The author argues that what is crucial to turning true belief into knowledge is the 'proper functioning' of one's cognitive faculties, and this clears the way for the proposal that a belief is warranted whenever it is the product of properly functioning cognitive processes.

Known for distinguished work in the fields of metaphysics and philosophy of religion, Alvin Plantinga ventures further into epistemology in this book and its companion volume, Warrant and Proper Function. Plantinga examines the nature of epistemic warrant; whatever it is that when added to true belief yields knowledge. This present volume surveys current contributions to the debate and paves the way for his own positive proposal in Warrant and Proper Function. This first volume serves as a good introduction to the central issues in contemporary epistemology.

In this companion volume to Warrant: The Current Debate, Alvin Plantinga develops an original approach to the question of epistemic warrant; that is what turns true belief into knowledge. He argues that what is crucial to warrant is the proper functioning of one's cognitive faculties in the right kind of cognitive environment. Although this book is in some sense a sequel to its companion volume, the arguments do not presuppose those of the first book and it stands alone as a stimulating contribution to epistemology.

Motivated by Plantinga's work, fourteen prominent philosophers have written new essays investigating Plantingian warrant and its contribution to contemporary epistemology. The resulting collection, representing a broad array of views, not only gives readers a critical perspective on Plantinga's landmark work, but also provides in one volume a clear statement of the variety of approaches to the nature of warrant within contemporary epistemology and to the connections between epistemology and metaphysics.

Describes the notion of warrant as that which distinguishes knowledge from true belief. This volume examines warrant's role in theistic belief, tackling the questions of whether it is rational, reasonable, justifiable, and warranted to accept Christian belief and whether there is something epistemically unacceptable in doing so.

Alvin Plantinga, in Warrant: The Current Debate, notes that there is a long history in Anglo-American epistemology that traces back to the classical internalist views of Rene Descartes and John Locke. Internalism is the view that an individual has special access to that quantity or quality that makes true belief into knowledge. This internalism, according to Plantinga, is motivated by deontology - or epistemic duty fulfillment. Closely connected with epistemic deontology is justification. Justification (or what Plantinga prefers to call 'warrant') is that quantity or quality, enough of which makes true belief into knowledge. Plantinga strongly objects to the deontological view of justification, claiming that no amount of duty fulfillment can get us to knowledge. He says justification is neither necessary nor sufficient for warrant. In Warrant: The Current Debate (hereafter WCD) Plantinga examines several versions of internalism - from Classical and Post-Classical Chisholmian internalism, several forms of coherentism, to reliabilism - to show that none of these views get us to that quantity or quality enough of which makes true belief into knowledge. Plantinga rejects all of these views, arguing that what is needed is a view that takes into account the proper function of our cognitive faculties. He then proposes to give a more accurate account of warrant in Warrant and Proper Function (WPF). Plantinga's theory is that a belief is warranted if it is formed by cognitive faculties functioning properly in an appropriate environment and according to a good design plan. The purpose of this book is to examine Plantinga's view of cognitive malfunction in connection with his view of warrant and his rejection of the traditional view of justification. I will argue that the cognitive faculty of reason does not and cannot malfunction in the way that Plantinga either explicitly or implicitly suggests. Consequently Plantinga's criticism of justification does not stand. I argue further that if reason is not subject to malfunction and is thus reliable, the traditional view of justification - having appropriate reasons for belief in conjunction with true belief, possibly with the addition of a fourth condition (the carefulness criterion) - will get us to knowledge.

This collection of essays and excerpts gives a comprehensive overview of Alvin Plantinga's seminal work as a Christian philosopher of religion.

This is a reissue of a book which is an exploration and defence of the notion of modality 'de re', the idea that objects have both essential and accidental properties. It is one of the first full-length studies of the modalities to emerge from the debate to which Saul Kripke, David Lewis, Ruth Marcus and others have contributed. The argument is developed by means of the notion of possible worlds, and ranges over key problems including the nature of essence, trans-world identity, negative existential propositions, and the existence of unactual objects in other possible worlds. In the final chapters Professor Plantinga applies his logical theories to the clarification of two problems in the philosophy of religion - the Problem of Evil and the Ontological Argument.

Michael Bergmann provides a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism, developing his theory of justification by imposing both a proper function and a no-defeater requirement.

In this long-awaited book, pre-eminent analytical philosopher Alvin Plantinga argues that the conflict between science and theistic religion is actually superficial, and that at a deeper level they are in concord.