SCOTT (Copy 1): From the John Holmes Library Collection.

This collection of essays reflects the proceedings of a 1991 conference on "The United States Air Force: Aerospace Challenges and Missions in the 1990s," sponsored by the USAF and Tufts University. The 20 contributors comment on the pivotal role of airpower in the war with Iraq and address issues and choices facing the USAF, such as the factors that are reshaping strategies and missions, the future role and structure of airpower as an element of US power projection, and the aerospace industry's views on what the Air Force of the future will set as its acquisition priorities and strategies. The authors agree that aerospace forces will be an essential and formidable tool in US security policies into the next century. The contributors include academics, high-level military leaders, government officials, journalists, and top executives from aerospace and defense contractors.

'Why are you making this about race?' This question is repeated daily in public and in the media. Calling someone racist in these times of mounting white supremacy seems to be a worse insult than racism itself. In our supposedly post-racial society, surely it’s time to stop talking about race? This powerful refutation is a call to notice not just when and how race still matters but when, how and why it is said not to matter. Race critical scholar Alana Lentin argues that society is in urgent need of developing the skills of racial literacy, by jettisoning the idea that race is something and unveiling what race does as a key technology of modern rule, hidden in plain sight. Weaving together international examples, she eviscerates misconceptions such as reverse racism and the newfound acceptability of 'race realism', bursts the 'I’m not racist, but' justification, complicates the common criticisms of identity politics and warns against using concerns about antisemitism as a proxy for antiracism. Dominant voices in society suggest we are talking too much about race. Lentin shows why we actually need to talk about it more and how in doing so we can act to make it matter less.

This is a book about strategy and war fighting. It contains 11 essays which examine topics such as military operations against a well-armed rogue state, the potential of parallel warfare strategy for different kinds of states, the revolutionary potential of information warfare, the lethal possibilities of biological warfare and the elements of an ongoing revolution in military affairs. The purpose of the book is to focus attention on the operational problems, enemy strategies and threat that will confront U.S. national security decision makers in the twenty-first century.

Antologi. Sikkerhedspolitiske forskere giver deres vurdering af følgerne af informationsalderens opgør med hidtidig kendt våbenteknologi og doktriner i forbindelse med den globale spredning af know-how på området.

The topic of biological weapons and the issues of arms control and disarmament are addressed in Middle East regional perspective. This requires that the subject be dealt with not as a separate category but within the overall context of the Middle East military balance. This taken into consideration, the different approaches to unconventional and mixed arms control are addressed in terms of how they affect the national interests of regional states, and in what form they are most likely to appear as increasing rather than diminishing their security. The US-USSR nuclear arms control effort during the Cold War is advocated as a process model for the Middle East. It provides a way to disarm the most heavily-armed regional powers of their most dangerous weapons without damaging their respective national interests. The voluntarism inherent in this approach respects the sovereignty of the region's several states, thereby overcoming both the Israeli distrust of international organizations and treaties and the Arab distrust of the partiality of the American superpower. The further recommendation to marry the US-USSR arms control negotiation model to the Middle East theater and its long history of negotiated military agreements, beginning with the Arab-Israeli armistice agreements in 1948-49, contains the additional benefit of separating the military requirements of arms control from the political shackles of a declining Middle East peace process. Israel's objection is that the Arms Control and Regional Security Committee, part of the multilateral track of the peace process, does not include states like Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya - the states by which Israel says it is most threatened. The remodeling of Middle East arms control according to Cold War standards enables the inclusion of those proliferating states which are not prepared to enter into political and economic normalization or security cooperation with Israel, but whose arms races with Israel and with one another are creating an ever more dangerous regional environment.

Can we talk about the news media without proclaiming journalism either our savior or the source of all evil? It is not easy to do so, but it gets easier if we put the problems and prospects of journalism in historical and comparative perspective, view them with a sociological knowledge of how newsmaking operates, and see them in a political context that examines how political institutions shape news as well as how news shapes political attitudes and institutions. Adopting this approach, Michael Schudson examines news and news institutions in relation to democratic theory and practice, in relation to the economic crisis that affects so many news organizations today and in relation to recent discussions of “fake news.” In contrast to those who suggest that journalism has had its day, Schudson argues that journalism has become more important than ever for liberal democracies as the keystone institution in a web of accountability for a governmental system that invites public attention, public monitoring and public participation. For the public to be swayed from positions people have already staked out, and for government officials to respond to charges that they have behaved corruptly or unconstitutionally or simply rashly and unwisely, the source of information has to come from organizations that hold themselves to the highest standards of verification, fact-checking, and independent and original research, and that is exactly what professional journalism aspires to do. This timely and important defense of journalism will be of great value to anyone concerned about the future of news and of democracy.

This book analyzes the Franco-German security partnership in the post-Cold War era and its implications for the Western alliance. It identifies new national security policy trends in France and Germany and considers their implications for the West.

President George H. W. Bush assumed office at a critical juncture, as the Cold War came to an end and the world shifted to a new era of international relations. In The Gulf War, Spencer Bakich argues that Bush fashioned a grand strategy to bring about a New World Order designed to transform international politics by focusing on great power cooperation through the United Nations. The Persian Gulf War became the chance for Bush to put his strategy into action. This latest volume in the Landmark Presidential Decision series offers a fresh and concise look at President Bush’s strategic decision making and his choice to wage war against Iraq. Bakich, an expert in wartime strategy, traces the ideas and actions of Bush’s new world order strategy between 1989 and 1991, which had a profound impact on the diplomacy of Desert Shield and the warfighting of Desert Storm. Bush’s strategic beliefs contained core elements of Wilsonian internationalism—specifically its goals of promoting democracy, conducting multilateral diplomacy through international institutions, and transforming the United Nations into the collective security institution that its founders envisioned. His “New World Order” was not mere political sloganeering intended to bolster support for the Persian Gulf War among a skeptical American public. Rather, Bush intended the Gulf War to exercise and firmly establish the UN’s collective security function in the post–Cold War era. In this bold new interpretation of George H. W. Bush’s foreign policy, Bakich challenges conventional wisdom, arguing that Bush’s New World Order was carefully defined and had a comprehensive logic. He shows how Bush’s strategic beliefs oriented American statecraft in peace and war. Bush’s grand strategy was remarkably coherent, powerfully affecting how his administration decided to go to war to evict Iraq from Kuwait, how it waged war in the Persian Gulf, and ultimately the reasons why the fighting was terminated before the coalition’s war aims were completely achieved. In the end, the Gulf War’s outcome exposed faulty assumptions about the international system that underpinned the strategy, weakening the president’s fidelity to his own approach. Ultimately, the Gulf War did usher in a New World Order, but not the one Bush had envisioned.