In this book, Federico Sturzenegger and Mariano Tommasi propose formal models to answer some of the questions raised by the recent reform experience of many Latin American and eastern European countries.

When a stabilization has significant distributional implications (as in the case of tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit) different socio-economic groups will attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups. The process leading to a stabilization becomes a "war of attrition", with each group finding it rational to attempt to wait the others out. Stabilization occurs only when one group concedes and is forced to bear a disproportionate share of the burden of fiscal adjustment. We solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of "rational" delay based on a war of attrition and present comparative statics results relating the expected time of stabilization to several political and economic variables. We also motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical episodes

This collection of essays discuss the economic policy problems that confront postcommunist countries. Most chapters focus on liberalization of the exchange rate and trade system, macroeconomic stabilization, and institutional reform.

This book authoritatively considers the phenomenon of the severe economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s, as exemplified by the combination of high inflation and negative growth in Israel and Latin America. The author analyses the common characteristics of such processes and their possible cures–with a detailed first-hand account of Israeli stabilization policy, and a comparative policy-oriented analysis of Latin American reforms. Professor Bruno also calls on his experience to give a preliminary evaluation of recent stabilizations and reform attempts in several East European economies. The discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of `shock' treatments provides a good example for the blending of a number of disciplines: lessons of economic history; open economy monetary and macro theory; game-theoretic applications to the theory of economic policy design (concepts such as dynamic inconsistency, government reputation, and credibility); and the rationalization of incomes policy. The Clarendon Lectures in Economics were established in 1987. They consist of coherent sets of three or four lectures given by distinguished economists which are accessible to advanced undergraduates and also of interest to academics. Subjects vary from high theory and applications of theory to policy-oriented topics. Lecturers include Professors J.-M. Grandmont, David Kreps, Kenneth Arrow, Angus Deaton, Robert Schiller, and Oliver Hart.

Fiscal policy in Latin America has been guided primarily by short-term liquidity targets whose observance was taken as the main exponent of fiscal prudence, with attention focused almost exclusively on the levels of public debt and the cash deficit. Very little attention was paid to the effects of fiscal policy on growth and on macroeconomic volatility over the cycle. Important issues such as the composition of public expenditures (and its effects on growth), the ability of fiscal policy to stabilize cyclical fluctuations, and the currency composition of public debt were largely neglected. As a result, fiscal policy has often amplified cyclical volatility and dampened growth. 'Fiscal Policy, Stabilization, and Growth' explores the conduct of fiscal policy in Latin America and its consequences for macroeconomic stability and long-term growth. In particular, the book highlights the procyclical and anti-investment biases embedded in the region's fiscal policies, explores their causes and macroeconomic consequences, and asesses their possible solutions.

Macroeconomic stability is most precarious, and stabilization most likely to be delayed, where the party system is fragmented or polarized.

Comprises essays presented at a conference held in Jerusalem in 1990.

Over the last twenty years Latin America has seen a definitive movement toward civilian rule. Significant trade, fiscal, and monetary reforms have accompanied this shift, exposing previously state-led economies to the forces of the market. Despite persistent economic and political hardships, the combination of civilian regimes and market-based strategies has proved to be remarkably resilient and still dominates the region. This book focuses on the effects of market reforms on domestic politics in Latin America. While considering civilian rule as a constant, the book examines and compares domestic political responses in six countries that embraced similar packages of reforms in the 1980s—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. The contributors focus on how ambitious measures such as liberalization, privatization, and deregulation yielded mixed results in these countries and in doing so they identify three main patterns of political economic adjustment. In Argentina and Chile, the implementation of market reforms has gone hand in hand with increasingly competitive politics. In Brazil and Mexico, market reforms helped to catalyze transitions from entrenched authoritarian rule. Finally, in Peru and Venezuela, traditional political systems have collapsed and civilian rule has been repeatedly challenged. The contributors include Carol Wise (University of Southern California), Karen L. Remmer (Duke University), Carol Graham (Brookings Institution), Stefano Pettinato (United Nations Development Programme), Consuelo Cruz (Tufts University), Juan E. Corradi (New York University), Delia M. Boylan (Chicago Public Radio), Riordan Roett (Johns Hopkins University), Martín Tanaka (Institute for Peruvian Studies, Lima), and Kenneth M. Roberts (University of New Mexico).

This paper analyzes the decision of a government facing electoral uncertainty to implement structural reforms in the presence of fiscal restraints similar to the Stability and Growth Pact. The model shows that a pact may harm structural reforms, sacrificing future growth for present stability. The welfare gains brought about by a pact depend on a trade-off between the reduction in the deficit bias and the induced reduction in the amount of structural reform. A pact becomes more attractive (“smarter”) if it takes into account the fiscal impact of structural reforms, in line with a recent proposal by the European Commission.