we are quick to deviate from the true gospel, for, as Pastor Josh Moody writes, "we tend toward human gospels." Believers must constantly battle to maintain the purity and simplicity of the gospel. Paul was acutely aware of this as he wrote his letter to the Galatians. He was writing to an established church—experienced believers who had started to slip in their gospel witness. Moody finds in Galatians particular relevance and parallels to many churches today. Stemming from a series of sermons delivered to his church, he examines thirty-one reasons Paul gives for this gospel. Moody writes this book with a pastor's heart, addressing important topics such as "The Gospel Not Moralism" and "The Use of Gospel Freedom." Paul's message is foundational to the Christian faith, and thoughtful readers will benefit from Moody's exposition.

Much of the writing in Anglo-American epistemology in the twentieth century focused on the conditions for beliefs being "justified." In a book that seeks to shift the ground of debate within theory of knowledge, William P. Alston finds that the century-long search for a correct account of the nature and conditions of epistemic justification misses the point. Alston calls for that search to be suspended and for talk of epistemic justification to cease. He proposes instead an approach to the epistemology of belief that focuses on the evaluation of various "epistemic desiderata" that may be satisfied by beliefs.Alston finds that features of belief that are desirable for the goals of cognition include having an adequate basis, being formed in a reliable way, and coherence within bodies of belief. In Alston's view, a belief's being based on an adequate ground and its being formed in a reliable way, though often treated as competing accounts of justification, are virtually identical. Beyond "Justification" also contains discussions of fundamental questions about the epistemic status of principles and beliefs and appropriate responses to various kinds of skepticism.

Much has been written of late about what the apostle Paul really meant when he spoke of justification by faith, not the works of the law. This short study by Stephen Westerholm carefully examines proposals on the subject by Krister Stendahl, E. P. Sanders, Heikki Raisanen, N. T. Wright, James D. G. Dunn, and Douglas A. Campbell. In doing so, Westerholm notes weaknesses in traditional understandings that have provoked the more recent proposals, but he also points out areas in which the latter fail to do justice to the apostle. Readers of this book will gain not only a better grasp of the ongoing theological debate about justification but also a more nuanced overall understanding of Paul.