This book presents a thorough analysis of US intelligence reforms and their effects on national security and civil liberties.

The publication of The 9/11 Commission Report, the war in Iraq, and subsequent negotiation of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 have provoked the most intense debate over the future of American intelligence since the end of World War II. For observers of this national discussion—as well as of future debates that are all but inevitable—this paper offers a historical perspective on reform studies and proposals that have appeared over the course of the US Intelligence Community's evolution into its present form. We have examined the origins, context, and results of 14 significant official studies that have surveyed the American intelligence system since 1947. We explore the reasons these studies were launched, the recommendations they made, and the principal results that they achieved. It should surprise no one that many of the issues involved—such as the institutional relationships between military and civilian intelligence leaders—remain controversial to the present time. For this reason, we have tried both to clarify the perennial issues that arise in intelligence reform efforts and to determine those factors that favor or frustrate their resolution. Of the 14 reform surveys we examined, only the following achieved substantial success in promoting the changes they proposed: the Dulles Report (1949), the Schlesinger Report (1971), the Church Committee Report (1976), and the 9/11 Commission Report (2004). Having examined these and other surveys of the Intelligence Community, we recognize that much of the change since 1947 has been more ad hoc than systematically planned. Our investigation indicates that to bring about significant change, a study commission has had to get two things right: process and substance. Two studies that had large and comparatively rapid effects—the 1949 Dulles Report and the 1971 Schlesinger Report—were both sponsored by the National Security Council. The 9/11 Commission, with its public hearings in the midst of an election season, had even more impact, while the Church Committee's effects were indirect but eventually powerful. It's perhaps worth noting that a study commission whose chairman later became DCI, as in the case of Allen Dulles and James Schlesinger, is also likely to have a lasting influence. Finally, studies conducted on the eve of or during a war, or in a war's immediate aftermath, are more likely to lead to change. The 1947 National Security Act drew lessons from World War II, and it was the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 that brought about the intelligence reforms the Dulles Report had proposed over a year earlier. The 1971 Schlesinger Report responded to President Nixon's need to cut spending as he extracted the United States from the Vietnam War. The breakdown of the Cold War defense and foreign policy consensus during the Vietnam War set the scene for the Church Committee's investigations during 1975–76, but the fact that US troops were not in combat at the time certainly diminished the influence of its conclusions. In contrast, the 9/11 Commission Report was published at the height of a national debate over the War on Terror and the operations in Iraq, which magnified its salience. Finally, in the substance of these reports, one large trend is evident over the years. Studies whose recommendations have caused power in the Intelligence Community to gravitate toward either the Director of Central Intelligence or the Office of the Secretary of Defense—or both—have generally had the most influence. This pattern of increasing concentration of intelligence power in the DCI and Secretary of Defense endured from the 1940s through the 1990s, whether Democrats or Republicans controlled the White House or Congress. When a new pattern of influence and cooperation forms, we are confident that future reform surveys will not hesitate to propose ways to improve it.

Amy Zegart examines the weaknesses of US intelligence oversight and why those deficiencies have persisted, despite the unprecedented importance of intelligence in today's environment. She argues that many of the biggest oversight problems lie with Congress—the institution, not the parties or personalities—showing how Congress has collectively and persistently tied its own hands in overseeing intelligence.

Documents the institutional growth of the intelligence community under Directors Walter Bedell Smith and Allen W. Dulles, and demonstrates how Smith, through his prestige, ability to obtain national security directives from a supportive President Truman, and bureaucratic acumen, truly transformed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The United States is transitioning from an industrial age to an information age military. This transition requires transformation in warfighting and the way we organize to support the warfighter. Although the end-state of transformation cannot be fully defined in advance, we do know some of the necessary prerequisites for transformation. In particular, we know that early transformation requires exploiting information technology to reform defense business practices and to create new combinations of capabilities, operating concepts, organizational relationships and training regimes. Successful transformation of U.S. military forces and Department of Defense (DoD) processes requires a strategy with clear objectives. Effective implementation of the strategy requires commitment and attention from the Department's senior leadership and clearly assigned roles and responsibilities. This document communicates the Department's strategy for transformation and assigns senior leader roles and responsibilities to ensure implementation of the strategy. Senior leadership commitment to transformation will mobilize the rest of the Department and stimulate the bottom-up innovation required for successful transformation. Effective implementation of the transformation strategy is an essential prerequisite for strategic management of the Defense program. It will allow the Department to define transformation investments that address future risk with enough specificity that they can be balanced against the other three primary risk areas identified in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): force management, operational, and institutional risk.

Examines the planning and budgeting processes of the United States. This title describes the planning and resource integration activities of the White House, reviews the adequacy of the structures and process and makes proposals for ways both might be reformed to fit the demands of the 21st century security environment.

The intelligence community (IC) plays an essential role in the national security of the United States. Decision makers rely on IC analyses and predictions to reduce uncertainty and to provide warnings about everything from international diplomatic relations to overseas conflicts. In today's complex and rapidly changing world, it is more important than ever that analytic products be accurate and timely. Recognizing that need, the IC has been actively seeking ways to improve its performance and expand its capabilities. In 2008, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) asked the National Research Council (NRC) to establish a committee to synthesize and assess evidence from the behavioral and social sciences relevant to analytic methods and their potential application for the U.S. intelligence community. In Intelligence Analysis for Tomorrow: Advances from the Behavioral and Social Sciences, the NRC offers the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) recommendations to address many of the IC's challenges. Intelligence Analysis for Tomorrow asserts that one of the most important things that the IC can learn from the behavioral and social sciences is how to characterize and evaluate its analytic assumptions, methods, technologies, and management practices. Behavioral and social scientific knowledge can help the IC to understand and improve all phases of the analytic cycle: how to recruit, select, train, and motivate analysts; how to master and deploy the most suitable analytic methods; how to organize the day-to-day work of analysts, as individuals and teams; and how to communicate with its customers. The report makes five broad recommendations which offer practical ways to apply the behavioral and social sciences, which will bring the IC substantial immediate and longer-term benefits with modest costs and minimal disruption.

The documents contained within this updated edition incorporate all amendments since the release of Winter 2012 version through February 26, 2016 and verified against the United States Code maintained by the United States Library of Congress and Westlaw private company. The documents cited in this volume range from principles of professional ethics and transparency for the Intelligence Community, several Acts including the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 that includes information sharing, privacy, and civil liberties, and security clearances, plus Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 1994, Classified Information Procedures Act, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Cybersecurity Act of 2015, numerous executive orders, presidential policy directives, and more. American citizens, law enforcement, especially U.S. Federal agency personnel that engage with intelligence surveillance, classified information, and national security efforts may be interested in this updated edition. Additionally, attorneys, civil servants involved within information technology departments, and records management may also be interested in this resource. Students pursuing courses in the areas of Ethics in Criminal Justice, Computer Forensics, Criminal Law in Criminal Justice, Homeland Security and Terrorism, Information Storage and Retrieval, Computer Security, or Military Science may be interested in this reference for research. Lastly, public, special, and academic libraries may want this legal reference available for their patrons. Related products: Intelligence Community Legal Reference Book, Winter 2012 - Limited quantities while supplies last - can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/041-015-00278-3 Intelligence and Espionage resources collection is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/security-defense-law-enforcement/intelligence-espionage Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice topical books can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/security-defense-law-enforcement/law-enforcement-criminal-justice Mail & Communications Security collection is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/security-defense-law-enforcement/mail-communications-security