Merriam Press World War 2 History. It wasn't that the US was mentally and materially unready for war. We weren't ready for the war we got. To say the USA was mentally and physically unprepared for World War II is an understatement. Details the history of the lead-up and beginning of war between the Empire of Japan and the United States. This is essentially a photo book with accompanying text. What Stanley offers, to both the casual reader and the military history buff, is his experience as a photo interpreter to draw information from the imagery. Because aerial photos are often difficult to research and understand without proper training, they are a seldom-used contributor to the study of military history. Stanley considers photos an "original source" equal to first-hand testimony. From the 1800s to Pearl Harbor, Stanley thoroughly explains how Japan and America entered into a war they did not want. Hundreds of photos and illustrations.

Although events in East Asia were a sideshow in the great drama of World War I, what happened there shattered the accord between Japan and the United States. This book pursues the two-fold question of how and why U.S.-Japanese tensions developed into antagonism during the war by inquiring into the historical sources of both sides. Kawamura explains this complex phenomenon by looking at various factors: conflicts of national interests—geopolitical and economic; perceptual problems such as miscommunication, miscalculation, and mistrust; and, most important of all, incompatible approaches to foreign policy. America's universalism and the unilateralism inherent in Wilsonian idealistic internationalism clashed with Japan's particularistic regionalism and the pluralism that derived from its strong sense of racial identity and anti-Western nationalistic sentiments. By looking at the motives and circumstances behind Japan's expansionist policy in East Asia, Kawamura suggests some of the centrifugal forces that divided the nations and challenged the premise of Wilsonian internationalism. At the same time, through critical examination of the Wilson administration's universalist and unilateral response to Japan's actions, she raises serious questions about the effectiveness of American foreign policy. At the close of the 20th century, after 50 years of Cold War, those in search of a new world order tend to resort to Wilsonian rhetoric. This book suggests that it can be unwise to apply a universalistic and idealistic approach to international conflicts that often result from extreme nationalism, regionalism, and racial rivalry.

On July 14, 1853, the four warships of America's East Asia Squadron made for Kurihama, 30 miles south of the Japanese capital, then called Edo. It had come to pry open Japan after her two and a half centuries of isolation and nearly a decade of intense planning by Matthew Perry, the squadron commander. The spoils of the recent Mexican Spanish–American War had whetted a powerful American appetite for using her soaring wealth and power for commercial and political advantage. Perry's cloaking of imperial impulse in humanitarian purpose was fully matched by Japanese self–deception. High among the country's articles of faith was certainty of its protection by heavenly power. A distinguished Japanese scholar argued in 1811 that "Japanese differ completely from and are superior to the peoples of...all other countries of the world." So began one of history's greatest political and cultural clashes. In Breaking Open Japan, George Feifer makes this drama new and relevant for today. At its heart were two formidable men: Perry and Lord Masahiro Abe, the political mastermind and real authority behind the Emperor and the Shogun. Feifer gives us a fascinating account of "sealed off" Japan and shows that Perry's aggressive handling of his mission had far reaching consequences for Japan – and the United States – well into the twentieth if not twenty–first century.

Early on Sunday, 7 December 1941, the air and naval forces of the Imperial Japanese Navy attacked the U.S. Pacific Fleet at anchor in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) recorded the day as “a date which will live in infamy” in his speech to a joint session of Congress. Subsequent investigations and histories judged U.S. intelligence as unprepared in its failure to predict the attack at Pearl Harbor. Yet FDR also listed the other locations Japan attacked in those first twenty-four hours starting with the attack at Kota Bharu in Malaya. Reviewing U.S. intelligence estimates and “war warning” messages against Imperial Japanese war plans and actions, U.S. intelligence understood Imperial Japan’s intentions and plans far better than is recorded. Of the places listed in the 27 November 1941 “war warning”—”the Philippines, Thai or Kra [Malay] Peninsula and possibly Borneo”—two were attacked on that first day of war and the last, Borneo, a week later. On that first day of war, Japan also attacked Guam, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Wake and Midway Islands, the latter two reinforced against impending war with Japan in early December 1941 by U.S. aircraft carriers. The surprise of the attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet overshadows the accuracy of U.S. intelligence estimates prior to the Pacific War.

This gripping blow-by-blow account of a war between the United States and Japan, originally published in 1925, predicted actual events. Writing 16 years before the japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, Bywater, the world's leading naval authority in the period between the two world wars, prophesied a Japanese surprise attack on the U.S. in the Pacific, while simultaneously invading the Phillippines and Guam.

Makes sense of Japan's seemingly incomprehensible decision to go to war against the United States.

"Although this book portrays the course of an imaginary war between the United States and Japan, it has not been written to support the view that such a conflict is either close at hand or inevitable. No doubt there are elements of danger in the immigration controversy, while further causes of friction may attend the growth of American commercial enterprise in the Far East."--Preface.

From 1899 until the American entry into World War II, U.S. presidents sought to preserve China's territorial integrity in order to guarantee American businesses access to Chinese markets -- a policy famously known as the "open door." Before the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, Americans saw Japan as the open door's champion; but by the end of 1905, Tokyo had replaced St. Petersburg as its greatest threat. For the next thirty-six years, successive U.S. administrations worked to safeguard China and contain Japanese expansion on the mainland. The Currents of War reexamines the relationship between the United States and Japan and the casus belli in the Pacific through a fresh analysis of America's central foreign policy strategy in Asia. In this ambitious and compelling work, Sidney Pash offers a cautionary tale of oft-repeated mistakes and miscalculations. He demonstrates how continuous economic competition in the Asia-Pacific region heightened tensions between Japan and the United States for decades, eventually leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Pash's study is the first full reassessment of pre--World War II American-Japanese diplomatic relations in nearly three decades. It examines not only the ways in which U.S. policies led to war in the Pacific but also how this conflict gave rise to later confrontations, particularly in Korea and Vietnam. Wide-ranging and meticulously researched, this book offers a new perspective on a significant international relationship and its enduring consequences.

Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.

This is a probing narrative of the history which came to its climax at Pearl harbor; an account of the attitudes and actions, of the purposes and persons which brought about the war between the United States and Japan. It is full and impartial. Though written as an independent and private study, records and information of an exceptional range and kind were used in its making. These give it authority. They include all the pertinent State Department papers; the American official military records in preparation; selections from the Roosevelt papers at Hyde Park; the full private diaries of Stimons, Morgenthau, and Grew; the file of the intercepted "Magic" cables; and equivalent collections of official and private Japanese records. The author was at the time in the State Department (as Adviser on International Economic Affairs) and thus in close touch with the men and matters of which he writes. In telling how this war came about, this book tells much of how other wars happen. For it is a close study of the ways in which officials, diplomats, and soldiers think and act; of the environment of decision, of the ambitions of nations, of the clash of their ideas, of the way sin which fear and mistrust affect events, and of the struggle for time and advantage. The narrative follows events in a double mirror of which one side is Washington and the other Tokyo, and synchronizes the images. Thus it traces the ways in which the acts and decisions of this country influenced Japan and vice versa. Originally published in 1950. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.