Excerpt from U. S. Policy and Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan: Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, Second Session The hearing today is an Opportunity to review current policies and future challenges. I hope our witnesses can provide insights into a number of questions, among them the issue of the $700 mil lion. I will also put the details of the briefings that this committee received, and it was on a bipartisan basis, with regard to the use of those funds in today's record. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.

A high-ranking general's gripping insider account of the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how it all went wrong. Over a thirty-five-year career, Daniel Bolger rose through the army infantry to become a three-star general, commanding in both theaters of the U.S. campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. He participated in meetings with top-level military and civilian players, where strategy was made and managed. At the same time, he regularly carried a rifle alongside rank-and-file soldiers in combat actions, unusual for a general. Now, as a witness to all levels of military command, Bolger offers a unique assessment of these wars, from 9/11 to the final withdrawal from the region. Writing with hard-won experience and unflinching honesty, Bolger makes the firm case that in Iraq and in Afghanistan, we lost -- but we didn't have to. Intelligence was garbled. Key decision makers were blinded by spreadsheets or theories. And, at the root of our failure, we never really understood our enemy. Why We Lost is a timely, forceful, and compulsively readable account of these wars from a fresh and authoritative perspective.

A colloquium on "U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat, and Occupation" was held November 2, 2005, and was co-sponsored by SSI and Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Three years beyond the start of that transition, the debate continues about the adequacy of planning for and proficiency of execution of Phase IV operations in Iraq and elsewhere. The debate most often surrounds three issues concerning this final operational phase: the relationship to preceding operational phases; responsibility for planning; and responsibility for execution. Much of the debate to this point has been an unproductive effort to assign blame for shortcomings in the planning for and execution of stability and reconstruction operations; participants in the colloquium moved beyond finding fault, began analyzing the central issues, and addressed solutions.

Witnesses: Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec. of Defense; Gen. Richard B. Myers, USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; & Marc Grossman, Under Sec. of State for Political Affairs.

This book provides information and analysis with respect to the 2003 war with Iraq, reviews a number of war-related issues, and provides links to additional sources of information. Contents: Introduction; US Policy: The Administration; Congressional Action; Issues fir Congress: Military Issues; Diplomatic Issues; Weapons of Mass Destruction Issues; Post-War Governance Issues; Burden Sharing; Implications for the Middle East; Humanitarian Issues; Humanitarian Assistance: Relief Operations; Post-War Relief Priorities; International and Domestic Legal Issues Relating to the Use of Force; Cost Issues; Oil Supply Issues; Information Resources; Index.

How have the costs, both human and material, of US involvement in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq affected the country's will for conducting regime-change operations? What are the implications for issues of strategy? This book assesses the impact of the two conflicts on US foreign policy, military planning, and capacities for counterinsurgency and state building.

This is the first academic analysis of the role of embedded media in the 2003 Iraq War, providing a concise history of US military public affairs management since Vietnam.In late summer 2002, the Pentagon considered giving the press an inside view of the upcoming invasion of Iraq. The decision was surprising, and the innovative "embedded media prog