This book analyzes the ways in which US policy toward Iraq was dictated by America's broader Cold War strategy between 1958 and 1975. While most historians have focused on “hot” Cold War conflicts such as Cuba, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, few have recognized Iraq's significance as a Cold War battleground. This book argues that US decisions and actions were designed to deny the Soviet Union influence over Iraq and to create a strategic base in the oil-rich Gulf region. Using newly available primary sources and interviews, this book reveals new details on America's decision-making toward and actions against Iraq during the height of the Cold War and shows where Iraq fits into the broader historiography of the Cold War in the Middle East. Further, it raises important questions about widely held misconceptions of US-Iraqi relations, such as the CIA's alleged involvement in the 1963 Ba'thist coup and the theory that the US sold out the Kurds in 1975.

Presents the findings of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, which was formed in 2006 to examine the situation in Iraq and offer suggestions for the American military's future involvement in the region.

Placing the second US-Iraq conflict in the context of emerging trends in international relations, this exceptional, timely volume examines the broad framework of US policy toward Iraq under the administration of George W. Bush. The Second Iraq War marks the third time since 1991 that the United States has invaded a Muslim country, and this book details not only the specifics of the conflict, but the war's broad impact on US relations with Muslim states, both in a regional and global context. It analyzes the development of the previous US policy of containment to the new doctrine of preemption. The volume also: ¢ Examines the linkages between Al Qaeda's attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 and the prosecution of the Second Iraq War. ¢

A career of nearly three decades with the CIA and the National Intelligence Council showed Paul R. Pillar that intelligence reforms, especially measures enacted since 9/11, can be deeply misguided. They often miss the sources that underwrite failed policy and misperceive our ability to read outside influences. They also misconceive the intelligence-policy relationship and promote changes that weaken intelligence-gathering operations. In this book, Pillar confronts the intelligence myths Americans have come to rely on to explain national tragedies, including the belief that intelligence drives major national security decisions and can be fixed to avoid future failures. Pillar believes these assumptions waste critical resources and create harmful policies, diverting attention away from smarter reform, and they keep Americans from recognizing the limits of obtainable knowledge. Pillar revisits U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War and highlights the small role intelligence played in those decisions, and he demonstrates the negligible effect that America's most notorious intelligence failures had on U.S. policy and interests. He then reviews in detail the events of 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, condemning the 9/11 commission and the George W. Bush administration for their portrayals of the role of intelligence. Pillar offers an original approach to better informing U.S. policy, which involves insulating intelligence management from politicization and reducing the politically appointed layer in the executive branch to combat slanted perceptions of foreign threats. Pillar concludes with principles for adapting foreign policy to inevitable uncertainties.

Shifts in public opinion have had an impact on U.S. foreign policy

Dr. F. Gregory Gause III has been Associate Professor of Political Science at the Department of Political Science, University of Vermont, since 1995. In 1998, he was appointed Director of Vermont’s Middle East Studies Program. His research focuses on political and social change in the Middle East, particularly the GCC countries and the countries of the Arabian Peninsula. Dr. Gause was Assistant Professor of Political Science at Columbia University from 1987 to 1992, and Associate Professor from 1992 to 1995. He acquired academic and research experience in Syria, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Israel, the Occupied Territories, Egypt and Morocco. He is proficient in Arabic. Dr. Gause has numerous publications to his credit. He contributed to various edited volumes, and his articles have been published in the Middle East Report, Foreign Affairs, the Journal of Arab Affairs, the Middle East Journal, the Journal of International Affairs and the Review of International Studies. He has published two books, Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States (1994), and Saudi-Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence (1990). The latter was translated into Arabic in 1993. From 1993 to 1994, Dr. Gause was Fellow for Arabic and Islamic Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He obtained a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University in 1987.