The journal 'Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism' was founded in 1995 and has since offered policy-relevant and theoretically advanced articles aimed at both academic and practitioner audiences. This collection presents some of the most significant pieces published in the journal, addressing topics ranging from human rights and peacekeeping to trade and development - often examining the evolution of the institutional arrangements themselves. Authors include senior UN officials, prominent scholars, and other careful students of international organization. By presenting these twenty-five articles - one from each year since the journal?s founding - in one volume (with an Introduction by by the two editors Kurt Mills and Kendall Stiles) we hope that the reader will be able to better appreciate the evolution of both global institutions and our thinking about them.

This 2004 book aims at advancing our understanding of the influences international norms and international institutions have over the incentives of states to cooperate on issues such as environment and trade. Contributors adopt two different approaches in examining this question. One approach focuses on the constitutive elements of the international legal order, including customary international law, soft law and framework conventions, and on the types of incentives states have, such as domestic incentives and reputation. The other approach examines specific issues in the areas of international environment protection and international trade. The combined outcome of these two approaches is an understanding of the forces that pull states toward closer cooperation or prevent them from doing so, and the impact of different types of international norms and diverse institutions on the motivation of states. The insights gained suggest ways for enhancing states' incentives to cooperate through the design of norms and institutions.

The notion of regimes as institutions that shape international behavior has received much attention from scholars in the field of international relations as a way of understanding how sovereign states secure international cooperation. Oran Young here seeks both to develop our theoretical grasp of international regimes and to expand the range of empirical applications of this line of analysis.

This work is a collection of twenty-five articles previously published in Global Governance - one from each year of the journal’s existence – highlighting some of the best work published in the journal, along with an Introduction by the two editors Kurt Mills and Kendall Stiles.

The twenty-first century global community is confronted with unprecedented challenges as well as unique opportunities. The degree to which it can establish and institutionalize norms and mechanisms designed to promote and sustain meaningful global cooperation will determine the future course of civilization. This volume brings together a broad range of scholars to highlight some of the areas of contemporary transnational cooperation and to examine the scope and levels at which cooperation can and does take place. The study examines the issue of weapons of mass destruction, explores the promises of biotechnology and space technology, and investigates the roles of global conventions and institutions as strategies for addressing the common threats facing the international system. In short, the volume raises important, timely issues regarding the challenges and opportunities confronting the global community which both policy makers and academicians will find informative and thought-provoking in their efforts to understand the nature and complexity of the twenty-first century global community.

A famed political scientist's classic argument for a more cooperative world We assume that, in a world ruled by natural selection, selfishness pays. So why cooperate? In The Evolution of Cooperation, political scientist Robert Axelrod seeks to answer this question. In 1980, he organized the famed Computer Prisoners Dilemma Tournament, which sought to find the optimal strategy for survival in a particular game. Over and over, the simplest strategy, a cooperative program called Tit for Tat, shut out the competition. In other words, cooperation, not unfettered competition, turns out to be our best chance for survival. A vital book for leaders and decision makers, The Evolution of Cooperation reveals how cooperative principles help us think better about everything from military strategy, to political elections, to family dynamics.

Scholars have long argued that transparency makes international rule violations more visible and improves outcomes. Secrets in Global Governance revises this claim to show how equipping international organizations (IOs) with secrecy can be a critical tool for eliciting sensitive information and increasing cooperation. States are often deterred from disclosing information about violations of international rules by concerns of revealing commercially sensitive economic information or the sources and methods used to collect intelligence. IOs equipped with effective confidentiality systems can analyze and act on sensitive information while preventing its wide release. Carnegie and Carson use statistical analyses of new data, elite interviews, and archival research to test this argument in domains across international relations, including nuclear proliferation, international trade, justice for war crimes, and foreign direct investment. Secrets in Global Governance brings a groundbreaking new perspective to the literature of international relations.

"A readable, balanced, and provocative view of the prospects for fruitful international economic cooperation. The papers are realistic: each discusses the difficulties involved in reaching cooperative solutions or procedures as well as the benefits of doing so. The discussion among the conference participants is lively, interesting, and insightful."--William H. Branson, Princeton University